### U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Technical Information Service

AD-A026 275

STORAGE RELIABILITY OF MISSILE MATERIEL PROGRAM STORAGE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT VOLUME I. ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES


RAYTHEON COMPANY

PREPARED FOR
ARMY MISSILE COMMAND

May 1976



# STORAGE RELIABILITY OF MISSILE MATERIEL PROGRAM



REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161



RAYTHEON COMPANY EQUIPMENT DIVISION

LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA

### STORAGE RELIABILITY

0F

### MISSILE MATERIEL PROGRAM

STORAGE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
SUMMARY REPORT
VOLUME I
ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC DEVICES

LC-76-2

May 1976

Prepared by: Dennis F. Malik
Approved by: Donald R. Earles

FOR

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY MISSILE COMMAND
REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA



IN COMPLIANCE WITH
CONTRACT NO. DAAHO1-74-C-0853
DATED 4 JUNE 1974
DATA ITEM SEQUENCE NO. 3

RAYTHEON COMPANY EQUIPMENT DIVISION

LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA

### ABSTRACT

This report summarizes analyses on the non-operating reliability of missile materiel. Long term non-operating data has been analyzed together with accelerated storage life test data. Reliability prediction models have been developed for various classes of devices.

This report is a result of a program whose objective is the development of non-operating (storage) reliability prediction and assurance techniques for missile material. The analysis results will be used by U. S. Army personnel and contractors in evaluating current missile programs and in the design of future missile systems.

The storage reliability research program consists of a country wide data survey and collection effort, accelerated testing, special test programs and development of a non-operating reliability data bank at the U.S. Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. The Army plans a continuing effort to maintain the data bank and analysis reports.

For more information, contact:

Commander

U. S. Army Missile Command


ATTN: DRSMI-QSD, Mr. C. R. Provence

Building 4500

Redstone Arsenal, AL 35809

Autovon 746-3235

or (205) 876-3235



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

# VOLUME I

1.0	INTR	ODUCTION	1-1
	1.1	Missile Reliability Considerations	1-1
	1.2	Storage Reliability Research Program	11
	1.3	Missile Environments	1-2
	1.4	System Level Analysis	1-4
	1.5	Limitations of Reliability Prediction	1-5
	1.6	Life Cycle Reliability Prediction	
		Modeling	1-5
	1.7	Reliability Predictions During Early	
		Design	1-8
2.0	MICR	OELECTRONIC DEVICES & INTERCONNECTIONS	2.1-1
	2.1	Monolithic Microelectronic Storage Re-	
		liability Analysis	2.1-1
	2.2	Monolithic Integrated Circuits Opera-	
		tional Prediction Model	2.2-1
	2.3	Hybrid Integrated Circuits Storage Re-	
		liability Analysis	2.3-1
	2.4	Hybrid Integrated Circuits Operational	
		Prediction Model	2.4-1
	2.5	Operational/Non-Operational Failure	
		Rate Comparison	2.5-1
	2.6	Conclusions & Recommendations	2.6-1
	2.7	References	2.7-1
3.0	DISC	RETE SEMICONDUCTORS	3.1-1
	3.1	Storage Reliability Analysis	3.1-1
`•	3.2	Discrete Semiconductor Operational	
		Prediction Models	3.2-1
	3.3	Operational/Non-Operational Failure	
		Rate Comparisons	3.3-1
4.0	ELEC	TRONIC VACUUM TUBES	4.1-1
	4.1	Storage Reliability Analysis	4.1-1
	4.2	Electronic Vacuum Tubes Operational	
		Prediction Model	4.2-1
	4.3	Operational/Non-Operational Failure	
		Rate Comparison	4.3-1

# TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)

5.0	RESI	STORS	5.1-1
	5.1	Storage Reliability Analysis	5.1-1
	5.2	Resistor Operational Prediction Models	5.2-1
	5.3	Operational/Non-Operational Failure	
		Rate Comparison	5.3-1
6.0	CAPA	CITORS	6.1-1
	6.1	Storage Reliability Analysis	6.1-1
	6.2	Capacitor Operational Prediction Models	s 6.2-1
	6.3	Operational/Non-Operational Failure	
		Rate Comparison	6.3-1
7.0	INDU	CTIVE DEVICES	7.1-1
	7.1	Storage Reliability Analysis	7.1-1
	7.2	Inductive Devices Operational Prediction	on
		Models	7.2-1
	7.3	Operational/Non-Operational Failure	
		Rate Comparisons	7.3-1
8.0	CRYS	TALS	8.0-1
	8.1	Storage Reliability Analysis	8.0-1
	8.2	Operational Failure Rate Information	8.0-1
	8.3	Operational/Non-Operational Failure	
		Rate Comparison	8.0-1
9.0	BATT	ERIES	9.1-1
	9.1	Storage Reliability Analysis	9.1-1
	9.2	Operational Failure Rate Data	9.2-1
10.0	CONN	ections & connectors	10.1-1
	10.1	Storage Reliability Analysis	10.1-1
	10.2	Connector and Connection Operational	
		Prediction Models	10.2-1
	10.3	Operational/Non-Operational Failure	
		Rate Comparisons	10.3-1
11.0	PRIN	TED WIRING BOARDS	11.1-1
	11.1	Storage Reliability Analysis	11.1-1
	11.2	Printed Wiring Boards Operational	
		Prediction Model	11.2-1
	11.3	Operational/Non-Operational Failure	
		Rate Comparison	11.3-1

# TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)

11.4 Conclusions and Recommendations 11.4-1

APPENDIX A - Environment Description

# FIGURES

FIGURE		PAGE NO.
2.1-1	Typical Planar Microelectronic Device Cross Section	2.1-2
2.1-2	Monolithic Bipolar SSI/MSI Device Non-Operational Failure Rate Prediction Model (for Aluminum Metallization/Aluminum Wire System)	2.1-25
2.1-3	Monolithic Bipolar SSI/MSI Device Non-Opera- tional Failure Rate Prediction Model (for Aluminum Metallization/Gold Wire System)	2.1-26
2.2-1	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Monolithic Bipolar Digital SSI/MSI Integrated Circuits (TTL, DTL, etc., excludes Beam Lead and ECL)	2.2-4
2.2-2	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Monolithic Bipolar Beam Lead, Bipolar ECL and MOS Digital SSI/MSI Integrated Circuits	2.2-5
2.2-3	MIL-HOBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Monolithic Bipolar and MOS Linear SSI/MSI Integrated Circuits	2.2-6
2.2-4	<ul> <li>MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Monolithic Bipolar LSI Integrated Circuits (TTL, DTL, etc., excludes Beam Lead and ECI'</li> </ul>	2.2-7
2.2-5	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Monolithic Bipolar Beam Lead, Bipolar ECL and MOS Integrated Circuits	2.2-8
2.2-6	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Bipolar Memories (TTL, DTL, etc., excludes Bipolar Beam Lead and Bipolar ECL)	2.2-9
2.2-7	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Bipolar Beam Lead, Bipolar ECL and MOS Memories	2.2-10
2.4-1	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Hybrid Microelectronic Devices	2.4-6
2.5-1	Monolithic Bipolar Digital Devices Operational/ Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparison	2.5-2
2.5-2	Monolithic Bipolar Linear Devices Operational/ Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparison	2.5-5
3.1-1	Non-Operational Failure Prediction Model for Transistors (includes Silicon NPN & PNP, and Germanium NPN and PNP)	3.1-4

<b>K</b> _	FIGURE NO.	<u>P.</u>	AGE NO.
	3.1-2.	Non-Operational Failure Rate Prediction Model for Field Effect Transistors	3.1-5
	3.1-3	Non-Operational Failure Rate Prediction Model for General Purpose Silicon and Germanium Diodes	3.1-6
	3,1-4	Non-Operational Failure Rate Prediction Model for Zener and Avalanche Diodes	3.1-7
	3.1-5	Non-Operational Failure Rate Prediction Model for Microwave Diodes	3.1-8
	3.2-1	MTL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Silicon NPN Transistors	3.2-6
	3.2-2	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Silicon PNP Transistors	3.2-7
	3.2-3	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Germanium PNP Transistors	3.2-8
	3.2-4	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Germanium NPN Transistors	3.2-9
	3.2-5	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Field Effect Transistors	3.2-10
	3.2-6	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Unijunction Transistors	3.2-11
	3.2-7	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Silicon (General Purpose) Diodes	3.2-12
	3.2-8	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Germanium (General Purpose) Diodes	3.2-13
	3.2-9	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Zener and Avalanche Diodes	3.2-14
	3.2-10	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Thyristors	3.2-15
	3.2-13	M. ADBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Bilicon Microwave Detectors	3.2-16
	3.2-3.	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Germanium Microwave Detectors	3.2-17
	3.2-13	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Silicon Microwave Mixers	3.2-18
	3.2-14	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Germanium Microwave Mixers	3,2-19
	3.2-15	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Varactors, Step Recovery & Tunnel Diodes	3.2-20
,	3.2-16	Conventional Derating Curve	3.2~22
(	3.2-17	Multipoint Derating Curve for IN3263 Power Diode	3.2-23
	4.2-1	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Electronic Vacuum Tubes	4.2-2

FIGURE		PAGE NO.
5.2-1	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Insulated Fixed Composition Resistors (MIL-R-39008, Style RCR and MIL-R-11, Style RC)	5.2-7
5.2-2	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Fixed Film (Insulated) Resistors (MIL-R-39017, Style RLR and MIL-R-22684, Style RL)	5.2-8
5.2-3	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Fixed Film Resistors (MIL-R-55182, Style RNR and MIL-R-10509, Style RN)	5.2-9
5.2-4	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Power Film Resistors (MIL-R-11804, Style RD/P)	5.2-10
5.2-5	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Fixed, Wirewound (Accurate) Resistors (MIL-R-39005, Style RBR and MIL-R-93, Style RB)	5.2-11
5.2-6	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Fixed, Wirewound (Power Type) Resistors (MIL-R-39007, Style RWR and MIL-R-26, Style RW)	5.2-12
5.2-7	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Fixed, Wirewound (Power Type, Chassis Mounted) Resistors (MIL-R-39009, Style RER and MIL-R-18546, Style RE)	5.2-13
5.2-8	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Thermistors (Beam and Disk Type) (MIL-T-23648, Style RTH)	5.2-14
5.2-9	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Variable, Wire Wound, (Lead Screw Actuated) Resistors (MIL-R-39015, Style RTR and MIL-R-27208, Style RT)	5.2-15
5-2-10	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Precision Wirewound Potentiometers (MIL-R-12934, Style RR)	5.2-16
5.2-11	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Semiprecision Wirewound Potentiometers (MIL-R-19, Style RA and MIL-R-39002, Style RK)	5.2-17
5.2-12	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Mcdel for Power, Wirewound Potentiometers (MIL-R-22, Style RP)	5.2-18
5.2-13	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Variable (Non Wirewound Trimmers) Resist-ors (MIL-R-22097, Style RJ)	5.2-19

AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER

()

Branch Commission of the Commi

<b>i</b> ,,	FIGURE		PAGE NO.
	5.2-14	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Composition (Low Precision) Potentiometers (MIL-R-94, Style RV)	5.2-20
	6.2-1	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Paper & Plastic Film Capacitors -65°C Max, Rated (MIL-C-14157, Style CPV07 and MIL-C- 19978, Style CQ08, 09, 12, 13 -Characteristic P)	6.2-5
	6.2-la	Equivalent Temperature Increase for Effects of AC or Pulses for Paper & Plastic Film Capacitors (applicable to MIL-C-14157 & MIL-C-19978, Chars. E, K, M & Q; MIL-C-39022, all styles)	6.2-6
	6.2-1b	Basic Restriction on Use of Paper & Plastic Film Capacitors in AC applications (applicable only to MIL-C-14157 & MIL-C-19978, Chars. E, K, M & Q; MIL-C-39022, all styles)	6.2-6
	6.7-2	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Paper and Plastic Film Capacitors -85°C Max Rated (MIL-C-14157, Style CPV17; MIL-C-39022, Style CHR09 (50 volt rated), CH R39 & 49; MIL-C-19978, Style CQ08, 09, 12, 13, chars. M, CQ 72 chars. E, CDR 32 & 33)	6.2-7
	6.2-3	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Paper and Plastic Film Capacitors -125°C Max Rated (MIL-C-39022, Style CHR09 (above 50 volt rated), CHR01, 12, 19, 29 & 59; MIL-C-19978, Style CQ08, 09, 12, 13, 20, 72 - chars. K, CQ06 & 07-chars. Q, CQR01, 07, 09, 12, 13, 19, 39, & 42)	6.2-8
	6.2-4	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Mica Capacitors (MIL-C-5, Style CM (molded) and MIL-C-39001, Style CMR (dipped)	6.2-9
	6.2-5	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Button Mica Capacitors (MIL-C-10950, Style CB)	6.2-10
	6.2-6	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Glass Capacitors (MIL-C-23269, Style CYR)	6.2-11
	6.2-7	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Ceramic (General Purpose) Capacitors -85°C Max Rated (MIL-C-11015, 'A' rated temperature; MIL-C-39014, Style CKR 13, 48, 64 & 72)	6.2-12
ž	6.2-8	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Ceramic (General Purpose) -125°C Max Rated (MIL-C-11015, 'B' rated temperature; MIL-C-39014, Styles CKRO5-12, 14-16, 17-19, 73 & 74)	6.2-13

FIGURE		PAGE NO.	U
6.2-9	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Ceramic (General Purpose) - 150°C Max Rated (MIL-C-11015, 'C' rated temperature)	6.2-14	
6.2-10	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Ceramic, Temperature Compensating Capacitors (MIL-C-20, Style CC)	6.2-15	
6.2-11	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Tantalum Electrolytic (Solid) Capacitors (MIL-C-39003, Style CSR)	6.2-16	•
6.2-12	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Tantalum Electrolytic (Non-Solid) Capacitors (MIL-C-39006, Style CLR and MIL-C-3965, Style CL)	6.2-17	
6.2-13	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Aluminum Electrolytic Capacitors (MIL-C- 39018, Style CU (Aluminum Oxide))	6.2-18	,
6.2-14	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Aluminum Dry Electrolytic Capacitors (MII-C-62)	6.2-19	
6.2-15	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Variable Ceramic Capacitors (MIL-C-81)	6.2-20	
6.2-16	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Variable, Piston Type (Tubular Trimmer) Capacitors (MIL-C-14409)	6.2-21	,
7.2-1	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for MIL-T-27, Transformers and Inductors (Audio, Power & Hi Power Pulse) and MIL-C- 15305, Coils, Radio Frequency	7.2-5	
7.2-2	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for MIL-T-21038, Transformers, Pulse, Low Power	7.2-6	
7.2-3	Power Loss and Radiating Area Known: Estimate Average Temp .rature-Rise (Step 1A)	7.2-10	
7.2-4	Power Loss and Case Symbol Known: Estimate Average Temperature-Rise (Step 1B)	7.2-11	
7.2-5	Power Loss and Weight Known: Estimate Average Temperature-Rise (Step 1C)	7.2-12	ţ
7.2-6	Power Input and Weight Known: Estimate Average Temperature-Rise (Based on 80 percent efficiency (Step 1D)	7.2~13 )	

(j	FIGURE		PAGE NO.
	10.2-1	MIL-HDbK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model for Connectors	10.2-7
	10.2-2	Connections Operational Failure Rate Predictions	10.2-7
	10.2-3	Best Connections Failure Rates from LC-76-EM5	10.2-7
	11.2-1	MIL-HDBK-217B Operational Failure Rate Model	11.2-2

A CONTROL OF THE PROPERTY OF T

4.

# TABLES

modeline stan steadakta mirtimassa albefadish sebindhanish Ashkas periodish nembih nembih ke kesasa

TABLE		PAGE NO.
1-1	Report Contents	1-9
2.1-1	Device Classification	2.1-3
2.1-2	Monolithic Device Failure Mechanisms	2.1-12
2.1-3	Aluminum Metallization, Aluminum Wire Non- Operating Data	2.1-29
2.1-4	Aluminum Metallization, Gold Wire Non- Operating Data	2.1-29
2.1-5	Gold Metallization, Gold Wire Non-Operating Data	2.1-30
2.1-6	Gold Beam Lead Sealed Junction Non-Operating Data	2.1-30
2.1-7	Principle Failure Mechanisms	2.1-30
2.1-8	Aluminum Metallization, Aluminum Wire Non- Operating Data	2.1-32
2.1-9	Aluminum Metallization, Gold Wire Non- Operating Data	2.1-32
2.1-10	Metallization Type Unknown	2.1-32
2.1-11	MOS SSI/MSI Device Non-Operating Data	2.1-34
2.1-12	MOS SSI/MSI Device Reported Failure Modes and Mechanisms	2.1-34
2.1~13	Random-Access Memories (RAMS) Non-Operating Data (Aluminum Metallization/Aluminum Wire System)	2.1-36
2.1-14	Random-Access Memories (RAMS) Non-Operating Data (Aluminum Metallization/Gold Wire System	m) 2.1-36
2.1-15	Read Only Memories (ROMS) Non-Operating Data	2.1-37
2.1-16	Memories Reported Failure Modes & Mechanisms	2.1-38
2.2-1	Monolithic Microelectronic Operational Prediction Models Cross Reference	2.2-3
2.3-1	Hybrid Thick Film Failure Mechanisms	2.3-3
2.3-2	Hybrid Thin Film Failure Mechanisms	2.3-6
2.3-3	Hybrid IC Non-Operating Data	2.3-8
2.5-1	Average Operating to Non-Operating Failure Rate Ratio	2.5-3
2.5-2	Average Operating to Non-Operating Failure Rate Ratio	2.6-1
3.1-1	Source A Transistor Non-Operating Data	3.1-11
3.1-2	Source B Transistor Non-Operating Data	3.1-12

# TABLES (cont'd)

TABLE NO.	•	PAGE NO.
3.1-3	Source C Transistor Non-Operating Data	3.1-13
3.1-4	Source D Transistor Non-Operating Data	3.1-14
3.1-5	Source E Transistor Non-Operating Data	3.1-15
3.1-6	Source F Transistor Non-Operating Data	3.1-15
3.1-7	Transistor Non-Operating Data - All Sources	3.1-16
3.1-8	Source A Diodes Non-Operating Data	3.1-17
3.1-9	Source B Diodes Non-Operating Data	3.1-17
3.1-10	Source C Diodes Non-Operating Data	3.1-18
3.1-1%	Source D Diodes Non-Operating Data	3.1-19
3.1-12	Diodes Non-Operating Data - All Sources	3.1-20
3.2-1	Discrete Semiconductor Operational Prediction Models Cross Reference	3.2-2
3.2-2	Discrete Semiconductor Base Failure Rate Parameters	3.2-4
3.3-1	Transistor Operating & Non-Operating Data	3.3-3
3.3-2	Diode Operating & Non-Operating Factors	3.3-4
4.1-1	Operational Failure Modes for Different Tube Types	4.1-2
4.1-2	Non-Operational Failure Modes for Different Tube Types	4.1-2
4.1-3	Preliminary Vacuum Tube Non-Operational Failure Rates	4.1-3
4.1-4	Vacuum Tube Non-Operating Data	4.1-4
4.3-1	Vacuum Tube Operating and Non-Operating Factors	4.3-2
5.1-1	Resistor Non-Operating Failure Rates	5.1-2
5.1-2	Resistor Non-Operating Data Summary	5.1-3
5.1-3	Source A Resistor Non-Operating Data	5.1-4
5.1-4	Source B Resistor Non-Operating Data	5.1-5
5.1-5	Source C Resistor Non-Operating Data	5.1-6
5.1-6	Source D Resistor Non-Operating Data	5.1-7
5.2-1	Resistor Operational Prediction Models Cross Reference	5.2-6
5.2-2	Fixed Resistor Base Failure Rate $(\lambda_h)$ Factors	5.2.2
5.2-3	Variable Resistor Base Failure Rate ( $\lambda_{f b}$ ) Factors	5.2-3
5.2-4	K <sub>H</sub>	5.2-22
5.2-5	Loaded Potentiometer Derating Factor, Neff.	5.2-22

Ø.,

# TABLES (cont'd)

TABLE		PAGE NO
5.2-6	Ganged Potentiometer Factor, Iganged	5.2-23
5.3-1	Resistor Operating and Non-Operating Factors	5.3-2
6.1-1	Failure Mechanisms Analysis, Solid Tantalum Capacitors	6.1-2
6.1-2	Failure Mechanism Analysis, Tantalum Foil Capacitors	6.1-4
6.1-3	Capacitor Non-Operating Failure Rate	6.1-5
6.1-4	Capacitor Non-Operating Data Summary	6.1-6
6.1-5	Source A Capacitor Non-Operating Data	6.1-7
6.1-6	Source B Capacitor Non-Operating Data	6.1-8
6.1-7	Source C Capacitor Non-Operating Data	6.1-9
6.1-8	Source D Capacitor Non-Operating Data	6.1-10
6.2-1	Capacitors Operational Prediction Model Cross Feference	6.2-3
6.2-2	Capacitor Base Failure Rate (\(\lambda_b\)) Factors	6.2-22
6.3-1	Capacitor Operating and Non-Operating Factors	6.3-2
7.1-1	Inductive Devices Non-Operational Failure Rates	7.1-1
7.1-2	Summary of Inductor Non-Operating Data	7.1-2
7.1-3	Source A Non-Operating Data for Inductive Devices	7.1-3
7.1-4	Source B Non-Operating Data for Inductive Devices	7.1-4
7.1-5	Source C Non-Operating Data for Inductive Devices	7.1-5
7.2-1	Model Equation Constants, MIL-T-27 Insulation Class & Max Operating Temp. (MIL-C-15305 Class in Parenthesis)	7.2-4
7.2-2	Model Equation Constants, MIL-T-21038 In- sulation Class & Max Operating Temp.	7.2-4
7.2-3	Estimate of Average Temperature Rise	7.2-9
7.3-1	Inductive Devices Operating & Non-Operating Factors	7.3-2
9.1-1	Failure Mechanism Analysis-Nickel Cadmium Batteries	9.1-4

# TABLES (cont'd)

TABLE		PAGE NO.
9.2-1	Battery Operational Failure Data	9.2-1
10.1-1	Storage Failure Data for Electrical Connections	10.1-2
10.2-1	Configuration, Applicable Specification, and Insert Material for Connectors	10.2-3
10.2-2	Temperature Ranges of Insert Materials	10.2-4
10.2-3	Model Constants	10.2-5
10.2-4	Insert Temperature Rise (°C) vs. Contact	10.2-5

### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Missile Reliability Considerations

Materiel in the Army inventory must withstand long periods of storage and "launch ready" non-activated or dormant time as well as perform operationally in severe launch and flight environments. In addition to the stress of temperature soaks and aging, they must often endure the abuse of frequent transportation and handling and the climatic extremes of the forward area battlefield environment.

Missiles spend the majority of the time in this nonoperating environment. In newer missile systems, complexity
is increasing significantly, longer service lives are being
required, and periodic maintenance and checkouts are being
reduced. The combination of these factors places great importance on selecting missile materiels which are capable of
performing reliably in each of the environments.

The inclusion of storage reliability requirements in the initial system specifications has also placed an importance on maintaining non-operating reliability prediction data for evaluating the design and mechanization of new systems.

# 1.2 Storage Reliability Research Program

An extensive effort is being conducted by the U. S. Army Missile Command to provide detailed analyses of missile material and to generate reliability prediction data. A missile material reliability parts count prediction handbook, LC-76-1, has been developed and provides the current prediction data resulting from this effort.

This report provides a summary of the analyses performed under the storage reliability research program and background information for the predictions in LC-76-1. Included are summaries of real time and test data, failure modes and mechanisms, and conclusions and recommendations resulting from analysis of the data. These recommendations include special design, packaging and product assurance data and information on specific part type, and part construction.

For a number of the part types, detailed analysis reports are also available. These reports present details on part construction, failure modes and mechanisms, parameter drift and aging trends, applications, and other considerations for the selection of materiel and reliability prediction of missile systems.

The U. S. Army Missile Command also maintains a Storage Reliability Data Bank. This data bank consists of a computerized data base with generic part storage reliability data and a storage reliability report library containing available research and test reports of non-operating reliability research efforts:

For the operational data contained in this report, the user should refer to the following sources: MIL-HDBK-2173, Military Standardization Handbook, Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment; Reliability Analysis Center (RAC) Microcircuit Generic Failure Rates; RADC-TR-69-458, Revision to the Nonelectronic Reliability Handbook; and the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) Summaries of Failure Rate Data.

### 1.3 Missile Environments

A missile system may be subjected to various modes of transportation and handling, temperature soaks, climatic extremes, and activated test time and "launch ready" time in addition to a controlled storage environment. Some studies have been performed on missile systems to measure these environments. A summary of several studies is presented in Report BR-7811, "The Environmental Conditions Experienced by Rockets and Missiles in Storage, Transit and Operations" prepared by the Raytheon Company, dated December 1973.

In this report, skin temperatures of missiles in containers were recorded in dump (or open) storage at a maximum of 165°F (74°C) and a minimum of -44°F (-42°C). In nonearth covered bunkers temperatures have been measured at a maximum of 116°F (47°C) to a minimum of -31°F (-35°C). In earth covered bunkers, temperatures have been measured at a maximum of 103°F (39°C) to a minimum of 23°F (-5°C).

Acceleration extremes during transportation have been measured for track, rail, aircraft and ship transportation. Up to 7 G's at 300 hertz have been measured on trucks; 1 G at 300 hertz by rail; 7 G's at 1100 hertz on aircraft; and 1 G at 70 hertz on shipboard.

Maximum shock stresses for truck transportation have been measured at 10 G's and by rail at 300 G's.

Although field data does not record these levels, where available, the type and approximate character of storage and transportation are identified and used to classify the devices.

### 1.4 System Level Analysis

The primary effort in the Storage Reliability Research Program is on analysis of the non-operating characteristics of parts. In the data collection effort, however, some data has been made available on system characteristics.

This data indicates that a reliability prediction for the system based on part level data will not accurately project maintenance actions if the missile is checked and maintained periodically. Factors contributing to this disparity include test equipment reliability, design problems, and general handling problems. In many cases, these problems are assigned to the system and not reflected in the part level analysis.

In general, a factor of 2 should be multiplied by the device failure rate to obtain the maintenance rate. Three system examples are described below:

### 1.4.1 System A

For system A, a check of 874 missiles in the field indicates 142 failed missiles. These failed missiles were taken to a maintenance facility. At the maintenance facility, no fault could be found in 51 of the missiles. Two missiles faults were corrected by adjustments. This left 89 failures which could be attributed to part failure. The parts were failure analyzed and the analysis indicated 19 failures to be a result of electrical overstress. These failures were designated design problems.

Therefore only 70 (49%) of the original 142 failures were designated as non-operating part failures.

# 1.4.2 System B

For system B, 26 missile failures were analyzed. Of these no fault was found in 2 missiles; adjustments were required for 2; external electrical overstress or handling damage was found in 10; a circuit design problem was assigned to 1, and component failures were assigned to 11.

### 1.4.3 Gyro Assemblies

An analysis of gyro assembly returns indicated that two thirds of the returns were attributed to design defects, mishandling, conditions outside design requirements, and to erroneous attribution of system problems.

Therefore, only 33 percent of the returns were designated as non-operating part failures.

### 1.5 Limitations of Reliability Prediction

Practical limitations are placed in any reliability analysis effort in gathering and analyzing data. Field data is generated at various levels of detail and reported in varying manners. Often data on environments, applications, part classes and part construction are not available. Even more often, failure analyses are non-existant. Data on low use devices and new technology devices is also difficult to obtain. Finally in the storage environment, the very low occurrence of failures in many devices requires extensive storage time to generate any meaningful statistics.

These difficulties lead to prediction of conservative or pessimistic failure rates. The user may review the existing data in the backup analyses reports in any case where design or program decision is necessary.

### 1.6 Life Cycle Reliability Prediction Modeling

Developing missile reliability predictions requires several tasks. The first tasks include defining the system, its mission, environments and life cycle operation or deployment scenario.

The system and mission definitions provide the basis for constructing reliability success models. The modeling can incorporate reliability block diagrams, truth tables and logic diagrams. Descriptions of these methods are not included here but can be studied in detail in MIL-HDBK-217B or other texts listed in the bibliography.

After the reliability success modeling is completed, reliability life cycle prediction modeling for each block or unit in the success model is performed based on the definitions of the system environment and deployment scenario. This reliability life cycle modeling is based on a "wooden

round" concept in order to assess the missile's capability of performing in a no-maintenance environment. The general equation for this modeling is:

 $R_{LC} = R_{T/H} \times R_{STOR} \times R_{TEST} \times R_{LR/D} \times R_{LR/O} \times R_{L} \times R_{E}$  where:

 $R_{\mbox{\scriptsize STOR}}$  is the reliability during storage

R<sub>TEST</sub> is the unit's reliability during check out and test .

R<sub>LR/D</sub> is the unit's reliability during dorrant launch ready time

R<sub>LR/O</sub> is the unit's reliability during operational (>10% electronic stress) launch ready time

R<sub>L</sub> is the unit's reliability during powered launch and flight

R<sub>F</sub> is the unit's reliability during unpowered flight

The extent of the data to date does not provide a capability of separately estimating the reliability of transportation and storage for missile material. Also data has indicated no difference between dormant (>0 and <10% electrical stress) and non-operating time. Therefore, the general equation can be simplified as follows:

 $R_{LC}(t) = R_{NO}(t_{NO}) \times R_{O}(t_{O}) \times R_{L}(t_{L}) \times R_{F}(T_{F})$ 

where: R<sub>NO</sub> is the unit's reliability during transportation and handling, storage and dormant time (non-operating time)

t<sub>NO</sub> is the sum of all non-operating and dormant time

R<sub>O</sub> is the unit's reliability during checkout, test
or system exercise during which components have
electrical power applied (operating).

to is the sum of all operating time excluding launch and flight

R<sub>I</sub> is the unit's reliability during powered launch and flight (Propulsion System Active)

t<sub>I.</sub> is the powered launch and flight time

 $oldsymbol{R_F}$  is the unit's reliability during unpowered flight

 $\mathbf{t_F}$  is the unpowered flight time

t is the sum of  $t_{NO}$ ,  $t_{O}$ ,  $t_{L}$  and  $t_{F}$ 

The values  $R_{NO}$ ,  $R_{O}$ ,  $R_{F}$  are calculated using several methods. The primary method is to assume exponential distributions as follows:

$$R_{NO}(t_{NO}) = e^{-\lambda}NO^{t}NO$$

$$R_{O}(t_{O}) = e^{-\lambda}O^{t}O$$

$$R_{L}(t_{L}) = e^{-\lambda}L^{c}L$$

$$R_{F}(t_{F}) = e^{-\lambda}F^{t}F$$

The failure rates  $\lambda_{\mathrm{NO}}$ ,  $\lambda_{\mathrm{O}}$ ,  $\lambda_{\mathrm{L}}$  and  $\lambda_{\mathrm{F}}$  are calculated from the models in the following sections.  $\lambda_{\mathrm{NO}}$  is calculated from the non-operating failure rate models. The remaining failure rates are calculated from the operational failure rate models using the appropriate environmental adjustment factors. Each prediction model is based on part stress factors which may include part quality, complexity, construction, derating, and other characteristics of the device.

Other methods for calculating the reliability include wearout or aging reliability models and cyclic or one shot reliability models. For each of these cases, the device section will specify the method for calculating the reliability.

# 1.7 Reliability Predictions During Early Design

Frequently during early design phases, reliability predictions are required with an insufficient system definition to utilize the stress level failure rate models. Therefore, a "parts count" prediction technique has been prepared. It provides average base failure rates for various part types and provides K factors for various phases of the system deployment scenario to generate a first estimate of system reliability. This prediction is presented in Report LC-76-1.

### 1.8 Summary of Report Contents

The report is divided into five volumes which break out major component or part classifications: Volume 1, Electrical and Electronic Devices; Volume II, Electromechanical Devices; Volume III, Hydraulic and Pneumatic Devices; Volume IV, Ordnance Devices; and Volume V, Optical and Electro Optical Devices. Table 1-1 provides a listing of the major part types included in each volume.

### TABLE 1-1. REPORT CONTENTS

### Volume I Electrical and Electronic Devices

### Section

- 2.0 Microelectronic Devices
- 3.0 Discrete Semiconductor Devices.
- 4.0 Electronic Vacuum Tubes
- 5.0 Resistors
- 6.0 Capacitors
- 7.0 Inductive Devices
- 8.0 Crystals
- 9.0 Batteries
- 10.0 Connectors and Connections
- 11.0 Printed Wiring Boards

### Volume II Electromechanical Davices

### Section

- 2.0 Gyros
- 3.0 Accelerometers
- 4.0 Switches
- 5.0 Relays
- 6.0 Transducers
- 7.0 Hi Speed Motors
- 8.0 Synchros and Resolvers

### Volume III Hydraulic and Pneumatic Devices

### Section

- 2.0 Valves
- 3.0 Accumulators
- 4.0 Actuators
- 5.0 Pumps
- 6.0 Cylinders
- 7.0 Compressors
- 8.0 Filters
- 9.0 Gaskets and Seals
- 10.0 Bearings
- 11.0 Regulators

### Volume IV Ordnance Devices

### Section

- 2.0 Solid Propellant Motors
- 3.0 Igniters and Safe and Arm Devices
- 4.0 Solid Propellant Gas Generators
- 5.0 Misc. Ordnance Devices

### Volume V Optical and Electro Optical Devices

### 2.0 Microelectronic Devices and Interconnections

Microelectronic devices have and continue to undergo a rapid development in design, materials, processes, screening and qualification procedures. Data applicable to one device may be significantly different from another device performing a similar function. This is a result of materials, processes, etc., and is particularly significant in the hybrid area. Based on the failure mechanism analysis, a detailed categorization of these devices will be necessary to assess assurance procedures to improve the storage reliability.

### 2.1 Monolithic Microelectronic Storage Reliability Analysis

Monolithic refers to a one chip device. They can be of the bipolar or MOS (metal oxide semiconductor) variety. The term bipolar refers to the two polarities of carriers that exist in the device. Both holes and electrons are essential for operation. MOS devices are "unipolar" since only one type of a carrier is used. For P channel MOS, the carriers are "holes" while electrons are the carriers for n-channel MOS.

THE PROPERTY AND SELECTION OF THE PROPERTY OF A SECURITY OF THE PROPERTY OF TH

Another distinction arises from the differing location of active regions. Bipolar devices are "bulk" devices. The active region is the base, several microns beneath the surface between the emmitter and the collector. MOS devices are "surface effect" devices. Their active region consists of a channel that is induced at the silicon/silicon-dioxide interface.

Because of the difference in construction and operation between bisolar and MOS devices, they are treated separately in this analysis.

Microelectronic device reliability depends primarily upon construction; process control, screening, qualification; and use characteristics. A review of the literature was performed to identify these characteristics which are listed in Table 2.1-1.

For convenience, device construction was broken into seven major areas: Bulk materiel and diffusion, oxide; metallization; glassivation; die bonding; chip connections; and packaging characteristics. Each of these areas identified in Figure 2.1-1 were




FIGURE 2.1-1. TYPICAL PLANAR MICROELECTRONIC DEVICE CROSS SECTION

nedicinal property decimal energy here energine energy the energy of the

analyzed for failure mechanisms which would be applicable in a missile's use environment from acceptance into the inventory to firing.

### TABLE 2.1-1. DEVICE CLASSIFICATION

### CONSTRUCTION

Die Properties Oxide Metallization Glassivation Die Bond Chip Connection Package

### DEVICE LEVEL PRODUCT ASSURANCE

MIL-STD-883 Quality Level Screens Quality Conformance Inspection Process Controls

### ASSEMBLY AND SYSTEM LEVEL PRODUCT ASSURANCE TESTS

### COMPLEXITY

### LOGIC TYPE

### USE ENVIRONMENT

Transportation and Handling
Temperature
Humidity
Storage Container & Location
Field Test Duration & Frequency
Derating

### 2.1.1 Failure Mechanisms

The mechanisms of failures affecting semiconductors are generally the same regardless of the device type, however, the rate of occurrence varies between types. For this reason, the failure mechanism discussion applies to all of the monolithic device discussed in the succeeding sections.

The failure mechanisms contributing to microelectronic device failures appear to be identical whether the device is operational or in storage. The difference in the two environments is the frequency in which individual failure mechanisms occur. In general the mechanisms can be grouped into three categories:

- 1) Mechanisms for which failure occurrence is independent of the application environment.
- 2) Mechanisms for which failure occurrence is dependent on the application environment, and
- 3) Mechanisms for which the failure occurrence is timerelated and environment dependent.

The mechanisms in group 1 are simply undetected defects which passed through the screens such as improper diffusions, oxide pinholes, etc. The rate of occurrence of these mechanisms would be the same, whether the device was applied in an operational or a storage environment. The only difference would be the time at which the mechanism was detected.

The mechanisms in group 2 are defects which do not fail the device immediately. For example, bond and metallization defects which progress to failure due to temperature or mechanical stress.

The third group of mechanisms are similar to group 2, except they are more time dependent. Examples are metal migration, intermetallic compound formations, corrosion, etc.

The mechanisms in groups 2 and 3 are dependent on environment and occur at different rates depending on whether the device is operational or dormant. In most cases, the storage environment is more benign than the operating environment.

In considering both operational and storage failure rates, the complexity of the device is important. The greater number of circuits on a given substrate area increases the temperature at which the devices are subjected and also requires greater process control in the production. The diffusions, metallization patterns and interconnections are very critical in a high density device.

THE THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER

In the operational environment, the rate of occurrence of particular failure mechanisms has differed between Bipolar Digital devices and Bipolar Linear and MOS devices. The major problem areas in digital devices have been contamination and oxide, wire bond and packaging defects. For Linear and MOS devices, contamination and metallization, die mount and oxide defects have been the

the major problem areas. Linear and MOS device failure rates are higher than digital devices because of the circuit sensitivity to surface, metallization and oxide defects.

Conversely, in the storage environment, analysis has indicated that the rate of occurrence of particular failure mechanisms is roughly the same between bipolar digital and linear devices.

Insufficient data is available to make a storage assessment of MOS devices.

Table 2.1-2 lists each failure mechanism with its acceleration environment. These acceleration environments are the surrounding conditions which can speed the defect or degradation to the point of failure.

### 2.1.1.1 Bulk Materiel and Diffusion Characteristics

The primary reliability considerations in an operational environment associated with bulk phenomena are those which govern temperature of the device during operation. Devices are generally rated in terms of maximum allowable power dissipation. This power coupled with various thermal resistances and ambient temperature, determines the junction temperature of the device. Steps must be taken to maintain a controlled and uniform temperature since device degradation and failure modes, in most cases, are accelerated by increased temperature.

For most devices, the power requirements are not excessive and junction temperatures are controlled by using suitable heat-sink packages. For high-power devices, wafer design may include junction-temperature control considerations to prevent localized high currents and resultant "hot spot" formation.

Bulk defects account for only a minor portion of the operational and storage failures. Primary areas of concern include dislocations (crystal lattice anomalies); impurity diffusions and precipitations; resistivity gradients; and cracks in the bulk materiel. These defects usually result during crystal preparation and are accelerated by mechanical, nuclear and thermal stresses.

The failure modes resulting from bulk defects include deviations in voltage breakdown and other electrical characteristics;

secondary breakdown or uncontrolled p-n-p-n switching; or opens or shorts in the subsequent metallization.

Diffusion defects account for approximately 5 to 15% of operational and storage failures. Other than those diffusion problems associated with bulk material defects, the primary area of concern is the diffusion process itself. These include mask alignment; contamination; mask defects; cracks in the oxide layer; and improper doping profiles. Diffusions that are due to misalignment of masks reduce the base and emitter or base and collector junction spacings. Other faults include discontinuous isolation diffusions and odd shapes or edges of diffusions. Diffusion defects are primarily accelerated to failure by thermal cycling and high temperature. Principle failure modes resulting from diffusion defects include deviations in device characteristics and shorts between the emitter and base.

### 2.1.1.2 Oxide Considerations

Junction passivation of silicon devices is generally accomplished by using thermally grown silicon dioxide ( $\mathrm{SiO}_2$ ). Other devices use phosphorous pentoxide ( $\mathrm{P}_2\mathrm{O}_5$ ) over the  $\mathrm{SiO}_2$  layer. Beam Lead Sealed Junction (BLSJ) devices utilize a layer of silicon nitride ( $\mathrm{Si}_3\mathrm{N}_4$ ) glass deposited over the grown  $\mathrm{SiO}_2$ . Both  $\mathrm{P}_2\mathrm{O}_5$  and  $\mathrm{Si}_3\mathrm{N}_4$  overcoatings have been found to improve the surface stability of bipolar devices. These materials act as gettering agents for sodium ions, thus making the contamination far less mobile. The stability of the structural and electrical properties of the oxide play an important role in determining the electrical characteristics and reliability of the passivated device.

Oxide defects are significant contributors to device failures. Approximately 5 to 50% of operational failures are attributed to these defects. Current data on non-operating failures indicates that approximately 5 to 35% of storage failures are attributable to oxide defects. Primary areas of concern are pinholes, cracks, thin oxide areas, and oxide contamination.

Pinholes can be caused by raulty oxide growth, a damaged mask, poor photo resist or an undercut by the etching process. They vary in depth and in the worst case, expose the silicon to the metallized interconnections. Where the pinhole or metallization does not extend completely to the surface of the silicon, a time-dependent migration or low voltage breakdown mechanism may occur. Where the oxide is overcoated with a second layer, the frequency of pinhole defects decreases.

Oxide cracks occur as a result of the mismatch in the thermal expansion rate of silicon and silicon dioxide. Diffusion of metal to the silicon is then possible. Thin oxide and other oxide difficiencies cause electrical breakdown in the surface passivation from the metal conductor to component areas in the silicon. All of these defects lead to increased current leakages or shorts from the metallization to diffusion areas or substrate.

Ionic impurities in the oxide may cause inversion layers, channeling, and other related phenomena creating lower threshold voltage. Ionic contamination is generally a significant contributor to total oxide charge. The ions are usually mobile and, by drifting under the influence of an electric field, can cause appreciable device parameter instability. Silicon nitride has been shown to be an effective barrier to sodium migration. In Beam Lead Sealed Junction (BLSJ) devices, the silicon nitride seals the devices from sodium and since the platinum silicide and titanium metals also offer very low mobility to the alkaline ions, the BLSJ is inert to sodium.

Inversion and channeling phenomenon occurs only with an electric field present. Bipolar linear and MOS devices are affected by this phenomenon greater than bipolar digital devices.

### 2.1.1.3 Metallization Considerations

A rather large number of metallization systems have been used on monclithic devices. The primary metals used have been aluminum, molybdenum-gold, and titanium-platinum-gold.

Failures related to metallization defects range from 7 to 26% in operational devices and current storage data indicates approximately 15% of the failures related to metallization.

Aluminum metallization defects result from manufacturing deficiencies and also from mechanisms inherent to the metal system.

Processing deficiencies which subsequently result in device failures include thin metal layers, poor metal-to-oxide adhesion due to oil or other impurities on the wafer, undercutting of Al during etching of the metallization pattern, bridging of Al between conductors due to unremoved photoresist, smears and scratches in conductor stripes, misalignment of masks, insufficient deposition at oxide steps, oxide steps too steep, incomplete removal of oxide, etc.

These defects are accelerated to failure primarily by thermal stresses and result in open and shorted conductors.

Mechanisms inherent to the aluminum metal system include electromigration formation, aluminum silicon eutectic, and intermetallic compound formations with gold.

Many of the failure mechanisms observed in molybenum-gold metallization systems can be attributed to processing problems. These include failures due to unsatisfactory adhesion of molybdenum to the silicon dioxide and of the gold layer to the molybdenum layer. These can be attributed to contamination of the surface and oxidation of the molybdenum layer prior to deposition of the gold. Other processing problems include: molybdenum undercutting during etching; scratches which expose the molybdenum to oxidation and subsequent opens, and corrosion of molybdenum from impurities introduced in the processing.

Gold-silicon eutectics can occur if pinholes exist in the molybdenum layer.

Failure mechanism data on Platinum Silicide-Titanium-Platinum-Gold metallization systems is just becoming available. Improved or eliminated failure modes include wire bond defects, alkali ion contamination, metallization corrosion, and aluminum migration. Possible failure mechanisms identified for these devices are all due to processing deficiencies. They include pinholes in the silicon nitride; thin silicon nitride; shorted metallization; platinum migration into the silicon; gold or titanium migration resulting from thin platinum; and contamination.

### 2.1.1.4 Glassivation Considerations

Both silicon nitride and phosphosilicate glass overcoatings have been found to greatly enhance the reliability of bipolar digital devices. These glassivation materiels act as gettering agents for sodium ions and when deposited over the total surface, including the metallization, the materiel provides an excellent protection against metallization scratches and loose particle shorts.

Inversion and increased metal migration are two failure mechanisms that have been reported caused by glassivation. These new mechanisms are not fully understood but some causes have been postulated.

The induced inversion formation may result from some defects or contamination in the oxide layer which allow high fields to accumulate electronic charge over the underlying silicon. A poor interface between the oxide and glass then allows lateral charge movement along the interface. The lateral charge movement can induce inversion extensive enough to form a conducting channel which can cause device instability.

The increased metal migration is not as well understood but appears to be caused by the high pressure on the metal between the thermal and deposited glasses. Generally, the metal migration is associated with damage to the glass. Both aluminum and gold migration have occurred through the damaged glass to the adjacent conductor causing device failure.

A third possible failure mechanism has been discussed where condensation from any moisture in a package tends to concentrate on a crack in the glassivation, normally on the metal strips. This tends to increase the susceptibility for metal corrosion along the crack.

### 2.1.1.5 Die Bond Considerations

Die bonds provide mechanical support; in most cases, electrical contact; and also provide the principle path by which heat flows out of the silicon chip. Three techniques are in general use for attaching semiconductor devices to the package substrate: alloy mount, frit mount and epoxy mount.

Low strength chip-to-header bonds have been reported to result in approximately 2-7% of device failures, in both operational and storage environments.

The failure mechanisms include diffusion of the gold into the silicon producing void formations; brittle frit mounts resulting from impurities in the glass or improper firing cycles used for devitrification; mechanical stresses in epoxies where the temperature goes through the glass-transition temperature of the epoxy, and outgassing of organic material and separation of metal particles due to incomplete curing of the epoxy.

### 2.1.1.6 Chip Connection Considerations

Device connections are created by connecting wire leads to the device package; or through the use of beam lead or aluminum bump techniques. Wire bonding is accomplished primarily by thermocompression or by ultrasonic bonding techniques.

Wire bond defects are reported to account for 15 to 45% of all device failures in an operational environment. Storage or non-operating data currently indicates from 19 to 76% of all device failures are bond related.

The principle failure mechanisms are process deficiencies including underbonding, overbonding, misaligned bonds, contaminated bonding pads or wire, and wire nicks, cuts or abrasions.

Thermocompression bonding of aluminum wires has a history of cracks at the heel of the bond, which later failed under power cycling.

The gold wire bonding to aluminum metallization has been a major concern in microelectronic devices. Intermetallic compound formations between these two metals combined with the formation of voids in the aluminum from the Kirkendall effect create high

resistance or weakened and brittle bonds. Formation of the compounds and voids is accelerated by thermal stresses. Design and processing criteria have been developed to minimize the occurrence of these formations. They include controlling the purity of the gold and providing thinner, metallization at the bonding pad.

The aluminum wire bond to the gold header post has not been a significant contributor to device failures and is attributed to two factors: 1) the ratio of aluminum to gold is small, and 2) the bonds are not exposed to the same temperature as the gold wire to aluminum bonds on the chip during operation.

Failure mechanism data on beam lead sealed junction device bonding is limited. Processing deficiencies would be expected to be the primary problem, however, these are significantly reduced since the chip connection is made in the beam forming process which leaves only bonding of the beams to the header. All of the bonds of a single device are made simultaneously.

### 2.1.1.7 Package Considerations

Bipolar digital devices are packaged in a variety of materials and configurations. These materiels include: metal, ceramic, glass, metal ceramic, epoxy, phenolic and other plastics. Package configurations include cans, flatpacks, inline and dual inline.

Device failures attributed to package defects have been reported from 8 to 28% of operational failures. In many cases of failure reports, the resulting contamination and corrosion is reported and not the seal defect. Special test programs on devices have shown hermiticity problems to be substantial.

Failure mechanisms besides the seal leaks are fractured packages due to improper handling, loose solder balls formed in sealing the package which later short conductors, current leakage between leads from formation of lead from lead oxide in the glass, broken or burnt external leads and improper marking. All of these are process defects.

TABLE 2.1-2. MONOLITHIC DEVICE FAILURE MECHANISMS

FAILURE MECHANISM	CAUSE	ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT	FAILURE MODE	DETECTION METHOD
BULK DEFECTS		,		
Dislocation and Stacking Faults	Lattice strain due to steep concentration gradients finally released as dislocations.	Mechanical Stress Hi Temp	Degradation of junction character- istics.	Electrical Test
Impurity Diffusions and Precipatations	Diffusions along dis- locations during epitaxial growth,	Hi Temp Power Burn-in Thermal Cycling	Low reverse breakdown voltage.	Electrical Test
Resistivity Gradiants	Large local stresses.	Mechanical Shock Vibration Nue_fon Bombardment	Change in component values.	Blectrical Test
Cracks in Bulk Materiel	Thermal shock during processing.	Mrchanical Shock Thermal Cycling Hi Temp	Opens or Shorts in metal. Junction degradation.	Precap · Visual Electrical Test

THE STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE P

TABLE 2.1-2. MONOLITHIC DEVICE FALLURE MECHANISMS

TANK TERESTER SECTIONS OF THE SECTION OF THE SECTIO

FAILURE MECHANISM	CAUSE	ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT	FAILURE MODE	DETECTION METHOD
DIFFUSION DEFECTS		·	·	•
Improper Diffusions	<ol> <li>Faulty Mask Alignment</li> <li>Dust or other Contaminants on mask</li> <li>Defects in mask itself</li> <li>Cracks in oxide</li> </ol>	Hi Temp Thermal Cycling	Shorts Opens Changes in Device Characteris-	Precap Visual Electrical Test
Improper Doping Profile	Process control problem.	Thermal Cycling Hi Temp. Storage	Unstable Components	Electrical Test
OXIDE DEFECTS				
Inversion Layer Phenomena	<ol> <li>Thermal oxidation of Silicon producing n or p type surface.</li> <li>Charged impurities.</li> </ol>	Hi Temp. Power Burn-in Reverse Bias	Emitter to Collector Short Lower Threshold Voltage	Electrical Test
Pinhole	Faulty Oxide Growth due to:  1) Dust particles or other contaminants.  2) Minute mask flaws.  3) Etch undercut.	Hi Temp. Thermal Cycling Power Burn-in	Short	Electrical Test

TABLE 2.1-2. MONOLITHIC DEVICE FAILURE MECHANISMS

				•
FAILURE MECHANISM	CAUSE	ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT	FAILURE MODE	DETECTION METHOD
OXIDE DEFECTS -	CONTINUED			
Cracks	Mismatch in Thermal Expansion rate.	Hi. Temp.	Short	Electrical Test
Thin Oxide	Improper Process Control.	Hi. Temp.	Short	Electrical . Test
METALLIZATION DEFECTS	SCTS			į
Surface Flaws	Scratched ox smeared metalli- zation during processing.	Thermal Cycling	Open Short	Precap Visual Electrical Test
Insufficient Coverage at Oxide step	1) Misalignment of masks. 2) Insufficient deposition at oxide steps. 3) Oxide step too steep. 4) Oversintering of metal to silicon. 5) Incomplete removal of oxide	Hi. Temp. Thermal Cycling Power Burn-in	Open Hi Resistance Connections	Precap Visual Electrical Test
Under etched Metallization	Improper Etching.	Hi. Temp. Thermal Cycling Power Burn-in	Short	Precap Visual Electrical Test

CHANGES STATES OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY

TABLE 2.1-2. MONOLITHIC DEVICE FAILURE MECHANISMS

Le proposition de la company d

Failure Mechanism	CAUSE	ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT	FAILURE MODE	DETECTION METHOD
METALLIZATION DEF	DEFECTS - CONTINUED			
Voids under Metallization	<ol> <li>Overetching causing under- cutting of metallization.</li> <li>Kirkendall effect of disimilar alloys.</li> </ol>	Hi. Temp. Thermal Cycling Mechanical Stress	0 Lean	Precap Visual Electrical Test
Non-adhesion of Metallization	<ul><li>1) Contamination of surface.</li><li>2) Improper alloying temp.</li><li>or time.</li></ul>	Hi. Temp. Thermal C/cling	Open	Precap Visual Electrical Test
Metal Migration (Hillocks, Voids, Whiskers, etc.)	Insufficient metal thickness, Scratches, grain size, etc.	Hi. Temp. & Current Density	Open Short Current Leakage	Precap Visual Electrical Test
Increased Resistance of Metallization	Thickness of oxide.	Hi. Temp.	Out of Tolerance	Electrical Test
GLASSIVATION DEFECTS				
Inversion Phenomenum	Poor Interface between oxide lâyer & glassivation layer.	Hi. Temp. & Reverse Bias	Out of Tolerance	Slectrical Test

TABLE 2.1-2. MONOLITHIC DEVICE FAILURE MECHANISMS

THE STATES OF TH

FAILURE MECHANISM	CAUSE	ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT	FAILURE MODE	DETECTION METHOD
GLASSIVATION DEFECTS	cts - continued			
Metal Migration	Damaged Glass - Pressure Between oxide & glassivation layers.	Hi. Temp. & Current Density	Open Short Current Leakage	Electrical Test
Oxide Cracks Corrosion	Thermal Shock During Processing.	Temp. Cycling	open .	Precap Visual Electrical Test
DIE BONDING DEFECTS	. รูเ			
Voids between header & die	Incomplete coverage of bonding materiel.	Hi. Temp. Vibration Shock	Open	Precap Visual Electrical Test
Cracked or lifted die to header bond.	<ol> <li>Weak metal eutectic bond due to oxide on reverse side of silicon.</li> <li>Glass frit facture in flexible package.</li> </ol>	Acceleration Shock Vibration Hi, Temp.	Open	Precap Visual Electrical Test

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

TABLE 2.1-2. MONOLITHIC DEVICE FAILURE MECHANISMS

THE STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF T

asterilandeside statisticaestate tatis sidisticatifications and and some construction and some some of the some

PAILURE MECHANISM	CAUSE	ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT	FAILURE MODE	DETECTION METHOD
DIE BONDING DEFECTS	rs – continued			•
Cracked Silicon Die	Strains during die attach.	Acceleration Shock Vibration	Open	Precap Visual Electrical Test
WIRE BONDING DEFE	ŶŢS			
Separation of Bond	<ol> <li>Underbonding.</li> <li>Contamination of Bonding.</li> <li>Cracks in bond due to overbonding.</li> </ol>	Hi. Temp. Shock Vibration	Open	Precap Visual Electrical Test
Bond Shorts	<ul> <li>1) Overbonding.</li> <li>2) Insufficient bonding pad area or spacing.</li> <li>3) Improper bond alignment.</li> </ul>	Hi. Temp. Power Burn-in Vibration Shock Thermal Cycling	Short	Precap Visual Electrical Test
Broken wires & Reduced wire size.	1) Overbonding. 2) Nicks, cuts or abrasions in wire during processing.	Hi. Temp. Shock Vibration	Open	Precap Visual Electrical Test

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

TABLE 2.1-2. MONOLITHIC DEVICE FAILURE MECHANISMS

FAILURE MECHANISM	CAUSE	ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT	FAILURE MODE	DETECTION
WIRE BONDING DEFECTS	CTS - CONTINUED			
Wire Shorts.	Unremoved pigtails.	Hi. Temp. Shock Vibration	Short Intermittent Shorts	Precap Visual Electrical Test
Intermetallic Compound Formation	Various Time-Dependent Formations of a Chemical Compound at metal-metal contacts:  1) Purple Plague Audl.  2) Black Plague - Aluminum Hydroxide.  4) Silver Plague - Tin Migration.  5) Red Plague - Copper Oxide on Silver Plate over Copper.	Hi. Temp. Power Burn-in Thermal Cycling	Open	Precap Visual Electrical Test
FINAL SEAL DEFECTS				
Poor Hermetic Seal	Fractured Glass or Imcomplete Thermal Weld, Braze, etc. Stress	Thermal & Mechanical Stress	Corresion Causing Opens, Shorts or Performance Degration.	Leak Tests

TABLE 2.1-2. MONOLITHIC DEVICE FAILURE MECHANISMS

THE STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF T

URE MECHANISM	CAUSE	ACCELERATING ENVIRCHMENT	FAILURE MODE	DETECTION METHOD
FINAL SEAL DEFECTS -	- CONTINUED			
##	Improper Handling or Improper Seal Leak Test	Thermal & Mechanical Stress	Corrosion Causing Opens, Shorts or Performance Degration	Visual
. Wires Sl. to Con- Lids periphery	Slack in leads.	Mechanical Stress Temp. Cycling	Short	Radiographic. Electrical Test
Rec	Low Resistance Leak due to Reduction of $P_{ m b}$ O Glass to $P_{ m b}$ .	Hi. Temp.	Current . Leakage	Electrical Test
Imi	Improper Brazing or Handling	Hi. Temp. Mechanical Stress	Open	Visual Lead Fatigue Tests
) J	Process Control Problem		Not Operative	Electrical Tests

TABLE 2.1-2. MONOLITHIC DEVICE FAILURE MECHANISMS

THE SECTION OF SECTION

FAILURE MECHANISM	CAUSE	ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT	FAILURE Mode	DETECTION ME THOD
CONTAMINATION		ż		
Surface, Wire or Bond Corrosion	Corrosive Residue & Moisture such as:  1) Photo Resist 2) Chlorine in wire Lubricant 3) Etch pits in oxide, trapping sodium or other corrosive agents 4) Outgassing from organic materiels. 5) Weld glasses 6) Incorrect atmosphere sealed in package 7) Loss of package hermiticity	Hi. Temp. Storage	Open Short Degraded Operation	Electrical Tests
Conductive Particles in Package	<ol> <li>Solder particles</li> <li>Wire particles</li> <li>Flaking metallization</li> <li>Die particles</li> <li>Die bond materiel</li> <li>particles</li> </ol>	Vibration Shock Thermal Cycling	Short	Electrical Tests
Corrosion at Glass Ceramic Interface	Small lead materiel junction at interface exposed to environment after lead plating.	Hi. Temp. Storage	Open	Visual Electrical Tests
				-
A TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPE	() () () () () () () () () () () () () (	Company of the second of the s	A STANDARD SANDARD AND SANDARD AND SANDARD SAN	

### 2.1.1.8 Device Level Product Assurance

The manufacturing controls and procurement methods for military equipment are normally determined by the criticality of the device in the system and the uniqueness of the device. Procurement specifications determine, to a significant degree, the reliability of the device in the field.

For standard devices in high volume production with established reliability, the parts may be procured according to the specifications in MIL-STD-883 and MIL-M-38510 or equivalent manufacturer specifications. The three quality levels defined in the military specifications are:

Class "A" - Devices intended for use where maintenance and replacement are extremely difficult or impossible, and reliability is imperative.

Class "B" - Devices intended for use where maintenance and replacement can be performed, but are difficult and expensive, and where reliability is imperative.

Class "C" - Devices intended for use where maintenance and replacement can be readily accomplished and down time is not a critical factor.

A Class "D" level has also been defined in this report to identify the manufacturer's commercial quality  $1\varepsilon$  el.

### 2.1.2 Monolithic Integrated Circuits Non-Operational Prediction Models

The general failure rate model for monolithic integrated circuits is:

$$\lambda_{\rm p} = \Pi_{\rm L} \Pi_{\rm Q} (\Pi_{\rm T} C_1 + \Pi_{\rm E} C_2) \times 10^{-6}$$

where:  $\lambda_{p}$  = device non-operating failure rate

 $\pi_{\tau} = \text{learning adjustment factor}$ 

 $II_O = quality adjustment factor$ 

C, = temperature failure rate factor

C<sub>2</sub> = environment failure rate factor

 $II_{rp}$  = temperature adjustment factor

 $II_E = environmental adjustment factor$ 

The values for each of these parameters are given in Figures 2.1-2 and 2.1-3 for Monolithic Bipolar SSI/MSI Digital and Linear Devices. These devices have complexities less than 100 gates (approximately 400 transistors). The model in Figure 2.1-2 applies to devices containing aluminum metallization with aluminum interconnecting wires. The model in Figure 2.1-3 applies to devices containing aluminum metallization with gold interconnecting wires. A description of the parameters is given in the following sections.

<u>il periori periori de la completa de la completa de la compania de la compania de la composita de la composita de la completa del la completa de la completa del la completa de la comple</u>

No distinction is made in logic type or between complexity levels within the SSI/MSI complexity range.

At present insufficient data is available for devices with all gold systems including beam lead systems. Some data has shown that gold beam lead systems have a lower failure rate than the devices modeled. The model in Figure 2.1-2 can be used as a conservative prediction.

Data is insufficient at this time to develop models for Bipolar LSI, MOS and Memory devices.

### 2.1.2.i Learning Adjustment Factor, II

 $II_L$  adjusts the model for production conditions and controls the conditions as defined in the figures for each device type:

### 2.1.2.2 Quality Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{Q}$

 $^{\rm II}_{\rm Q}$  accounts for effects of different quality levels as defined in MIL-M-38510 and MIL-STD-883.

### 2.1.2.3 Temperature Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{TP}$

 $\ensuremath{\pi_{T}}$  adjusts the model for temperature acceleration factors. Two models are applicable:

II is applicable to Bipolar Digital and Linear devices with aluminum metallization and aluminum interconnecting wires.

$$\pi_{\text{Tl}} = 0.1 \text{ e}^{\text{X}}$$

where 
$$x = -6544$$
 (  $\frac{1}{T + 273} - \frac{1}{298}$ )

 $\Pi_{T,2}$  is applicable to Bipolar Digital and Linear devices with aluminum metallization and gold interconnecting wires.

$$n_{T2} = 0.1 e^{X}$$

where 
$$x = -8121 \left( \frac{1}{T + 273} - \frac{1}{298} \right)$$

In  $\rm II_{T1}$  and  $\rm II_{T2}$  above, T is the ambient storage temperature (°C) and e is natural logarithm base, 2.718.

### 2.1.2.4 Environmental Adjustment Factor, IIE

 $\rm II_{\rm E}$  accounts for the influence of environmental factors other than temperature. Refer to the environment description in the Appendix.

### 2.1.2.5 Temperature Factor, $C_1$

{ i.

 $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{l}}$  is a constant and is the temperature component of the base failure rate. Values are given in the figures.

### 2.1.2.6 Mechanical Stress Factor, C2

C<sub>2</sub> is a constant and is the mechanical stress component of the base failure rate. Values are given in the figures.

### FIGURE 2.1-2

PREDICTION MODEL (FOR ALUMINUM METALLIZATION/ALUMINUM WIRE SYSTEM) MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR SSI/MSI DEVICE NON-OFERATIONAL FAILURE RATE

$$\lambda_{\rm P} = n_{\rm L} n_{\rm Q} [n_{\rm T} c_{\rm l} + n_{\rm E} c_{\rm 2}] \times 10^{-6}$$

IL (Learning Factor)

nQ (Quality Factor)

a new device in initial production	a major change in design or	process	extended line interruption or	change in line personnel	,
	7		3		rwi
= 10 for 1)					otherwise
10					Н
n					II
II.					ı,

MIL-STD-883 IIQ Class A 1 B 3.5 C 4.5 D 11.25  $\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$  (Application Environment Factor)

Environment	H 편
Ground, Benign	0.2
Space Flight	0.2
Ground, Fixed	1.0
Airborne, Inhabited	4.0
Naval, Sheltered	4.0
Ground, Mobile	4.0
Naval, Unsheltered	6.0
Airborne, Uninhabited	•

II (Temperature Factor)

- 1	
remperature °C	Et E
25	0.1
30	0.14
40	0.29
50	0.55
100	8.27
125	20.20
150	:65.83
170	N

C<sub>1</sub> (Temperature Base Failure Rate)

$$c_1 = 0.0013$$

C<sub>2</sub> (Mechanical Stress Base Failure Rate)
C<sub>2</sub> = 0.0007

AND THE PROPERTY OF A SECOND O

FIGURE 2.1-.3

PREDICTION MODEL (FOR ALUMINUM METALLIZATION/GOLD WIRE SYSTEM) MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR SSI/MSI DEVICE NON-OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE

$$\lambda_{\rm p} = n_{\rm L} n_{\rm Q} [n_{\rm T} c_{\rm l} + n_{\rm E} c_{\rm 2}] \times 10^{-6}$$

IL (Learning Factor)

II\_L = 10 for 1) a ..ew device in initial production
2) a major change in the design
 or process
3) extended line interrupt or
 change in line personnel
L = 1 otherwise

No Quality Factor)

ощ	1 3.5 4.5 135
L-STD-883 Class	
MIL-STD Class	41 ង ប ប

IE Application Environment Factor)

Environment	E E
16.3	0.2
1	0.2
Ground, Fixed	1.0
Airborne, Inhabited	4.0
Naval, Sheltered	4.0
Ground, Mobile	4.0
Naval, Unsheltered	6.0
Airborne, Uninhabited	5.0

 $\Pi_{\mathrm{T}}$  (Temperature Factor)

00	
remperature .c	Œ II
	! ~!
•	(
0	6
	2
	9
0	442.37
170	5

 $c_1$  (Temperature Base Failure Rate)

$$c_1 = 9.00054$$

I - Ambient Temperature °C

THE PARTY OF THE P

 $C_2$  (Mechanical Stress Base Failure Rate)  $C_2 = 0.0085$ 

### 2.1.3 Non-operational Failure Rate Data

### 2.1.3.1 <u>Bipolar Digital SSI/MSI Devices</u>

The failure rate models are based on a collection of data which includes over 5 billion hours of storage or non-operating field data with 132 device failures. In addition, over 170 million hours of high temperature storage life data was collected with 616 device failures reported.

Storage data collected is summarized in tables 2.1-3 through 2.1-6. This data is organized in accordance to the metallization and interconnection systems.

Data sources for this analysis were:

- a) RADC-TR-73-248 report "Dormancy and Power Cn-Off Cycling Effects on Electronic Equipment and Part Reliability," August 1973
- b) The Reliability Analysis Center Generic Failure Rate Publication - December 1973
- c) Sandia Corp. W68 Field Experience
- d) Raytheon Improved Hawk Field Experience
- e) Planning Research Corporation Data on Standby Devices
- f) Special Test Data on the General Electric Site Defense Program.

energiskertof orderlikent fertiprødtskelten blædende ich volkelskeltelske vistelske blidthom, derikles for

A first characterization of the storage or non-operating data identified a definite correlation between the device failure rate and the device quality and temperature. However, insufficient data was available to determine the effect of a learning factor or an application environment factor. The data on device complexity was analyzed but no significant differences were noted between the storage failure rate and the complexity of the device for SSI/MSI devices.

During the first characterization of the non-operating data, the failure experience indicated a sufficient difference between devices with aluminum metallization/aluminum wire systems and aluminum metallization/gold wire systems to require segregation of the data sets. This led to the segregation of data sets for other

metallization/interconnection systems even though sufficient data was not available to completely characterize them.

The initial data characterization divided the data into several data sets with the prime category being metallization/interconnection systems; the first subcategory being quality level; and the second subcategory being ambient temperature.

Following this characterization several other potential reliability factors were investigated. The results of the investigations indicated that no significant reliability difference was apparent in the data for storage duration, logic type, or package type. The data was insufficient to determine any factors for the die attach method or glassivation.

Failure mechanisms for 28 of the 372 storage life test failures of aluminum metallization/aluminum wire devices were reported. In the aluminum metallization/gold wire case, failure mechanisms for 155 of the 243 storage life test failures were reported. The distributions of failure mechanisms for both aluminum and gold wire systems are shown in Table 2.1-7.

### 2.1.3.2 Bipolar Linear SSI/MSI Devices

The failure rate models are based on a collection of data which includes over 1.7 billion hours of storage or non-operating field data with 12 device failures reported. In addition over 39 million hours of high temperature storage life data was collected with 87 device failures reported.

Storage data collected is summarized in Tables 2.1-8 and 2.1-9 depending on the metallization and interconnection systems used:

Primary data sources include two missile programs, one special storage program and two reliability data banks.

TABLE 2.1-3. MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR DIGITAL NON-OPERATING DATA (ALUMINUM METALLIZATION, ALUMINUM WIRE)

QUALITY LEVEL	AMBIENT TEMPERATURE	STORAGE HOURS X 10 <sup>6</sup>	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURE RATE IN FITS*
Class A	25-30°C 22°C (Nitro-	5,861.4	5	.85
	gen Atmosp.)	1,071.2	0	(<.9)
	125°C	.113	0	(<8850.)
Class B	25-30°C	3,512.7	11	3.1
	150°C	.155	0	<b>(&lt;6452.)</b>
	250°C	.009	2	222000.
Class C	25-30°C	2,103.0	8	.3.8
	125°C	. 4	0	(<2500.)
	150°C	64.593	25	387.
	180°C	.11	0	(<9091.)
	200°C	5.954	16	2687.
	250°C	3.1	23	7420.
	300°C	3.656	59	16136.
	350°C	2.152	148	68760.
Class D	25-30°C	4.61	0	(<217.)
~_	125°C	2.953	5	1693.
	150°C	42.207	39	924.
	175°C	1.643	9	5479.
	180°C	.205	0	(<4878.)
•	200°C	6.472	0 3	463.
	300°C	.788	43	54558.

TABLE 2.1-4. MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR DIGITAL NON-OPERATING DATA (ALUMINUM METALLIZATION, GOLD WIRE)

QUALITY LEVEL	AMBIENT TEMPERATURE	STORAGE HOURS X 10 <sup>6</sup>	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURERATE IN FITS*
Class A	250°C	.01	0	(<100000.)
	300°C	.01	0	(<100000.)
	350°C	.01	0	(<100000.)
Class B	25-30°C	2,604.11	77	30.
Class C	150°C	15.848	50	3155.
	175°C	.282	0	(<3546.)
•	200°C	.758	9	11873.
	250°C	.315	13	41270.
Class D	25-30°C	.268	0	(<3713.)
	125°C	.307	0	(<3257.)
	150°C	16.875	25	1481.
	180°C	.086	7	81112.
	200°C	.119	40	336417.
	250°C	.063	99	1462000.

<sup>\*</sup> Failures per Billion Hours

TABLE 2.1-5. MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR DIGITAL NON-OPERATING DATA (GOLD METALLIZATION, GOLD WIRE)

QUALITY LEVEL	AMBIENT TEMPERATURE	STORAGE HOURS X 10 <sup>6</sup>	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Class B	25-30°C	.354	0	(<2825.)
Class C	25-30°C	8.689	0	(<115.)
Class D	25-30°C	8.689	0	(<115.)

TABLE 2.1-6. MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR DIGITAL NON-OPERATING DATA (GOLD BEAM SEALED JUNCTION)

QUALITY	AMBIENT	STORAGE	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE
LEVEL	TEMPERATURE	HOURS X 10 <sup>6</sup>	FAILED	IN FITS
Class B	150°C	.045	0	(<22200.)
Class D	150°C	2.41	0	(<415.)
	200°C	2.13	1	469.
	300°C	.062	0	(<16200.)

### TABLE 2.1-7. PRINCIPLE FAILURE MECHANISMS

### Aluminum Metallization, Aluminum Wire, Gold Post

Oxide Defects (31%)

Wire Bond (19%)

Diffusion Defects (16%)

Surface Inversion (13%)

Al-Au Post Bond (12&)

Die Bond (3%)

Lead Failures (6%)

### Aluminum Metallization, Gold Wire, Gold Post

Wire Bond (76%)

Resistive Output (16%)

Oxide Defects (4%)

Die Bond (2%)

Wire Shore (2%)

Cracked Die (1%)

The initial data characterization divided the data into several data sets with the prime category being metallization/interconnection systems; the first subcategory being quality level; and the second subcategory being ambient temperature.

No data was available, on gold metal system or beam lead systems.

Compared to the bipolar digital device data, considerably less data is available on the bipolar linear devices. A comparison of these two data sets indicated a close correlation. Coefficients of correlation for the linear data points to the digital prediction models were calculated to be 0.899 for quality class C and 0.933 for class D devices with aluminum metallization/aluminum wire systems. Insufficient data points were available on devices with aluminum metallization/gold wire systems to estimate a correlation.

Based on this close correlation, a test of significance was performed to determine whether there was any significant difference in the linear and digital data points. The test indicated no significant difference and for the linear data a decision was made to use the same Arrhenius function developed for the digital data points.

Following the decision to use the digital prediction models, data on storage duration, device function, package type, die attach method and glassivation was analyzed for linear devices and for digital and linear devices combined to determine potential reliability problems. The results of the investigation indicated that no significant reliability difference was apparent for these factors.

No data on failure mechanisms was available for the linear devices in storage. Since the bipolar linear device construction is identical to the digital device, no significant difference would be anticipated. The primary operational failure modes for linear devices which are not as predominant for digital devices are drift and inversion phenomenon. The failure modes may be

TABLE 2.1-8. MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR LINEAR NON-OPERATING DATA (ALUMINUM METALLIZATION, ALUMINUM WIRE)

QUALITY	AMBIENT TEMPERATURE	STORAGE HOURS X 106	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURE RATE IN FITS*
Class A	150°C	.038	0	(<26316.)
Class B	25-30°C 150°C	556.266 .076	2 0	3.59 (<13158.)
Class C	150°C 180°C 200°C 250°C 300°C 350°C	9.709 7.959 3.034 .338 .292	4 0 1 3 3	411. (<126.) 330. 8876. 10274. 58309.
Class D	100°C 150°C 300°C 350°C	.010 13.392 .131 .041	0 15 9 29	(<100000.) 1120. 68702. 710784.
Class B-A	24°C-Ni- trogen Atmosphere	·289.966	1	3.45

TABLE 2.1-9. MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR LINEAR NON-OPERATING DATA (ALUMINUM METALLIZATION, GOLD WIRE)

QUALITY LEVEL	AMBIENT TEMPERATURE	STORAGE HOURS X 10 <sup>6</sup>	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURE RATE IN FITS*
Class B	25°-30°C	114.	6	53.
Class C	150°C	2.880	6	2083.
Class D	150°C	. 896	4	4463.

TABLE 2.1-10. MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR LINEAR NON-OPERATING DATA (METALLIZATION/WIRE TYPE UNKNOWN)

QUALITY	AMBIENT TEMPERATURE	STORAGE HOURS X 106	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURE RATE IN FITS*
Class A	25°-30°C	535.534	1	1.86
Class B	25°-30°C	235.534	2	8.49

caused by ionic contamination or defects in the chip surface and normally require a certain amount of operational time for their occurrence. Therefore, the bipolar linear device failure mechanisms in storage would be similar to those reported for digital devices which include oxide defects, failed wire bonds, diffusion defects, failed die bonds and lead failures.

### 2.1.3.3 MOS SSI/MSI Devices

The data collected on MOS SSI/MSI Devices did not include any field data but consisted of approximately 4 million hours of high temperature storage life data with 81 device failures reported.

Storage data collected is summarized in Table 2.1-11.

Data is given by metallization/Interconnection Systems, quality level, storage temperature and complexity.

Failure modes or mechanisms for 35 of the storage life test failures were reported. These modes and mechanisms are listed in Table 2.1-12.

### 2.1.3.4 Bipolar & MOS LSI Devices

All data available on Bipolar and MOS LSI Devices was included in the memory section. This included complex (larger than dual 8-bit) static and dynamic shift registers. Smaller shift registers were included in the Digital SSI/MSI models.

### 2.1.3.5 Memories

Data on two major categories of monolithic memories was collected: random-access memories (RAMS) and read only memories (ROMS). Complex (larger than dual 8-bit) static and dynamic shift registers were included with the RAM data.

Data on RAMS consisted of 3 million hours of storage data roughly equivalent to field storage with no failures reported. In addition, approximately 5 million hours of high temperature storage life data with 76 device failures was reported.

Data on ROMS consisted entirely of high temperature storage life data with slightly more than 1 million hours and 25 failures reported.

TABLE 2.1-11

MOS SSI/MSI DEVICE NON-OPERATING DATA

Quality Level	Ambient Temperature	Metal/Inter- conn.	Complex.	Part Stor. Hrs.x 10	No. of Failures	Fail.Rate in Fits
A	150°C	Al/Al	SSI MSI	.015 .017	0 5	(<66657.) 299401.
D	125°C 140°C 150°C	Al/Al Al/Al Al/Al	MSI SSI SSI MSI	.206 .011 2.232 .084	24 1 2 0	121654. 88889. 896. (<11905:)
С	150°C	Al/Au	MSI	.100	0	(<10000.)
	130°C 150°C 250°C 300°C 350°C	Al/Au Al/Au Al/Au Al/Au Al/Au	MSI SSI MSI SSI SSI SSI	.510 .108 .242 .057 .110	1 0 1 1 15 3J	1961. (<9259.) 4127. 17544. 136363. 497592.

TABLE 2.1-12

MOS SSI/MSI DEVICE REPORTED FAILURE MODES & MECHANISMS

13

No. Reported	Mode or Mechanism
5	Drift
10	Open
1	Short
1	Field Oxide Short
2	Gate Oxide Short
1 '	Lid Seal Defective
2	Al Wire Bond Defects
6	Au Ball Bond Defects
2	Al/Au Kirkendall Voids
1	Die Bond Defect
1	Resistive Junction
19	Contamination
2	Foreign Particles

The storage data collect—is summarized in Tables 2.1-13 through 2.1-15. Data is given by quality level, storage temperature, complexity, metallization/interconnection system and logic type.

Failure modes or mechanisms for 55 of the storage life test failures were reported. These modes and mechanisms are listed in Table 2.1-16.

and december of the second of the second second

### TABLE 2.1-13. RANDOM-ACCESS MEMORIES (RAMS) NON-OPERATING DATA (ALUMINUM METALLIZATION/ALUMINUM WIRE SYSTEM)

The second of th

QUALITY LEVEL	TEMP	BITS	LOGIC	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER FAILED	
С	150°C	1024	MOS	.050	0	(<20000.)
D	85°C	64	MOS	.400	0	(<2500.)
D .	125°C	256	TTL	.139	7	50360.
		16	MOS	.384	0	(<2600.)
		64	MOS	.180	18	(<100000.)
		256	MOS	.226	2	8850.
		1024	MOS	.040	0	(<25000.)
D	150°C	8	TTL	.025	0	(<40000.)
		16	TTL	.252	0	(<3968.)
		64	$\mathtt{TTL}$	.015	0	(<66700.)
		_	MOS	.038	0	(<26300.)
		32	MOS	.028	0	(<35700.)
		64	MOS	.034	0	(<29400.)
		256	MOS	.620	4	6450.
D	160°C	256	MOS	.015	0	(<66700.)
		1024	Mos	.015	0	(<66700.)

### TABLE 2.1-14. RANDOM-ACCESS MEMORIES (RAMS) NON-OPERATING DATA

(ALUMINUM METALLIZATION/GOLD WIRE SYSTEM)

	(MICHTIA	OF PIL.	「いかかいすので	ZY YOM GOY	n utve o	TOTELL
				STORAGE		FAILURE
QUALITY	?			HOURS	NUMBER	RATE
LEVEL	TEMP	BITS	LOGIC	X 10 <sup>6</sup>	FAILED	IN FITS
D	85°C	20	MOS	.220	0	(<4545.)
		21	MOS	2.200	0	(<454.)
	đu	al 25	MOS	.220	0	(<4545.)
	125°C	_	MOS	.034	0	(<29400.)
		256	MOS	.375	0	(<2667.)
		512	MOS	.288	34	118000.
		1024	MOS	.218	0	(<4590.)
	130°C	_	MOS	.040	0	(<25000.)
	,	20	MOS	.470	Ō	(<2128.)
		21	MOS	.360	Ō	(<2778.)
	đu	al 25	MOS	.300	Ō	(<3333.)
		64	MOS	.060	Ö	(<16700.)
	150°C	20	MOS	.160	ì	6250.
		al 16	MOS	.054	Ō	(<18500.)
		64	MOS	.051	Ŏ	(<19600.)
		1024	MOS	.036	Ŏ	(<26700.)
		64	TTL	.104	Ö	(<9615.)
	160°C	256	MOS	.100	Ŏ	(<10000.)
	200 0	1024	MOS	.144	Ö	(<6969.)

TABLE 2.1-15. READ ONLY MEMORIES (ROMS)
NON-OPERATING DATA

				STORAGE		FAILURE
QUALITY	•			HOURS	NUMBER	RATE
LEVEL	TEMP	BITS	LOGIC	X 10°	FAILED	IN FITS
(ALUMIN	JM META	L/ALUM	INUM WIRE	SYSTEM)		
С	180°C	1256	Schottky TTL	.019	0	(<52600.)
	150°C	512	TTL	.092	0	(<10870.)
		8256	TTL	.022	0	(<45400.)
D	125°C	64	Schottky TTL	.529	23	43500.
		2048	MOS	.058	0	(<17000.)
	150°C	1024		.050	2	40000.
		-	RTL	.211	0	(<4740.)
		1024	MOS	.018	Ö	(<57100.)
	160°C	64	Schottky	.025	0	(<40000.)
		2048	MOS	.005	0	(<200000.)
(ALUMIN	JM META	L/GOLD	WIRE SYST	'EM)		
В	160°C	256	Schottky TTL	.025	0	(<40000.)
D	150°C	2560	MOS	.052	0	(<19300.)
		-	MOS	.068	0	(<14700.)
	160°C	2048	MOS	.025	0	(<40000.)

TABLE 2.1-16
MEMORIES REPORTED FAILURE MODES AND MECHANISMS

		No. of Units	Mode or Mechanism
RAMS	- Al Metal/Al Wire .	?	Oxide Pinhole
		18	Gate Oxide Pinhole
		1	Field Oxide Pinhole
		2	Contamination
RAMS	- Al Metal/Au Wire	2	Gate Oxide Pinhole
	•	1	Field Oxide Pinhole
		31	Contamination
ROMS	- Al/Metal/Al Wire	?	Wire Bond Defects
ROMS	- Al Metal/Au Wire - Non	ne Reported	

The second of th

### 2.2 Monolithic Integrated Circuits Operational Prediction Models

The MIL-HDBK-217B general failure rate model for monolithic integrated circuits is:

$$\lambda_{p} = \Pi_{L} \Pi_{Q} (\Pi_{T} C_{1} + \Pi_{E} C_{2}) \times 10^{-6}$$

where:

 $\lambda_n$  = device failure rate

II = learning adjustment factor

 $II_O = quality adjustment factor$ 

C<sub>1</sub> & C<sub>2</sub>= Complexity Factors

 $II_m = Temperature Adjustment Factor$ 

II = Environmental Adjustment Factor

The various types of microelectronic devices require different values for each of these factors. The specific factor values for each type of device are shown in Figures 2.2-1 through 2.2-7.

In the title description of each monolithic device type, SSI, MSI, and LSI represent Small Scale Integration, Medium Scale Integration, and Large Scale Integration respectively, and indicate the complexity level for which the device model is applicable. MOS represents all metal-oxide semiconductor microcircuits which includes NMOS, PMOS, CMOS, and MNOS fabricated on various substrates, such as sapphire, polycrystalline, or single crystal silicon.

Since different models are designated for the SSI/MSI and LSI Monolithic Digital devices, the following distinction in terms of complexity level is made in order to provide guidance in selection of the appropriate model. For the present, and until a new limit is established, devices having complexities less than 100 gates (approximately 400 transistors) are to be considered as SSI/MSI devices. More complex devices by gate count (or transistor count at 4 per gate) are to be considered as LSI devices. No distinction is made between SSI and MSI Monolithic Digital devices since the same model applies directly to both. Also, no distinction is made between the complexity factors for MOS and Bipolar devices in that the factors that define complexity are independent of the specific technologies.

For the purposes of this handbook, a gate is considered to be any one of the following logic functions: AND, OR, NAND, NOR, Exclusive OR, and Inverter. A J-K or R-S flip-flop is equivalent to 8 gates when used as part of a complex circuit. When the flip-flop is individually packaged (single, dual, or greater) the gate count should be determined from the schematic or logic diagram. For guidance in symbols used for these functions, see Standard ANSI Y32.14-1973, "Graphic Symbols for Logic Diagrams." This standard has been adopted by the Department of Defense and supersedes Mil-Std-806B (an earlier logic symbol standard).

Monolithic memories, because of their high gate-to-pin ratio, are not treated as a part of the SSI/MSI/LSI models. Their complexity factors are expressed in terms of the number of bits and are divided into the two major categories of monolithic memories: random-access memories (RAMS), and read-only memories (ROMS). However, for the purposes of this handbook, programmable-read-only memories (PROMS) and content-addressable memories (CAMS) are considered in the same categories as ROMS and RAMS, respectively; therefore, the same models are applicable. For complex (larger than dual 8-bit) static and dynamic shift registers, use the RAM model with bit count. For smaller shift registers, use the Digital SSI/MSI model. For linear devices, both MOS and Bipolar, the same model expressing complexity in terms of the number of transistors is presented.

Table 2.2-1 provides a list of monolithic microelectronic generic groups with a cross reference to the corresponding figure number.

The failure rate model and adjustment factors are based on certain assumptions and sub models. See Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 for a description of these parameters.

### 2.2.1 Model Description

In order to help clarify some of the parameter descriptions for the various models, all of monolithic device models are based on a "  $\lambda_{\rm T}$  +  $\lambda_{\rm M}$  additive model concept" -- i.e.  $\lambda_{\rm P}$  =  $\lambda_{\rm T}$  +  $\lambda_{\rm M}$ ,

where:

# TABLE 2.2-1. MONOLITHIC MICROELECTRONIC OPERATIONAL PREDICTION MODELS CROSS REFERENCE

Monolithic Microelectronic Type	Figure No.
Bipolar Digital SSI/MSI IC's (TTL, DTL, etc., excluding Bipolar Beam Lead and Bipolar ECL)	2.2-1
Bipolar Beam Lead and Bipolar ECL Digital SSI/MSI IC's	2.2-2
Bipolar Linear SSI/MSI IC's	2.2-3
MOS Digital SSI/MSI IC's	2.2-2
MOS Linear SSI/MSI IC's	2.2-3
Bipolar Digital LSI IC's (TTL, DTL, etc., excluding Bipolar Beam Lead and Bipolar ECL)	2.2-4
Bipolar Beam Lead and Bipolar ECL Digital LSI IC's	2.2-5
MOS LSI IC's	2.2-5
Bipolar Memory IC's (TTL, DTL, etc. excluding Bipolar Beam Lead and Bipolar ECL)	2.2-6
Bipolar Beam Lead and Bipolar ECL Memory IC's	2.2-7
MOS Memory IC's	2.2-7

THE PARTY OF THE P

MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR DIGITAL SSI/MSI INTEGRATED CIRCUITS MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL & ECL (TTL, DTL, etc. excludes Beam Lead FIGURE 2.2-1

是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们

 $\lambda_{\tilde{y}} = \pi_{L} \tilde{h}_{\tilde{Q}} ( \pi_{T} c_{1} + \pi_{E} c_{2} ) \times 10^{-6}$ 

(Learning Factor) II.

extended line interruption or change a new device in initial production a major change in design or process in line personnel otherwise 366 for 10 --1 Ħ 11 H

 $\pi_Q$  (Quality Factor)

по	7		7		2	<del></del>		10				16	-	150	_
Quality Level	MIL-M-38510	Class A (JAN)	MIL-M-38510	Class B (JAN)	MIL-STD-883	Method 5004	Class B	Vendor Equiv.	MIL-STD-883	Method 5004	Class B	MIL-M-35810	Class C (JAN)	Commercial	Class D

(Complexity Factors) ပ် Ø

ပ်

	c <sup>2</sup>		$\mathbf{H}$	$\vdash$		.016
	$c_1$	~	Н	-	$\mathbf{H}$	.019
	No. Gates	46			52	
	C2	03		90	.0074	.0082
7	$c_1$	<b> </b>	02	03	04	.0053
7	o. tes		7	4	9	80

0.100.0010.00100.0 .019 .020 020 020 .022 .022 .023 .023 .025 .021 021 .022 024 026 027 028 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 .0089 .0095 .010 .013 .014 .014 .015 1600 6900 1900 0077 0084 014 014 015 015 011 011 012 013 R Ga t

				_	_		_	_							
	П	T	•	•	•	•	•	•	•			17.		- Control of the Cont	
tor)	T	(°င်)	0	0	4	Н	2	~	$\omega$	4	ស	165	~		
Fact	-ш			•	•	•	•	•	•		•	2.1	•	•	•
ture	Ŧ÷											55			
ra	Ш											. 79			1.0
(Tempe	Ħ,	က်)	51	53	55	57	539	19	63	65	67	69	71	73	75
H <sub>T</sub>	F	H	10									.25			
!	£;											43			

 $\Pi_{
m E}$  (Environmental Factor)

Environment	⊒ E
Ground, Benign	
Space Flight	0
Ground, Fixed	۲,
Airborne, Inhabited	7
Naval, Sheltered	4.
Ground, Mobile	4.
Airborne, Uninhab.	6
Naval, Unsheltered	بى
Satellite or	10.
Missile Launch	

orthogogy of the second of the

MUNOLITHIC BIPOLAR BEAM LEAD, BIPOLAR ECL & MOS MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL DIGITAL SSI/MSI INTEGRATED CIRCUITS FIGURE 2.2-2

CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR O

The state of the s

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \Pi_{\rm L} \Pi_{\rm Q} \ ( \ \Pi_{\rm T} C_{\rm l} + \Pi_{\rm E} C_{\rm 2} \ ) \times 10^{-6}$ 

(Learning Factor)

extended line interruption or change a major change in design or process a new device in initial production in line personnel otherwise 33 for 10 <u>.</u> X 11

C<sub>2</sub> (Complexity Factors) W (Quality Factor)

Į,

Quality Level

N

S

10

Vendor Equiv

MIL-STD-883

Method 5004

Class B

16

150

Class C (JAN)

Commercial

Class D

MIL-M-35810

.018 019 020 020 021 022 022 022 023 021 Gates Š 62 64 66 68 70 .0095 .0064 .0089 .0074 .0082 .0050 .012 0043 0033 0053 0084 1900 6900 0021 0077 1600 8600 Gates No. 80222222 8022222 80249 80249

(	_п_	${f T}$				56.			S	ທ	Ō		Ñ		
actor)	L	0	0	õ	Ä	115	Ñ	~	m	₹	S	Ö	1		
E4	1		•	•	•	8.5	•							23.	
Temperature	T	(့င်)													
ешре	Ш	T	တ	•	•	1.4	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Ŀ	ŗŢ	(၁၄)				. 57									
ш	Ш	H				.17								.65	
	F.	ည်				37									

0.2 0000 6.0 Factor) Airborne, Inhabited (Environmental Naval, Unsheltered Airborne, Uninhab Naval, Sheltered Launch Ground, Mobile Environment Ground, Benign Ground, Fixed Space Flight Satellite or Missile,

.018

023

024 024

025 025 026 028

027

direction of the second of the

Class A (JAN)

MIL-M-38510

MIL-M-38510

Class B (JAN)

MIL-STD-883

Method 5004

Class B

## MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR & MOS LINEAR SSI/MSI INTEGRATED CIRCUITS FIGURE 2.2-3

是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人

$$\lambda_{\rm p} = n_{\rm L} n_{\rm Q} ( n_{\rm T} c_{\rm l} + n_{\rm E} c_{\rm 2}) \times 10^{-6}$$

 $\Pi_{\underline{L}}$  (Learning Factor)

<pre>II, = 10 for 1) a new device in initial p</pre>	production
2) a major change in design	or process
3) extended line interruption	on or change
in line personnel	
II = 1 otherwise	•

- 54
$\sim$
ţ
بد
ับ
Fac
Ť.
$\rightarrow$
ţζ
ಹ
- 3
ã
$\sim$
-
`
=

	Oμ	7		7		വ	~		10				16	<del>,</del>	150	
, ŏ	Quality Level	MIL-M-38510	Class A (JAN)	385	m	7	Method 5004	Class B	Vendor Equiv.	Y	Method 5004	Class B	35	Class C (JAN)	Commercial	Class D

Factors)
Complexity
C <sub>2</sub>
دی سا
ပ်

c <sub>2</sub>	ကြ							.039			.043			.046			.050			•056		
$c_1$		Ч	Ч	~	2	~	~	.024	~	~	2	2	2	m	3	3	m	3	n	マ	4	4
	<u>L</u> _	0	0	0	Н	3	3		4	ស	9	~	$\infty$	$\infty$	σ	0	~	$\mathbf{c}$	S	9	œ	0
	.0056	0		-1										~								
$c_1$	6	02	03	04	05	90	07	.0079	80	60	$\overline{}$	H	~	H	Н	H	-	Ļ	H	Н	Н	H
No. Frans	Ą	œ						32														

### II (Temperature Factor)

	TH		32.			m	4	55		90	10	Ñ		•
	بر و ا	0		$\vdash$	-	3	N	m	4	S	ø	~		
	Lu	5.7		•	•	•	÷					20.		
	Tj.													
	LI	$ \infty $	1.0	•	•	•	•	•	. •	•			•	•
	13.													
7	n <sub>T</sub>		.12											
	٦. ر	25												

## IE (Environmental Factor)

a <sub>u</sub>
0.2
0.2
<u>-</u>
Inhabited 4.0
•
•
9
س
10.0
ronment Benign light Fixed e, Inhabite Sheltered Mobile e, Uninhab, Unsheltered te or

2.2-4 MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR LSI INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (TTL, DTL, etc. excludes Beam Lead & ECL) FIGURE

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \pi_{\rm L} \pi_{\rm Q} ( \pi_{\rm T} c_{\rm 1} + \pi_{\rm E} c_{\rm 2} ) \times 10^{-6}$ 

(Learning Factor)

a major change in design or process extended line interruption or change a new device in initial production in, line personnel otherwise. 325 = 10 forII

In (Quality Factor)

	Ŏπ	7		7		<u>ئ</u>			70			<del>-</del>	16		150	
2	Quality Level	MIL-M-38510	ID.	¥	Class B (JAN)	ES	g	Class B	Vendor Equiv.	MIL-STD-883	Method 5004	Class B	MIL-M-35810	Class C (JAN)	Commercial	Class D

tors)	$c_2$	7.7.						. 23															•	•	2.1	٠	•
Facto	$c_1$		•36					.58					o.	•	•	•	•	1.5	•	•	•	2.6	•	•	5.3	•	-
Lexity			m	S	~	Ō	Ä	m	S	~	9		m	S	~	Ö	H	3	ហ	~	Ō	05	10	15	0	25	30
(Comp1	c <sub>2</sub>	.020	2	2														.074				.10	11.	.12	.13	.15	.16
$c_2$	$c_1$	.030	m	m	m	4	4	.050	ហ	9	ဖ်	~	$\overline{\omega}$	œ	9							.19					
C <sub>1</sub> &	0 +	100	$\vdash$	m	S	~	g	-1	m	S	-	9	Н	m	S	-	σ	$\boldsymbol{\vdash}$	n	S	~	O	-4	n	ນ	~	9

T <sub>T</sub> (Temperature Factor)  (°C) T (°												-	_		_
Jun (Temperature Factor)  1 II T T T (°C)  5 .10 51 .36 77 1.1 103 2  7 .11 53 .40 79 1.2 105 3  9 .12 55 .44 81 1.3 110 3  1 .14 57 .48 83 1.4 115 4  3 .15 59 .52 85 1.5 120 4  5 .17 61 .57 87 1.6 125 5  7 .19 63 .52 89 1.7 135 7  9 .21 65 .67 91 1.9 145 10  1 .23 67 .73 93 2.0 155 13  5 .28 71 .86 97 2.3 175 22  7 .30 73 93 99 2.5			8	0	9	~	σ	~	7					•	1
Jun (Temperature Factor)  1 II T T II T T T T T T T T T T T T T T		=	-	m	ä	*	٠.	'n		<u>.</u>	'n	ċ	ä		- 1
J II Temperature  J II T J II T J II  S 10 51 .36 77 1.  1.14 57 .48 81 1.  3.15 59 .52 85 1.  9.21 65 .67 91 1.  1.23 67 .73 93 2.  5.28 71 .86 97 2.  7.30 73 .93 99 2.	~		Γ'	• •	• •	•	•		•						
J II Temperature  J II T J II T J II  S 10 51 .36 77 1.  1.14 57 .48 81 1.  3.15 59 .52 85 1.  9.21 65 .67 91 1.  1.23 67 .73 93 2.  5.28 71 .86 97 2.  7.30 73 .93 99 2.	Ä		3	_	_		$\overline{}$		_	10		10	10		$\neg$
J II Temperature  J II T J II T J II  S 10 51 .36 77 1.  1.14 57 .48 81 1.  3.15 59 .52 85 1.  9.21 65 .67 91 1.  1.23 67 .73 93 2.  5.28 71 .86 97 2.  7.30 73 .93 99 2.	ŭ	E 0													- 1
J II Temperature  J II T J II T J II  S 10 51 .36 77 1.  1.14 57 .48 81 1.  3.15 59 .52 85 1.  9.21 65 .67 91 1.  1.23 67 .73 93 2.  5.28 71 .86 97 2.  7.30 73 .93 99 2.	Ŋ		H	H	H	H	H	Ч	Н	Н	Н	Н	Н		1
J II Temperature  J II T J II T J II  S 10 51 .36 77 1.  1.14 57 .48 81 1.  3.15 59 .52 85 1.  9.21 65 .67 91 1.  1.23 67 .73 93 2.  5.28 71 .86 97 2.  7.30 73 .93 99 2.	E G	FI		~	3	Ŧ	2	9	7	9	0	一	3	2	9
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #			•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	ည		ĭ	ᅼ	ᅼ	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>~</u>	<u> </u>	<u>~</u>	~	2	7	낔
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	7	က်ပ	6	σ	~	m	ເດ	7	თ	Н	ന	S	~	0	H
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	TT.	EH 0	-	~	$\infty$	$\infty$	$\infty$	Φ	ω	9	σ	σ	9	σ	의
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	Ľ	)													
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	Ø	E	9	0	4										0
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	멅	=	۳.	4.	4	4	ស	ស	œ.	ø	1		ω,	o.	_;
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	O I		<del>ا</del> نا		Ť									-	-4
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	Ħ	100													
100	_	F C	L.	u,	u)	u)	u)	W	W	w	w	w	•		,-
ב ביייייייייייייייייייייייייייייייייי			<u> </u>											_	긐
10000000000000000000000000000000000000			2	ゴ	$\simeq$	7	2	7	5	7	23			_	
		_	<b>[</b> :	•	7	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	-
			1.	_	_		_	••	~	~		~		_	$\overline{a}$
		ETO													4
			L			_									

The state of the s

田田	E (Environmental factor)	ac cor
E	Environment	II E
Ground	nd, Benign	0.2
Space	Plight	0.2
Groun	nd, Fixed	1.0
Airbo	Airborne, Inhabited	4.0
Naval,	l, Sheltered	4.0
Ground,	nd, Mobile	7.0
Airbo	Airborne, Uninhab.	0.9
Nava]	l, Unsheltered	5.0
Sate	Satellite or	10.0
Missi	Missile, Launch	

MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR BEAM LEAD, BIPOLAR ECL & MOS MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL CIRCUITS INTEGRATED FIGURE 2.2-5

 $( \pi_{\rm T} c_1 + \pi_{\rm E} c_2 ) \approx 10^{-6}$  $\lambda_p = \pi_L \pi_Q$ 

(Temperature Factor)

II II

(Learning Factor)

extended line interruption or change major change in design or process new device in initial production in line personnel ಗ ಡ otherwise a a a for 10 H 11 ŧ

(Quality Factor) C C

42. 56. 73. 155.

5

83 83 83 83 83

1.6 1.9

76666667597 7667697697

1.4

1.0

53

3.5 9 250. 390. 610. 920.

97 101

8

.65

93

0,000,00 0,000,00

.40

120 125 135 145 155 165

28.

ПТ

II.

ည်

II.

Quality Level MIL-M-38510 Class A (JAN) MIL-STD-883 Method 5004 Class B Vendor Equiv. MIL-STD-883 Method 5004 Class B MIL-STD-883 Method 5004 Class B MIL-M-35310 Class B Class B Commercial Class D		о́п	7	•	7		2			10				16		150	••••
	2		MIL-M-38510	Class A (JAN)	MIL-M-38510	Class B (JAN)	MIL-STD-883	Method 5004	Class B	Vendor Equiv.	MIL-STD-883	Method 5004	Class B	MIL-M-35310	Class C (JAN)	Commercial	Class D

333 .40 .20 .24 .26 .29 .34 .44 .48 .52 .62 .67 Factors) .36 .40 .44 .48 .53 .64 .70 .77 .93 (Complexity Gates 850 So. 630 650 670 690 790 830 890 930 950 .021 .038 .041 .053 .057 .062 .068 .074 .028 .029 .032 .034  $c_2^2$ .073 .046 .050 .055 .061 .088 .097 .042 .031  $^{2}_{2}$ ပ် ß Gates 410430 No. 130 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 290 310 330 350 390 5 C

Factor)	_
(Environment	
_ <u>i</u> i	_

Environment	II.
Ground, Benign	0.2
Space Flight	0.2
Ground, Fixed	H.
Airborne, Inhabited	4.
Naval, Sheltered	4.
Ground, Mobile	4
Airborne, Uninhab.	0.9
Naval, Unsheltered	•
Satellite or	10.0
Missile Lannch	

990

.088

450

490

1100 1050

1150 1200 1250

530

The second designation of the second second

(TTL, ETL etc., excludes Bipolar Beam Lead and Bipolar ECL) MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR BIPOLAR MEMORIES FIGURE 2.2-6

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \pi_{\rm L} \pi_{\rm Q} ( \pi_{\rm T} c_{\rm l} + \pi_{\rm E} c_{\rm 2}) \times 10^{-6}$ 

 $\Pi_{\rm L}$  (Learning Factor)

 $\Pi_L = 10 \text{ for 1) a new device in initial production} \\ 2) \text{ a major change in design or process} \\ 3) \text{ extended line interruption or change} \\ \text{in line personnel} \\ \Pi_L = 1 \text{ otherwise} \\$ 

 $\Pi_{Q}$  (Quality Factor)

	Oπ	7		7		ıs			10				16		150	
1	ity Level	M-38510	_	M-38510		4	500	æ s	or Equiv.	9-6	od 5004	2 3	358	S C (JAN)	ercial	s D
צ	Quality	MIL-1	10	MIL-	rń	MIL-S	Ē	Class	Vendor	MIL-	Metho	Class	MIL-1	Class	Comme	Class

 $c_1$  &  $c_2$  (Complexity Factors).

33

	RAMS		.0033	05	80	H		2	3	B	4	ស	S	7	$\infty$	$\infty$							
	2	$\sigma^{\mathbf{J}}$		Н	2	3	.056	9	8	g	$\omega$												
	ROMS	$c_2^2$	.0019	03	04	07,	.012	Н	Н	~	~	m	n	4	4	S							
7	RO	$^{\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{J}}}$	.0061	60	Н	2		3	4	S	~	~	$\infty$	H									
4		Bits				~	256	2	$\vdash$	~	02	12	28	04	24	56	60	13	21	024	228	4	638

 $\Pi_T$   $T_j$   $\Pi_T$   $T_j$   $\Pi_T$   $T_j$   $\Pi_T$   $T_j$   $\Pi_T$   $\Pi_T$  <t

4.0 田田 0.2 1.0 4.0 4.0 (Environmental Factor) Airborne, Inhabited Naval, Unsheltered Airborne, Uninhab Naval, Sheltered Ground, Mobile Ground, Benign **Environment** Ground, Fixed Space Flight Satellite or

Missile, Launch

A SECTION OF THE PROPERTY OF T

FOR BIPOLAR BEAM LEAD, BIPOLAR ECL and MOS MEMORIES MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FIGURE 2.2-7

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = n_{\rm L} n_{\rm Q} ( n_{\rm T} c_{\rm L} + n_{\rm E} c_{\rm Z} ) \times 10^{-6}$ 

(Learning Factor)

extended line interruption or change a major change in design or process a new device in initial production in line personnel otherwise = 10 for 4 n

 $c_1$  &  $c_2$  (Complexity Factors)

	RO	ROMS	R	RAMS
its	$\tau_{\mathfrak{I}}$	$c_{2}$	ت <sup>ئ</sup> .	7
			.011	.0033
	60	m		
	Н	-	~	
N	2		n	- 1
S	W			.020
N	m			-
H				
~	.053			.034
02		N	.13	
12		3	.14	
2		m		
04	.11			
24	.12			
હ	.13	.051	.23	
60	.17			.12
19	.26	.11	.46	
21		.12		.20
2	.30	.13		
28		.14	.58	.24
	.37	1.16		.27
,	. (	!		•

~

Class A (JAN)

MIL-M-38510

MIL-M-38510

Class B (JAN)

MIL-STD-883 Method 5004

S

10

Vendor Equiv.

Class B

MIL-STD-883 Method 5004 16

150

Class C (JAN)

Commercial

MIL-M-35810

Class B

			32.				4	S	0	90	10	20		
actor)	<sup>π</sup> ၌ (°င)	0		H	-	~	2	S	4	S	9	~		
4	тп	•	•	•	•	•	ä						23.	
rature	$^{\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{j}}}$ (၁၄)												66	
Temper		8	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	4.4	•
T (Te	T <sub>j</sub> (°င)												73	
п,	Tu												.65	.76
														49

IE Environmental Factor)	ctor)
Environment	πE
Ground, Benign	•
싎	0.5
a, Fi	1.0
Airborne, Inhabited	4.0
Naval, Sheltered	4.0
Ground, Mobile	•
Airborne, Uninhab.	6.0
	•
Satellite or	10.0
lissile. Launch	-

THE PARTY OF THE P

16384

"Q (Quality Factor)

Quality Level

- $\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{p}$  is the overall device failure rate for monolithic devices.
- λ<sub>T</sub> is the failure rate component due to time degradation causes, and represents degradation mechanisms which are accelerated by temperature and electrical bias; composed largely of phenomena which follow the Arrhenius type rate acceleration.
- λ<sub>M</sub> is the failure rate component due to mechanical
  (application environment) causes, and represents
  failure mechanisms resulting from mechanical stresses
  directly, or indirectly (such as stresses set up by
  thermal expansion).

# 2.2.2 Parameters

# 2.2.2.1 Complexity Factors C<sub>1</sub> and C<sub>2</sub>

The circuit complexity factors,  $\mathbf{C_1}$  and  $\mathbf{C_2}$ , are based on the models presented below.

# 2.2.2.1.1 Digital SSI/MSI Devices

Tabulated values are derived from the following equations:

$$C_1 = 1.29 (10)^{-3} (N_G)^{0.677} C_2 = 3.89 (10)^{-3} (N_G)^{0.389}$$

where  $N_G$  = number of gates (assumes 4 transistors per gate). The tabulated values are applicable to devices in packages containing up to 22 pins. For larger packages multiply the values by:

No. of Pins	Multiplier
24 to 40	1.1
42 to 64	1.2
>64	1.3

# 2.2.2.1.2 Linear SSI/MSI Devices

Tabulated values are derived from the following equations:

$$c_1 = .00056 (N_T)^{0.763}$$
  $c_2 = .0026 (N_T)^{0.547}$ 

where  $N_{\mathbf{r}} = \text{number of transistors.}$ 

# 2.2.2.1.3 LSI Devices

Tabulated values are derived from the following equations:

$$c_1 = .0187e^{(.00471)N_G}$$
  $c_2 = .013e^{(.00423)N_G}$ 

where  $N_G$  = number of gates (assume 4 transistors per gate) and e = natural logarithm base, 2.718.

The tabulated values are applicable to devices in packages containing up to 24 pins. For larger rackages, multiply values by:

No. of Pins	Multiplier
26 to 64	1.1
>64	1.2

# 2.2.2.1.4 Memory Devices

Tabulated values are derived from the following equations:

For ROMS - 
$$C_1 = .00114 (B)^{0.603} C_2 = .00032 (B)^{0.646}$$

For RAMS - 
$$C_1 = .00199 (B)^{0.603} C_2 = .00056 (B)^{0.644}$$

where: B = number of bits.

The tabulated values are applicable to devices in packages containing up to 24 pins. For packages with greater than 24 pins, multiply tabulated values by 1.1.

TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERT

# 2.2.2.2 Learning Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_L$

 ${
m II}_{
m L}$  adjusts the model for production conditions and controls. The conditions are defined in the figures for each device type.

# 2.2.2.3 Quality Adjustment Factor, IIQ

 $\rm II_{\mbox{\scriptsize Q}}$  accounts for effects of different quality levels as defined in MIL-M-38510 and MIL-STD-883.

# 2.2.2.4 Temperature Adjustment Factor, $\pi_{_{{\bf T}}}$

 $\mathbf{II}_{\mathbf{T}}$  adjusts the model for temperature acceleration factors. Two models are applicable:

 $^{\rm II}_{\rm Tl}$  is applicable to Bipolar Digital devices, i.e. TTL and DTL, not included in  $^{\rm II}_{\rm T2}$  below.

$$\Pi_{m1} = 0.1e^{X}$$

where 
$$x = -4794 \left( \frac{1}{T_j} + \frac{1}{273} - \frac{1}{298} \right)$$

 $\rm II_{\rm T2}$  is applicable to Bipolar and MOS Linear, Bipolar Beam Lead, Bipolar ECL, and all other MOS devices.

$$\pi_{T2} = 0.1e^{x}$$
where:  $x = -8121 \left( \frac{1}{T_1 + 273} - \frac{1}{298} \right)$ 

In  $II_{T1}$  and  $II_{T2}$  above,  $T_j$  is the worst case junction temperature (°C) and e is natural logarithm base, 2.718.

If  $T_{j}$  is unknown, use the following approximations:

For packaged monolithic devices use:

 $T_{ij}$  = ambient T + 10°C if number of transistors  $\leq$  120.

T<sub>j</sub> = ambient T + 25°C if number of transistors >120.

# 2.2.2.5 Environmental Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{E}$

 $\Pi_{\rm E}$  accounts for the influence of environmental factors other than temperature. Refer to the environment description in the Appendix.

# 2.3 Hybrid Integrated Circuits Storage Reliability Analysis

A hybrid integrated circuit is any combination of solid state active circuit components (IC or discrete) and of thin or thick film-deposited passive circuit elements, in combination with other compatible discrete parts when called for, interconnected by film patterns on one or more substrates in a single device package, to perform one or more circuit functions. Hybrid IC's are commonly classified as either thin or thick film.

A vapor deposited or vacuum-evaporated, or also sputtered, plated or grown film circuit is called "thin film" when the mean free path of its current carriers (mainly electrons) is comparable in length to the thickness of the film, usually in the range of a few thousand Angstroms. In practice thin film is limited to a maximum of 10,000 Angstroms (1 micron).

A film circuit deposited by screen printing (or also by spraying) with subsequent air drying and high temperature firing steps, applied in sequential cycles, is commonly known as "thick film," denoting also that its structure came about by fusing originally separated and dispersed microscopic particulate matter into a self-passivating glaze. Thick film thickness overlaps the range of thin film thickness and extends approximately to 2.5 mils (63 microns).

# 2.3.1 Hybrid Device Failure Mechanisms

The hybrid failure mechanisms include all those listed for the monolithic devices plus those that are unique to the hybrid technology. Hybrid devices exhibit problems as a result of the number of different materiels used in one package; the number of interconnections and bonds; the amount of processing with the chance of error or inclusion of contaminating materiels; and the hermetic sealing of a larger package. Careful selection of materiels and control of processing and temperatures are required to prevent thermal mismatches between materiels; leaching, diffusion and migration of materiels; intermetallic compound formations; and corrosion.

Tables 2.3-1 and 2.3-2 summarize the mechanisms unique to thick and thin film devices. Many of these mechanisms would be detected in formal processing and screening.

In thick film devices, the faulty substrate bond or cracked substrate which is undetected or non-failed during processing will be accelerated to failure by mechanical vibration and shock. The frequency of this failure, whether in operation or not, is dependent on the transportation and handling of the equipment in the depots and field.

The failure mechanisms for thick film resistors include those failures in processing which would slip through the screens; those that are defects which are accelerated by high temperature or thermal cycling; and those that are a result of corrosion. The two latter groups of defects may be accelerated or decelerated to failure depending on the storage environment.

The chip element failure mechanisms in thick film devices are the same as monolithic except that bonding materiels or processes may be different.

The number of conductors and interconnections in the hybrid device lead to shorted conductors, faulty bonds, etc. Most of these defects are accelerated to failure by thermal or mechanical stresses. The silver migration depends on a high current density and would be decelerated in a storage environment.

The thin film devices exhibit similar types of failure mechanisms as thick film The unique mechanisms of thin film devices are those associated with the element films. Many of these defects are accelerated to failure by thermal stresses. The rate at which defects progress to failure is dependent on the environment. The ionic migration between resistor strips is a function of high voltage and temperature and would be decelerated in a storage environment.

Most hybrid devices are custom designed for each application. The materiel selection, device design and processing for each application will determine the particular set of failure mechanisms experienced.

TABLE 2.3-1. HYBRID THICK FILM FAILURE MECHANISMS

ctrical est cap visual, ctrical test	ctrical test of the ctrical ctrical .	Electrical Probing Electrical Probing
변 전 보 보 보 보 보 보 보 보 보 보 보 보 보 - - - - - -		80 80 HH HH HH NH
Open Open Open	Open or out of tolerance Open or out of out of Tolerance	Open Open
Mechanical Stress Mechanical Stress Mechanical	Hi Tempera-	Thermal Cycling
Insufficient or Incomplete Substrate Bonding  1) High Thermal stressed during processing 2) Thin Substrate	1) Overspray of abrasive trimming materiel to adjacent resistors during processing 2) Electrostatic discharge during processing 3) Leaching or diffusion at resistor-conductor interface	1) Insufficient quantity of slow drying solvent, wetting agent, or flow control additive 2) Mismatch in thermal coefficient of expansion of the resistor, conductor and ceramic substrate
Substrate Faulty Substrate Bond Cracked or Broken Substrate	Film Resistors Damaged Resistor	Cracked Resistor
	Substrate Bond Insufficient or Incomplete Mechanical Open Electrical Test  or Broken 1) High Thermal stressed Mechanical Open Precap visite during processing Stress  2) Thin Substrate Mechanical Open Precap visite	rate     Mechanical     Open     Electrical       1ty Substrate Bond     Strass     Strass     Test       cked or Broken     1) High Thermal stressed     Mechanical     Open     Precap visitive       strate     2) Thin Substrate     Mechanical     Open     Precap visitive       Resistors     1) Overspray of abrasive     Stress     Precap visitive       adjacent resistors     2) Electrical     Probing       during processing     Probing       2) Electrostatic discharge     Open or out of tolerance       during processing     Open or out of tolerance       3) Leaching or diffusion at ture     Open or out of tolerance       1) Leaching or diffusion at ture     Tolerance       1) The conductor inter-     Tolerance

THE THE PARTY OF T

TO SECURE OF THE PROPERTY OF T

TABLE 2.3-1 (continued)

- HYBRID THICK FILM FAILURE MECHANISMS -

DETECTION . METHOD		Electrical Probing	3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	initated scanning prior to capping		Bond Pull Test,	פוער הידנטן דעמנ	Bond Pull Test, Electrical Test	Bond Pull Test, Electrical Test	Precap visual, Electrical Test		
FAILURE MODE		Out of tolerance	Out of	נסדפו מווכפ		Open		Open	Open	Open		
ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT						Mechanical		Mechanical Stress	Mechanical Stress	Thermal & Mechanical Stress		
CAUSE		1) Palladium-silver re- sistor change in hydrogen stmosphere	2) Hot spots at sharp			1) Insufficient or in-	***************************************	2) Leaching of silver- gold-solder combi- nations	3) Glass Frit Fracture	Mechanical stress during Processing	•	
FAILURE MECHANISM	Film Resistors (cont.)	Out-of-tolerance Resistors			Chip Elements	Faulty Bonds				Cracked Dice		
	- <del>/ -/</del> -	****			2.3-	4						

THE THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER

TABLE 2.3-1 (continued)

HYBRID THICK FILM FAILURE MECHANISMS

	DETECTION . METHOD	Precap visual, Electrical Test	Precap visual, Electrical Test Precap visual,	Electrical Test	Precap visual, Electrical Test	Electrical Test	
	FAIL!RE MODE	Short	Short Short		Short	Out-of- Tolerance	
RE MECHANISMS -	ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT	Hish Current Density with potential dif- ference	Thermal & Mechanical Stresses Thermal &	Mechanical Stresses	Thermal & Mechanical Stresses		
- HYBRID THICK FILM FAILURE MECHANISMS	CAUSE	1) Silver migration 2) Holes in glass insula- tion at crossover or insufficient thickness of glass.	1) Downbonding from a higher surface to a lower one 2) Improper lead length		Insufficient or Imcom- plete Bonding	Long parallel conductors resulting in capacitive coupling	
	FAII.URE MECHANISM	Conductors Shorted Conductors	Shorted Intercon- necting wires	2.3	Faulty Bonds	Capacit.ve Coupling	

TABLE 2.3-2. - HYBRID THIN FILM FAILURE MECHANISMS

DETECTION · METHOD	Precap Visual, Substrate Capacitance Measurements, Electrical Test.	Precap visual	Electrical Test
FAILURE MODE	Op en	Out-of- Tolerance	Out-of- Tolerance
ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT	Thermal & Mechan- ical Stresses		Thermal Cycling Thermal Cycling Thermal Stresses Hi Voltage & Temperature
CAUSE	Thermal & Mechanical Stresses during Processing	rain size uncontrolled and large grains pulled out during lapping, buffing or polishing.	1) Surface Alkali Concentra- tions 2) Diffusion of Alkali Ions from Substrate into re- sistor film 3) Uneven surface 4) Separation of Nichrome during deposition 5) Thermal coefficient of expansion mismatch be tween film and substrate 6) T <sub>0</sub> <sub>2</sub> film exhibiting semi- conductor properties 7) Ionic migration between resistor strips 8) Excess die bonding times and temperatures
FAILURE MECHANISM	Substrate Cracked Substrate	Craters or Pits of in Substrace	Drif: of Electrical Parameters

TABLE 2.3-2 (continued)

TO THE STATE OF TH

HYBRID THIN FILM FAILURE MECHANISMS -

DETECTION METHOD .	Electrical Test Precap visual,	Precap visual, electrical test
FAILURE MODE	Open resis- tor, open or shorted capa- citor Short	Open
ACCEL TRATING ENVIRONMENT		Thermal & Mechanical Stresses
CAUSE	Thermal runaway due to constriction & oxidation Explosion of gases during vaporization	1) Irsufficient Bonding 2) Damage caused by probe testing
FAILURE MECHANISM	Element Films (cont.) Cracked or Open Element Shorted Capacitor	Chir & Wire Bonding Bond Separation

# 2.3.2 Storage Reliability Data

The storage data collected on hybrid integrated circuits consists of 799.2 million storage hours with 23 failures reported and 1.5 million hours of accelerated storage life tests with 7 failures reported. This data represents a quality level approximately equivalent to Class B in MIL-STD-883.

Based on the number of storage hours and failures, the storage failure rate for these devices is 28.8 failures per billion hours. However, the range of types and complexities of hybrid circuits precludes the use of a single failure rate for all devices. More data will be required to adequately evaluate hybrids in the storage or non-operating environment.

The data that has been collected is summarized in Table 2.3-3.

Of the thirty reported failures, twenty six failure causes were reported: one failed due to a failed zener diode, four due to open wire bonds; and twenty one due to open wire bonds at the aluminum/gold interface.

TABLE 2.3-3. HYBRID IC NON-OPERATING DATA

Ambient Temperature	Technology	Storage Hours (millions)	No. of Failures	Failure Rate in Fits
25°C	Thin Film	43.246	1	23.1
25°C	Thick Film	474.914	19	40.0
25°C	Thick Film	146.000	1	6.85
25°C	Thick Film	135.080	2	14.8
70°C	Thick Film	.400	0	(<2500.)
125°C	Thin Film	.098	2	20408.0
150°C	Thin Film	.680	3	4412.
150°C	Thick Film	.261	2	7663.
200°C	Thick Film	.011	0	(<90090.)

# 2.4 Hybrid Integrated Circuits Operational Prediction Model

The MIL-HDBK-217B failure rate model for hybrid microelectronic devices is:

$$\lambda_{p} = \lambda_{b} (\Pi_{T} \times \Pi_{E} \times \Pi_{Q} \times \Pi_{F}) \times 10^{-6}$$

where:

 $\lambda_{h}$  = base failure rate

 $\Pi_{m}$  = temperature factor

 $II_{r} = environmental factor$ 

II<sub>O</sub> = quality factor

 $\Pi_{\mathbf{F}}$  = circuit function factor

From the I.C. chip standpoint, the hybrid model is structured to accommodate all of the monolithic chip types and the various complexity levels indicated in Section 2.2.

Figure 2.4-1 gives the hybrid model and values for each parameter. The base failure rate must be calculated and a description of this calculation is given below.

# 2.4.1 Base Failure Rate, $\lambda_h$

The base failure rate equation is:

 $\lambda_b = \lambda_S + A_S \lambda_C + \Sigma \lambda_{RT} N_{RT}$  (substrate contribution)

+  $\Sigma \lambda_{DC}^{N}_{DC}$  (contribution of attached components)

+  $\lambda_{pF}I_{pF}$  (package contribution)

# A. Substrate Contribution

is the failure rate due to the substrate and film processing. It has a value of either 0.02 or 0.04 and is independent of the number cf substrates. The value 0.02 applies if only thick film or only thin film substrates are used. The value 0.04 applies if both types are used.

is the failure rate contribution due to network complexity and substrate area. The values of  $\lambda_{C}$  (complexity term) are a function of the element density,  $N_{E}/A_{S}$ .  $A_{S}$  is the substrate area in square inches.

To compute complexity,  $A_S$  is obtained by summing the areas of all thick film substrates resulting in a single equivalent thick film substrate. An equivalent thin film substrate is determined similarly. However, when substrates are stacked, only the area of the bottom substrate shall be used to compute  $A_S$ . If a substrate contains only one device, it shall be considered a chip and shall not be considered a substrate for purposes of failure rate prediction.

 $N_{\rm E}$  is the total complexity expressed as

$$N_E = N_{LT} + N_{RT} + N_{DC}$$

#### where:

N<sub>LT</sub> = number of internal lead terminations. Normally, this would be 2 times the number of leads, but for beam leads and flip chips, this would be one for each connection. This includes the leads from substrate to external leads.

 $N_{pm}$  = number of film resistors

As a convenience in estimating the number of terminations from the schematic, the following approximations may be used (it is always more desirable to count the actual lead terminations than to use the approximation):

N <sub>LT</sub>	=	No. of transistors	x	4
	+	No. cf diodes	x	2
	+	No. of capacitors	x	4
	+	No. of chip resistors	x	4
	+	No. of conventionally pack- aged integrated circuit leads	x	2
	+	No. of integrated circuit chip bond pads	x	2
	+	No. of external hybrid package leads	x	2

For the single equivalent thick film substrate, the value for N<sub>E</sub> is determined from the above rules. Then N<sub>E</sub>/A<sub>S</sub> is computed using the A<sub>S</sub> obtained in accordance with the above rules. The value of failure rate per square inch,  $\lambda_{\rm C}$ , is obtained from the following equations.

For thin film :

$$\lambda_{C1} = 4.7(10)^{-8} \left(\frac{N_E}{A_S}\right)^{2.082}$$
 for  $120 \le \frac{N_E}{A_S} \le 10,000$   
= .001 for  $10 \le \frac{N_E}{A_S} \le 120$ 

For thick film:

$$\lambda_{C2} = 2.4(10)^{-14} {\binom{N_E}{A_S}}^{4.429} \text{ for } 250 \le \frac{N_E}{A_S} \le 2,000$$

$$= .001 \text{ for } 10 \le \frac{N_E}{A_S} \le 250$$

The final value of  $A_{S^{\lambda}C}$  requires the use of the same  $A_{S}$  used to determine  $N_{E}/A_{S}$ .

This procedure is ther repeated for the chin film equivalent substrate. It should be noted that when  $N_{\rm E}$  is computed for stacked substrates, the elements of the upper substrates are included with the bottom substrate, even though the upper substrate uses a different resistor technology than the bottom substrate (thin film or thick film or vice versa).

is the sum of the failure rates for each resistor as a function of the required resistance tolerance.  $N_{RT}$  is the number of film resistors of a given tolerance.

λ<sub>RT</sub> is the failure rate to be used for each resistor of a given tolerance as specified in Figure 2.4-1.

# B. Attached Components Contribution.

is the sum of the attached device failure rates for semiconductors, integrated circuits, capacitors and resistors, both packaged and unpackaged. The failure rate is computed by multiplying the  $\lambda_{DC}$  by  $N_{DC}$ , the quantity of each type. The  $\lambda_{DC}$  is the same for a packaged or unpackaged device. The  $\lambda_{DC}$  values are in Figure 2.4-1.

# C. Package Contribution.

is the hybrid package failure rate which is a function of the package style or configuration and the materials used in its construction.  $\lambda_{\rm pF} \text{ is 0.01 failure/10}^6 \text{ hr. This is a normalized}$  value of base failure rate for all hybrid packages.  $\Pi_{\rm pF} \text{ is an adjustment factor which modifies } \lambda_{\rm pF} \text{ as a function of the package style and materials. Its values are in Figure 2.4-1.}$ 

# 2.4.2 II Adjustment Factors

# 2.4.2.1 Temperature Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{\mathbf{T}}$

 $\Pi_{_{\mbox{\scriptsize T}}}$  adjusts the model for temperature acceleration factors. The values in Figure 2.4-1 are derived from

where x = -3411 (  $\frac{1}{T+273} - \frac{1}{298}$  ) for  $\Pi_{T1}$  if the temperature (°C) of the package mounting base is known, and x = -3794 (  $\frac{1}{T+273} - \frac{1}{318}$  ) for  $\Pi_{T2}$  if the highest temperature (°C) within the hybrid package is known.

 $II_{T}$  values are invalid at package mounting base temperatures above 125°C or for hot spot temperatures above 175°C.

# 2.4.2.2 Environmental Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{ m E}$

 $I\!I_E$  accounts for the influence of environmental factors other than temperature. Refer to the environment description in the appendix.

# 2.4.2.3 Quality Factor, $\Pi_{Q}$

 $\rm II_Q$  accounts for effects of different quality levels. Classes A, B and C devices are those which have been subjected to, and passed all requirements, tests, and inspections specified in Methods 5004 and 5006 of MIL-STD-883, including screening, qualification, and quality conformance inspection requirements for the specified class.

# 2.4.2.4 Circuit Function Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{ m F}$

 $\ensuremath{{\rm II}}_{\ensuremath{\mathbf{F}}}$  adjusts the model for circuit function, (i.e., digital or linear).

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR HYBRID MICROELECTRONIC DEVICES FIGURE 2.4-1

THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE PARTY PARTY OF THE PARTY PA

( )

+ Ashc + Lhrung + Lhochoc + hprupr =  $\lambda_b$  (  $\pi_T \times \pi_E \times \pi_Q \times \pi_F$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ # \ \

thick film if both thick film thin film λ<sub>S</sub>(Substrate Failure Rate) and thin film only if only .02 .04 11 ຽ

AS (Substrate Failure Rate Modifier)

Square Inches = Substrate Area in A S

λ<sub>C</sub> (Complexity Term)

 $\lambda_{\mathrm{RT}}$  (Resistor Tolerance Factor) See next Page

Thin Film Thick Film Resistors 0.00050 0.00012 Resistors 0.00050 0.00010 0.0 0.0 Tolerance (-Percent) Resistor Ç ۲ ۲ л 0 0.1

# of Resistors of a Given Tolerance ADC (Attached Devices Term) 11 NRT

See next page

# of attached devices of a given type. 11 S S S

λ (Packaçe Failure PF Rate)

Package Description  $\pi_{
m pF}$  (Package Factor)

3.0 PF Dual-In-Line (<16 leads)2.0 Top Hat Type (I.e. TO-3, up to 16 leads) Flat Pack (soldered lid, Flat Pack (welded lid, outer seal perimeter or <0.625" diameter) Package Type (<2.25 Single Substrate up to 16 leads) TO-5)

(welded lid) (welded lid) outer seal perimeter or >0.625" diameter) Package Type (>2.25" Flat Pack Butterfly

Multiple Substrate

4.0 4.0 (soldered lid) (soldered lid) Vertical Sidewall (cold Substrates Dihedral (soldered lid) lid) Platform (soldered Multilayer Ceramic Modular Packages welded lid) Flat Pack Butterfly

with Note: Forrall packages >16 leads, add 0.15 to leads >16. each 4 for National contractions of the contraction of the con

II, (Temperature Factor)

τ( <sup>ο</sup> c)	) n <sub>Tl</sub>	птг	7 (°C)	пт	пт2
	•		0	11	•
	•		Ä		•
	•	.68	H	77	9 9
	•		Ñ		•
45	2.1	1.0	125		11.
	•	•	<b>(~)</b>	1	
	•	•	m	ı	
	•	•	4	1	
	•	•	4	1	
	•	•	Ŋ	ı	
	•	•	S	ı	
	•	3.3	Ö	i	24.
	•	•	Ø	ı	
	•	•	~	ı	
	•	•	~	ş	
	•	۰			
Use	II <sub>m</sub> , if	packa	ge moun	tin	g base
	<b>1</b>	Temper		is ki	nown.
Use	II, 1£	high	st	ra	ture in
		packag	e is k	nown	•
		-			

 $\Pi_{f E}$  (Environment Factor)

Environment	$\Xi_{\mathrm{II}}$
Ground, Benign	0.2
Space Flight	0.2
Ground, Fixed	1.0
Airborne, Inhab.	4.0
Naval, Sheltered	4.0
Ground, Mobile	4.0
Naval, Unshelt.	5.0
$\overline{\mathbf{u}}$	6.0
Missile, Launch	10.0

FIGURE 2.4-1 MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FALLURE PATE MODEL FOR HYBRID MICROFLECTRONIC DEVICES (Southing)

Rate)
Failure
Devices
(Attached
λης (

mic, General Purpose  trolytic  signal  Sillicon*  Switch  Switch  Signal (<500ma)  Signal (<500ma)  r (volt. reg)  istor  ctor; Step Rec; Tunnel  ctor  Logic Switch  Log	Attached Device Description	ADC
restrolytic  restrolytic  sinicon*  c Switch  l Signal ( <500ma)  r Rectifier ( >500ma)  r (voit. reg)  istor  ctor; Step Rec; Tunnel  ctor  Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Logic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch	c, General	0.0004
rs r Chips Silicon* c Switch l Signal ( <500ma) r Rectifier ( >500ma) r Rectifier ( >500ma) r (voit. reg) istor ctor; Step Rec; Tunnel ctor ctor; Silicon* Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN) MIL-M-38510 Qualith	olytic	•1
Echips Silicon* c Switch l Signal ( <500ma) r Rectifier ( >500ma) r Rectifier ( >500ma) ristor ctor; Step Rec; Tunnel ctor ctor ctor ctor ctor ctor ctor ctor	W.	•
Silicon*  c Switch  l Signal ( <500ma)  r Rectifier ( >500ma)  ristor  ctor; Step Rec; Tunnel  ctor  Logic Switch  Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Dogic Switch  Linear  Nogic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Linear  Nogic Switch  Linear  Nogic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Linear  Nogic Switch  Linear  Nogic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Linear  Nogic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Linear  Nogic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Linear  Nogic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Logic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Logic Switch  Logic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Logic Switch  Logic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Logic Switch  Logic Switch  Logic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Logic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Logic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Linear  Logic Switch  Logic Switc	_	•
Switch  Signal ( <500ma)  r Rectifier ( >500ma)  r (voit. reg)  istor  ctor; Step Rec; Tunnel  ctor  Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Unction  hic Microcircuits  lar & MOS linear, bipolar  am lead, bipolar ECL and  low)  N TX or TXV multiply by 0  N-JAN/Commercial multiply  onolithic models, assuming  B (JAN) MIL-M-38510 Qualit  " "E = 1.0 and "L = 1.0.	SI.	
r Rectifier ( <500ma) r Rectifier ( >500ma) r (voit. reg) istor ctor; Step Rec; Tunnel ctor ctor rs  togic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Logic Switch Linear Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Logic Switch Line	Switch	0.0048
r Rectifier ( >500ma) r (volt. reg) istor ctor; Step Rec; Tunnel ctor rs  togic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Line	Signal ( <50	0.0081
istor ctor; Step Rec; Tunnel ctor ctor ctor Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Unction And Microcircuits lar digital devices (TTL DTL types not included low) lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and low) N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Qualith I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	Rectifier (	0.012
ctor; Step Rec; Tunnel ctor rs  tor, Silicon* Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear  Logic Switch Linear  Unction hic Microcircuits  Linear  Unction hic Microcircuits  lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and low) N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Qualith I I E = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	٠ ۲	0.022
ctor rs togic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Logic Switch Linear  unction hic Microcircuits lar digital devices (TTL DTL types not included low) lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and low) N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Qualith	Step Rec:	60.0
tor, Silicon* Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Logic Switch Linear  Unction hic Microcircuits Lar digital devices (TTL DTL types not included Low) Lother MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and Lother MOS devices. N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Quality I I E = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	4	0.18
tor, Silicon* Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Linear  Unction hic Microcircuits lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and low) N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Qualith I I E = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.		•
Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Linear  Unction  hic Microcircuits  lar digital devices (TTL  DTL types not included  low)  lar & MOS linear, bipolar  am lead, bipolar ECL and  I other MOS devices.  N TX or TXV multiply by 0  N-JAN/Commercial multiply  onolithic models, assuming  B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Qualith  I I E = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.		
Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  unction  hic Microcircuits  har digital devices (TTL  DTL types not included  low)  lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and  I other MOS devices.  N TX or TXV multiply by 0  N-JAN/Commercial multiply  onolithic models, assuming  B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Qualith  I E = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	ic	.005
Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear unction hic Microcircuits lar digital devices (TTL DTL types not included low) lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and l other MOS devices. N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Qualith	, Linear	.01
Logic Switch Linear Power ( > IW) Logic Switch Linear unction hic Microcircuits lar digital devices (TTL DTL types not included low) lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and l other MOS devices. N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Qualit I in E = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	, Power	.05
Linear  Power ( >1W)  Logic Switch  Linear  unction  hic Microcircuits  lar digital devices (TTL  DTL types not included  low)  lar & MOS linear, bipolar  am lead, bipolar ECL and  I other MOS devices.  N TX or TXV multiply by 0  N-JAN/Commercial multiply  onolithic models, assuming  B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Quality  I E = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	, Logic	00.
Power ( >1W) Logic Switch Linear unction hic Microcircuits lar digital devices (TTL DTL types not included low) lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and lother MOS devices. N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Quality IE = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	Linear	.01
Logic Switch  Linear  unction hic Microcircuits lar digital devices (TTL DTL types not included low) lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and lother MOS devices. N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Quality I E = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	, Power	.08
unction hic Microcircuits lar digital devices (TTL DTL types not included low) lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and l other MOS devices. N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Quality IE = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	Logic	.02
unction hic Microcircuits lar digital devices (TTL DTL types not included low) lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and l other MOS devices. N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Quality IE = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	FET, Linear	90.
hic Microcircuits lar digital devices (TTL DTL types not included low) lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and l other MOS devices. N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Qualit ' "E = 1.0 and "L = 1.0.	ijunct	대
lar digital devices (TTL DTL types not included low) lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and lother MOS devices.  N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Qualifier.  IR = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	ithic Microcircuits	
lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and lother MOS devices.  N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Qualithin E = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	digital devices	*
lar & MOS linear, bipolar am lead, bipolar ECL and lother MOS devices.  N TX or TXV multiply by 0. N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Quality.  " " E = 1.0 and " L = 1.0.	types not	
am lead, bipolar ECL and lother MOS devices.  N TX or TXV multiply by 0 N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Quality IE = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	ipolar & MOS linear,	* *
l other MOS devices.  N TX or TXV multiply by 0.  N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Quality.  IR = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	m lead, bipolar E	
N TX or TXV multiply by 0. N-JAN/Commercial multiply onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Quality IE = 1.0 and IL = 1.0.	all other MOS devices.	
onolithic models, assuming B (JAN)MIL-M-38510 Quality, $\pi_{\rm E}=1.0$ and $\pi_{\rm L}=1.0$ .	JAN TX or TXV multi	
B (JAN) MIL-M-38510 Quality $^{\rm II}_{\rm E}=1.0$ and $^{\rm IL}=1.0$ .	HONOTIFE TO HOGOTE	
, $\Pi_{\rm E}=$ 1.0 and $\Pi_{\rm L}=$ 1.0.	ss B (JAN) MIL-M-38510	ty 6.1
	, $\pi_{\rm E}=$ 1.0 and $\pi_{\rm L}=$	•
as above and multiply by	s above and multiply	2

λ<sub>C</sub> (Complexity Term)

1500 .19 2.8 .0010 2000 .35 10.0 .0010 2500 .35 10.0 .0010 3000 .820022 4000 1.50044 4500 1.90080 5000 2.4014 5500 2.9022 6000 3.6033 6500 4.1048 7500 8.0059 8500 6.3096 8500 7.1096 8500 6.3096 8500 7.1097 8500 7.1097 8500 7.1098 8500 7.1
1500 .19 2.00 2500 300 3500 3500 1.1 2.4 4500 1.5 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
2500 .56 2500 1.1 2 4000 1.5 4 4500 2.4 5500 2.4 5500 2.4 7500 4.1 7500 4.1 7500 8.0 1000 10.0 1000 10.0 25500 8.0
0 3000 .8 4 4500 1.1 5500 2.4 5500 2.4 5500 3.6 6000 4.1 7500 7.1 8500 6.3 8500 8.0 9500 8.0 9500 8.0 10000 10.0
0 3500 1.5 4 4500 1.9 0 5000 2.4 5500 2.9 6000 3.6 6500 4.1 7500 4.8 7500 6.3 8000 6.3 8500 8.0 9500 8.0 9500 10.0
2 4000 1.5 4 4500 2.4 5500 2.9 6000 3.6 6500 4.1 7000 . 4.8 7500 6.3 8500 8.0 9500 8.0 9500 8.0 1000 10.0
4 4500 1.9 5500 5.9 6000 3.6 6500 7.1 8.8 7500 8.0 8.0 9.0 9.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
5500 2.4 5500 3.6 6000 3.6 6500 4.1 7000 4.8 7500 6.3 8500 6.3 8500 9.0 10000 10.0 1 Lead Terminati sistors e Chip Devices
5500 2.9 6000 3.6 6500 4.1 7000 4.8 7500 6.3 8500 6.3 8500 9.0 10000 10.0 1 Lead Terminati sistors e Chip Devices
6000 3.6 6500 4.1 7000 . 4.8 7500 5.5 8000 6.3 8500 7.1 9500 9.0 1000 10.0 1 Lead Terminati sistors e Chip Devices
6500 4.1 7000 4.8 7500 5.5 8000 6.3 8500 8.0 9500 9.0 10000 10.0 1000 10.0 Sistors e Chip Devices
7000 . 4.8 7500 6.3 8000 6.3 8500 7.1 9500 9.0 10000 10.0 1 Lead Terminati
7500 5.5 8000 6.3 8500 7.1 9000 8.0 9500 9.0 10000 10.0 1 Lead Terminati sistors e Chip Devices
000 6.3 000 8.0 000 9.0 000 10.0 Terminati
000 8.0 000 9.0 000 10.0 Terminati
00 8.0 00 9.0 00 10.0 Terminati
000 9.0 000 10.0 Terminati s Devices
10.0 Terminati
Terminati S Devices
Terminati s Devices
Terminati s Devices
l Lead Terminati sistors e Chip Devices
sistors e Chip Devices
e Chip Device

n̄<sub>Q</sub> (Quality Factor) Level

IF (Circuit Function Factor)

II.F	0.8	1.0	1:1	
Function	Digital	near	Linear/Digital	Combination

S S S

A .5

m

or Class

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

# 2.5 Operational/Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparison

# 2.5.1 Bipolar Digital SSI/MSI Devices

A comparison of the failure rates for non-operational and operational environments was made using the non-operating model and the MIL-HDBK-217B operational model. The comparison is presented in Figure 2.5-1. Failure rates for several operating conditions were predicted to present a range for comparison. The non-operating prediction was made at a nominal ambient temperature of 25 degrees centigrade.

Comparing the digital devices with aluminum metallization and aluminum wire gave an operating to non-operating ratio of 7 and 9 for Class A, small scale integration (SSI), digital devices at two operation junction temperatures: 35°C and 75°C; for Class B the ratios were 4 and 5; for Class C devices, 23 and 30; and for Class D, 86 and 114.

For medium scale integration (MSI), the ratios for Class A were 15 and 25; Class B, 9 and 14; Class C, 54 and 89; and Class D, 204 and 334.

Failure rates for digital devices with aluminum metallization and gold wire were also compared. Since MIL-HDBK-217B uses one prediction model for both metallization systems, the operating failure rates are the same. For the non-operating failure rate, the aluminum metallization, gold wire systems exhibited a significantly higher failure rate, therefore the ratios are considerably different so different that in many cases, the non-operating failure rate is higher than the operating failure rate. The ratios for Class A, SSI Digital devices at the two junction temperatures are 0.6 and 0.8; for Class B, 0.4 and 0.5; for Class C, 2.2 and 3.0 and for Class D, 0.7 and 0.9.

For MSI devices, the ratios for Class A were 1.5 and 2.4; Class B, 0.9 and 1.4; Class C, 5.3 and 8.7; and Class D, 1.7 and 2.7.

Since most missile materiel are in the Class B or Class A quality range, average operating to non-operating factors can be defined as presented in Table 2.5-1.

OPERATING FAILURE RATES PER MIL-HDBK-217B\* (GROUND FIXED ENVIRONMENT)

Condition 1 $T_J = 35^{\circ}C$ , 2 Gates	•	Condition 3 $T_J = 75^{\circ}C_{f}$ Cates	Condition 4 $T_J = 75^{\circ}C$ , 20 Gates
PARTS	14.5	232.0	
CONDITION 4	04	332.8	
CONDITION 3	7.1	113.6	
CONDITION 2	12.7	202.9	
CONDITION 1	10.7	85.7 803.5	
QUALTIY	a n	O A	

NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATE & NON-OPERATING/OPERATING RATIO

WIRE:
ALUMINUM
METALLIZATION,
ALUMINUM

1			1	
PARTS COUNT	100	233	PARTS COUNT	1.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.
4			4	
RATIO	25 14 89	334	RATIO CONDITION	2.1. 2.4. 7.7.
2			M	
RATIO	o ທ 🤉	114	RATIO CONDITION	& W O O
7			7	
RATIO CONDITION 2	15	204	WIRE: RATIO CONDITION	
리			OLD 1	10 01
RATIO CONDITION	<i>L</i> 4 c	98	IZATION, GOLD WIRE: PERATIO RA CONDITION 1 CONDI	2,2
NON-OP FAILURE RATE*	2.91	9.34	METALLIZ NON-OP FAILURE RATE*	8.5 29.8 38.3 1150.0
QUALITY	<b>ፈ</b> ጠር	) <u>D</u>	ALUMINUM QUALITY CLASS	<b>∢</b> ⊞∪口:

\*Failures per Billion Hours.

FIGURE 2.5-1. MONOLITHIC RIPOLAR DIGITAL DEVICE OPERATIONAL/
NON-OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE COMPARISON

Phi Sand Response and the contract of the cont

#### TABLE 2.5-1.

# AVERAGE OPERATING TO NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATE RATIO ALUMINUM METALLIZATION/.LUMINUM WIRE

Complexity	Average Operating to N	
Level	Operating Failure Rate	Ratio
ssi	<b>-5</b> ·	
MSI	. 14	

# ALUMINUM METALLIZATION/GOLD WIRE

Complexity	Average Operating to Non-
Level	Operating Failure Rate Ratio
SSI	0.5
107	3 4
MSI	1.4

The quality factors in the non-operating prediction model for a device with aluminum metal / gold wire systems were estimated from the aluminum metal / aluminum wire system. Therefore, these are preliminary and will be further investigated in subsequent reports.

# 2.5.2 Bipolar Linear SSI/MSI Devices

A comparison of the failure rates for non-operational and operational environments was made using the non-operating model developed here and the MIL-HDBK-217B operational model. The comparison is presented in Figure 2.5-2. Failure rates for several operating conditions were predicted to present a range for comparison. The non-operating prediction was made at a nominal ambient temperature of 25 degrees centigrade.

Comparing the digital devices with aluminum metallization and aluminum wire gave an operating to non-operating ratio of 10 and 26 for Class A, small scale integration (SSI), linear devices at two operation junction temperatures: 35°C and 75°C; for Class B the ratios were 6 and 15; for Class C devices, 38 and 93; and for Class D, 140 and 347.

For medium scale integration (MSI), the ratios for Class A were 40 and 131; Class B, 23 and 75; Class C, 141 and 468; and Class D, 527 and 1751.

Failure rates for linear devices with aluminum metallization and gold wire were also compared. Since MIL-HDBK-217B uses one prediction model for both metallization systems, the operating failure rates are the same. For the non-operating failure rate, the aluminum metallization, gold wire systems exhibited a significantly higher failure rate, therefore the ratios are considerably different - so different that in some cases, the non-operating failure rate is higher than the operating failure rate. The ratios for Class A, SSI linear devices at the two junction temperatures are 1.0 and 2.5; for Class B, 0.6 and 1.4; for Class C, 3.6 and 13.7 and for Class D, 1.1 and 2.8.

For MSI devices, the ratios for Class A were 3.8 and 12.8; Class B, 2.2 and 7.3; Class C, 13.7 and 45.5; and Class D, 4.3 and 14.2.

Since most missile materiel are in the Class B or Class A quality range, average operating to non-operating factors can be defined as presented in Table 2.5-2.

OPERATING FAILURE RATES PER NTJ-HDBK-217B\* (GROUND FIXED FNVIRONMENT)

1.

Condition 1 T <sub>1</sub> = 35°C, 8 transistors	Condition 2 T: = 35°C, 80 trabsistors	Condition 3 $T_{ij} = 75^{\circ}C_{ij}$ 8 transistors	Condition 4 $\overline{T}_{i} = 75^{\circ}C, 80 \text{ transistors}$
PARTS COUNT	26.0 52.0	416.0	
CONDITION 4	109.0	1744.0	
CONDITION	21.6	345.6 3240.0	
CONDITION 2	ကမ	525.4 4926.0	
CONDITION 1		140.0 1312.0	
QUALITY	<b>स्</b> छ।	υp	

NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATE & NON-OPERATING/OPERATING RATIO

WIRE:	
ALUMINUM	
M METALLIZATION,	NON-OP
ALUMINUM	

	3					
QUALITY	FAILURE	RATIO	RATIO	RATIO	RATIO	PARTS
CLASS	RATE*	CONDITION 1	CONDITION 2	CONDITION	3 CONDITION 4	COUNT
A	83	10	A O	26	121	2.2
		1	2	0 7	TCT	75
മ	2.91	ဖ	23	15	75	œ.
ပ	3.73	38	144	93	468	
6	9.34	140	527	247	נחנו	1 7
)	•	<b>.</b>	1		10/1	0T#
ALUMINUM	METALLI	ALLIZATION, GOLD	D WIRE:			

	PARTS	COUNT	3,0	) 1	7.7	10.9	7	•
	RATIO	CONDITION 4	12.8		7.3	45.5	,	•
	RATIO	CONDITION 3	2.5	•	۲.4	0.6	2.8	
	RATIO	CONDITION 2	3.8	c	7.7	13.7	4.3	•
	RATIO	CONDITION 1	1.0	¥	•	3.6	1.1	
いっこうと	FAILURE	RATE*	8.5	300	67.0	38.3	1150.0	
	×	CLASS	⋖	ρ	Q	ပ	Ω	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

\*Failures per Billion Hours.

FIGURE 2.5-2. MONOLITHIC BIPOLAR LINEAR DEVICE OPERATIONAL/ NON-OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE COMPARISON

#### TABLE 2.5-2.

# AVERAGE OPERATING TO NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATE RATIO ALUMINUM METALLIZATION/ALUMINUM WIKE

Complexity	Average Operating to Non-
Level	Operating Failure Rate Ratio
SSI	15
MSI	75

#### ALUMINUM METALLIZATION/GOLD WIRE

Complexity	Average Operating to Non-
Level	Operating Failure Rate Ratio
	-
SSI	1.4
VOT	<b>7.</b> 2
MSI	7.3

The quality factors in the non-operating prediction model for a device with aluminum metal/gold wire systems were estimated from the aluminum metal/aluminum wire system. Therefore, these are preliminary results which should be further investigated.

#### 2.6 Conclusions and Recommendations

The models presented in section 2.1 for monolithic bipolar SSI/MSI digital and linear integrated circuits can be used as a method of prediction failure rates for these devices.

The analysis indicates that a single metal should be used for the contact metallization and interconnection interface. The all-aluminum system shows a definitely more reliable storage capability than the aluminum metallization/gold wire system. Data on the Beam Lead Sealed Junction device with gold beams is not available on the linear devices.

In both user surveys and high temperature storage tests, wire bond failures were prominent.

For the aluminum metallization/aluminum wire systems, the principle problems were wire bonds and oxide defects or contamination.

Screens or tests recommended for wire bonds include centrifuge, temperature shock/cycling, power cycling, mechanical shock and bond pull tests. Due to the low mass of aluminum wires, the temperature shock/cycle, power cycle, and bond pull tests would be most effective.

Screens or tests recommended to weed out oxide defects include: Operating AC and DC with temperature; high temperature reverse bias; power cycling; elevated temperature storage; and visual inspection.

In the MIL-STD-883 screen, temperature cycling is required for Class A, E and C devices while temperature shock is only required for Class A devices. Burn-in and final electrical tests at maximum and minimum operating temperatures are required for Class A and B devices. Reverse bias burn-in is only required for Class A MOS and linear devices when specified. Visual inspection is required for Class A and B devices.

Depending on whether Class A, B or C devices are specified in the procurement, it may be desirable to specify more screens and/or quality conformance tests which are related to wire bond and oxide reliability.

Effects of periodic testing or operational cycling of devices which are in a storage or dormant environment has not been addressed here. The data does not identify the effects of cycling. One special test was performed to determine cycling effects on 1000 digital devices but after 18 months, no failures were experienced. The testing was performed under controlled conditions.

Lack of sufficient data on LSI devices, MOS devices and memories precludes any conclusions on these devices.

# 2.7 Reference

The information presented for digital and linear devices is a summary of document numbers LC-76-ICl, "Monolithic Bipolar SSI/MSI Digital Integrated Circuit Analysis," dated May 1976 and LC-76-IC2 "Monolithic Bipolar SSI/MSI Linear Integrated Circuit Analysis," dated May 1976. Refer to those documents for details of the data collection and analysis, development of models, definition of failure mechanisms, and technical description of the devices themselves.

#### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- RADC-TR-70-232, Reliability Characterization and Prediction of Integrated Circuits, the Boeing Company, D. C. Porter and W. A. Finke, dated November 1970, AD 878235
- TM-72-1, Microcircuit Wire bond Reliability, Reliability Analysis Center, T. R. Meyers, dated July 1972, AD 746315
- MCR-72-169, Long Life Assurance Study for Manned Spacecraft Long-Life Hardware, Martin Maxietta, R. W. Burrows, dated September 1972
- RADC-TR-67-108, Vol. II, RADC Reliability Notebook, Hughes Aircraft Co., Clifford M. Ryerson et al, dated September 1967
- RADC-TR-65-330, Reliability Physics Notebook, dated October 1965
- RADC-TR-73-248, Dormancy and Power On-Off Cycling Effects on Electronic Equipment and Part Reliability, Martin Marietta, J. S. Bauer, et al, dated August 1973
- GIDEP Summaries of Failure Rate Data, dated January 1974 (Supplement dated September 1975)
- MGFR-1273, RAC Microcircuit Generic Failure Rates, dated December 1973
- RADC-TR-69-350, Failure Rate for Complex Bipolar Microcircuits, AFSC, Peter F. Manno, dated October 1969, AD 861045
- RADC-TR-72-55, Reliability Problems with S102 Passivation and Glassivation RADC, Clyde H. Lane, dated March 1972, AD 741765
- MIL-M-38510A, General Specifications for Microcircuits, dated 3 July 1972
- MIL-STD-883, Test Methods and Procedures for Microelectronics, dated 3
  July, 1972
- N71-19422, Beam Lead Technology, GTE Labs, T. W. Fitzgerald, et al, dated 15 March 1971
- RADC-TR-71-294, Microcircuit Bond Screening Study, Raytheon, John Gaffrey and Bennie Bonomi, dated December 1971, AD 892498
- 99900-6735-R0-00, Appraisal of Microelectronic Integrated Circuit Performance, TRW, G. A. Van Hoorde, dated October 1968.
- BR-7811, The Environmental Conditions Experienced by Rockets and Missiles in Storage, Transit, and Operations, Raytheon, James M. Durben and Edward T. Smith, dated December 1973
- EPIC-IR-81, Materiels and Interface Factors Limiting LSI Performance and Reliability, Hughes Aircraft, Thomas C. Hall et al, dated August 1972
- Metallurgical Failure Modes of Wire Bonds, George G. Harmon, National Bureau of Standards, 12th Annual Proceedings IEEE Reliability Physics Symposium, 1974

MIL-HDBK-217B Reliability Prediction, dated 20 September 1974

Mandard Market and the Committee of the

- Aging Effects in Gold Thermocompression Bonds to Complex Metallizations J. H. Anderson, Jr. et al, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Vol. R-19, No. 1, February 1970
- Elements of Semiconductor-Device Reliability, C. Gordon Peattre, et al, Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 62, No. 2, February 1974
- Reliability Assurance of Individual Semiconductor Components, Raymond F. Haythornthwaite, et al, Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 62, No. 2 February 1974
- Failure Analysis of Oxide Defects, G. H. Ebel and H. A. Engelke, 11th Annual Proceedings IEEE Reliability Physics Symposium, 1973
- Metallization and Bonds A Review of Failure Mechanisms, G. L. Schnable and R. S. Keen, Sixth Annual Reliability Physics Symposium Proceedings, 1967
- Raytheon Memo No. HREL:75:189, from R. J. Callinan, Subject: Field History Data of Storage and Non-Storage Oriented Dormant Failures, dated 17 February 1975
- Telecon Report, Mr. Bill Johnson, General Electric, Subject: Site Defense System Study, dated 6 March 1975
- Sandia Letter from Mr. J. A. Hood, Subject: Semiconductor Reliability Assessment, dated 23 September 1974
- UCLA ENG. 7359, Interface Phenomena in Integrated Circuit Oxides, C. R. Viswanathan, University of California, Los Angeles, July 1973
- Technical Note 1972-20, Procurement of Reliable Semiconductor Devices for Military Space Applications, Alan G. Stanley, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 3 April 1972.

## 3.0 Discrete Semiconductors

This section contains a summary of the analyses and data on discrete semiconductors-transistors and diodes. Being special types of semiconductors, failure modes and mechanisms affecting transistors and diodes are similar to those found in other semiconductors discussed in Section 2.1. Also applicable are the causes, accelerating environments and detection methods. That information is well covered in Section 2.1 and will not be repeated in detail. Only differences between discrete semiconductors and integrated circuits will be discussed.

# 3.1 Storage Reliability Analysis

#### 3.1.1 Failure Mechanisms

The failure mechanisms, causes, accelerating environment: and detection methods characteristic of transistors are found in Table 2.1-2. As in all semiconductors, transistors do not appear to have failure mechanisms inherent to the concept of the device. All of the mechanisms are initiated by deficiencies in the materials and fabrication processes used during manufacture of the devices.

The difference between discrete transistors and integrated circuits lies in the physical size and number and complexity of manufacturing processes. Compared to the average integrated circuit, a transistor is a relatively simple device. There are fewer number of junctions and leads. The distances between different parts of the device are larger. The manufacturing processes are fewer and simpler. Although the failure mechanisms are similar to those in integrated circuits, the above differences tend to shift their emphasis. Bulk defects are more common due to the larger blocks of silicon required thus increasing the probability of crystal imperfections. Imperfections collect mobilized contaminants resulting in breakdown, leakage, gain failures and, in high power devices, thermal runaway. Diffusion defects are not as critical due to the lower density of diffusions. and metallization defects are not as pronounced as in integrated circuits because the metallization patterns are much simpler.

A large percentage of transistor failures are the result of die and wire bonding defects. Contamination, both ambient and within the material, is also a serious problem in transistors.

The failure mechanisms of diodes are similar to those for in transistors. The mechanisms, causes, accelerating environments and detection methods presented in Table 2.1-2 apply and will not be repeated here. In addition to those mechanisms in Table 2.1-2, alloy bonded and point contact diodes can develop intermetablic compounds at the junction, however, this has not been noticed to be a severe problem. Loss of contact is also a potential problem in spring loaded contacts. This happens when the contact material loses its compression strength or by slipping off the contact.

3.1.2 <u>Discrete Semiconductor Non-Operational Prediction Models</u>

The non-operational failure rate model for discrete semiconductors is:

$$\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b} (\Pi_{\rm Q} \times \Pi_{\rm E}) \times 10^{-6}$$

where:

 $\lambda_{p}$  = device failure rate

 $\lambda_{b}^{-}$  = base failure rate

 $\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{O}}$  = quality adjustment factor

 $\pi_{E} = \text{environmental adjustment factor}$ 

The model and values for Silicon NPN & PNP and Germanium NPN & PNP Transistors are presented in Figure 3.1-1; and for Field Effect Transistors in Figure 3.1-2.

Non-operating data on Unijunction transistors was insufficient to develop a non-operating prediction at this time.

The model and values for General Purpose Silicon and General Purpose Germanium Diodes are presented in Figure 3.1-3; for Zener and Avalanche Diodes in Figure 3.1-4; and for Microwave Diodes in Figure 3.1-5.

Non-operating data on thyristors and varactors was insufficient to develop a non-operating prediction at this time.

In the models, the base failure rate,  $\lambda_b$ , is 0.82 fits (failures per billion hours) for silicon transistors; 0.77 fits for field effect transistors; 1.1 fits for general purpose diodes; and 0.55 fits for Zener and Avalanche Diodes; and 3.3 fits for microwave diodes.

The quality adjustment factor,  $\Pi_Q$ , accounts for effects of the quality levels (JAN and JANTX) as defined in MIL-S-19500.

The environmental adjustment factor,  $\pi_E$ , accounts for the influence of factors other than temperature. Refer to the environmental description in the Appendix.

NON-OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE PREDICTION MODEL FOR TRANSISTORS (Includes Silicon NPN & PNP, and Germanium NPN & PNP) FIGURE 3.1-1.

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b} (\Pi_{\rm Q} \times \Pi_{\rm E}) \times 10^{-6}$ 

 $\lambda_{\mathbf{b}}$  (Base Failure Rate)

0.00082

Ilo (Quality Factor)

Quality ho contract the contract contra

IE (Environmental Factor)
Environment

Ground, Benign 1 Space Flight 1 Ground, Fixed 5 Airborne, Inhabited 25 Naval, Sheltered 25 Ground, Mobile 25 Naval, Unsheltered 25 Airborne, Uninhab. 40 NON-OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE PREDICTION MODEL FOR FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTORS FIGURE 3.1-2.

 $y^{D} = y^{D} (u^{O} \times u^{E}) \times 10^{-6}$ 

 $\lambda_{\mathbf{b}}$  (Base Failure Rate)

0.00077

MQ (Quality Factor)

Quality  $\Pi_{Q}$  Level JANTX 0.2

II_E (Environmental Factor) Environment II_E	OHO HE
Ground, Benign Space Flight	нн
.Ω	220
Ground, Mobile	2 2 2 2
Naval, Unsheltered Airborne, Uninhab.	25
Missile, Launch	40

FIGURE 3.1-3. NON-OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE PREDICTION MODEL FOR CENERAL PURPOSE SILICON & GERMANIUM DIODES

$$\gamma_{\rm p} = \gamma_{\rm b} \, (\pi_{\rm Q} \times \pi_{\rm E}) \times 10^{-6}$$

λ<sub>b</sub> (Base Failure Rate)

0.0011

"Q (Quality Factor)

OH	60.0	1.0
Quality Level	JANTX	JAN

NON-OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE PREDICTION AND MODEL FOR ZENER AND AVALANCHE DIODES FIGURE 3.1-4.

ί,

$$^{\lambda_p} = ^{\lambda_b} (^{\Pi_Q} \times ^{\Pi_E}) \times 10^{-6}$$

 $\lambda_{b}$  (Base Failure Rate)

0.00055

IIQ (Quality Factor)

Quality  $\pi_Q$ JANTX 1.0

E (Environmental Factor	0 ti
Environment	=E
Ground, Benign	-
Space Flight	-
Ground, Fixed	S
	25
0	25
Ground, Mobile	25
Naval, Unsheltered	25
Airborne, Uninhab.	40
Missile, Launch	40

NON-OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE PREDICTION AND MODEL FOR MICROWAVE DIODES FIGURE 3.1-5.

$$\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b} (\Pi_{\rm Q} \times \Pi_{\rm E}) \times 10^{-6}$$

 $\lambda_{\mathbf{b}}$  (Base Failure Rate)

.0033

 $\Pi_{Q}$  (Quality Factor)

Quality  $^{\Pi}Q$  Level  $^{J}Q$  JANTX .6

HE (Environmental Factor)

Environment	ILE
Ground, Benign	7
Space Flight	~
Ground, Fixed	10
Airborne, Inhabited	20
Naval, Sheltered	20
Ground, Mobile	20
Naval, Unsheltered	20
Airborne, Uninhab.	80
Missile. Launch	200

#### 3.1.3 Non-Operating Failure Rate Data and Analysis

### 3.1.3.1 Transistors

The failure rate models in Section 3.1.2 are based on storage data consisting of over 18 billion hours with 36 failures reported. This includes data from six different programs. The breakdown of storage hours and failures for each source (identified by code names A through F) is shown in Tables 3.1-1 through 3.1-6). In cases where definition of device type and application was not possible, the data was aggregated into an "all types" category. For example, programs E and F utilized JANTX transistors, however further designation was not possible.

The aggregation of storage hours and failures from all five programs is shown in Table 3.1-7. This table presents the aggregated data for both JANTX and JAN rated devices.

Analysis of this data together with the parameters in the MIL-HDBK-217B model indicated very little difference between the failure rates of silicon NPN and PNP transistors.

The storage data indicated a difference between JAN and JANTX device failure rates in the operational and non-operational environments. While the MIL-HDBK-217B operational model shows a factor of five, the storage data indicated a factor of 3+. Field effect transistor data indicates for JANTX devices to be in the same general failure rate range as the silicon NPN and PNP devices. No JAN data was available on the field effect transistors and a factor of 5 from MIL-HDBK-217B was used.

Insufficient data on Unijunction Transistors is available for analysis.

#### 3.1.3.2 Diodes

The failure rate tables in Section 3.1.2 are based on storage data consisting of over 30 billion part hours with 57 failures reported. This includes data from four different programs. The breakdown of storage hours and failures for each program (identified by code names A through D) is shown in Tables 3.1-8 through 3.1-11. In cases where the definition of device type and application was not possible, the data was aggregated into an "all types" category.

The aggregation of storage hours and fialures from all three programs is shown in Table 3.1-12.

Analysis of this data together with the parameters in the MIL-HDBK-217B model indicated very little difference between the failure rates of Silicon and Germanium General Purpose Diodes.

The storage data did indicate a greater difference between JAN and JANTX device failure rates than in the operational environment. While the operational model shows a factor of 5, the storage data indicates a factor of 11+.

The present storage data on Zener Diodes does not show a difference between the JAN and JANTX devices. The JANTX data shows 3 failures in approximately 1.1 billion hours for a storage failure rate of 2.8 fits while the JAN data shows no failures in 0.8 billion storage hours for a failure rate of less than 1.2 fits. This rate is approximately five times that of the Silicon Ceneral Purpose Diodes JANTX quality.

Only JANTX data was available on microwave diodes showing a failure rate of 20 fits.

Insufficient data on Thyristor and Varactor diodes is available for analysis.

TABLE 3.1-1. SOURCE A TRANSISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA

是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们

DEVICE TYPE	NUMBER DEVICES	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Transistors JAN All Data	70794	1.034	8	1.93
Silicon PNP (All)	3496	.051	0	(<19.59)
Signal	2622	.038	0	(<26.12)
Power		i	ı	t
Switching	874	.013	0	(<78.37)
Silicon NPN (All)	29716	.434	7	4.61
Signal	27968	.408	7	4.90
Power	874	.013	0	(<78.37)
Switching		t	ı	i

TABLE 3.1-2. SOURCE B TRANSISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA

FAILURE RATE FAILED IN FITS	5 1.010	2 1.633	2 1.752	0 (<12.002)	2 .803	2 .819	0 (<20.004)	1 .816	1 .930	(899°9>) 0	( 0212)
STORAGE HOURS X 10	4949.075	1224.771	1141.453	83.318	2491.201	2441.210	49.991	1224.771	1074.799	149.972	8.332
NUMPER	376596	93198	86858	6340	189566	185762	3804	93198	81786	11412	634
DEVICE TYPE	Transistors JANTX All Data	Silicon PNP (All)	Single	Dual	Silicon NPN (All)	Single	Dual	FET (A11)	Single	Dual	Microwave Power

TABLE 3.1-3. SOURCE C TRANSISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA

ER HOURS NUMBER RATE CES X 10 FAILED IN FITS	10662 12 1.13	1327 1 .75	686 1 1.46	189 0 (<5,30	452 0 (<2.21	4076 6 1.47	3036 4 1.32	249 0 (<4.01	791 2 2.53	21 0 (<48.0)	45 0 (<22.32	72 0 (<13.95	1 0 (<973.)	1528 16 10.47
DEVICE TYPE DEVICES	Transistors JANTX All Data	Silicon PNP (All)	Low Power	Medium Power	High Power	Silicon NPN (All)	Low Power	Medium Power	High Power	Germanium NPN	Germanium PNP	FET	Unijunction	Transistors JAN

TABLE 3.1-4. SOURCE D TRANSISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA

FAILURE SR RATE SD IN FITS	(<36.6)	(<59.1)	(<98.8)	(<144.8)	(<130.4)	(<1779.)	(<3154.)	(<531.1)
NUMBER FAILED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STORAGE HOURS X 10	27.342	16.911	10.005	906.9	7.669	.562	.317	1.883
NUMBER	. <del>.</del> . 8	547	315	232	239	30	10	55
DEVICE TYPT	Transistor JANTX All Data	Silicon NPN (Ali)	Single	Dual	Silicon PNP	Silicon PNPN	Unijunction	FET

TABLE 3.1-5. SOURCE E TRANSISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA

是一个人,我们就是我们的现在分词,我们是我们的人,我们是我们的人,我们是我们的人,我们是我们的人,我们是我们的人,我们是我们的人,我们是我们的人,我们是我们的人 第一个人,我们就是我们的人,我们就是我们的人,我们就是我们的人,我们是我们的人,我们是我们的人,我们就是我们的人,我们就是我们的人,我们就是我们的人,我们就是我

FAILURE RATE IN FITS	(<303.)	ATING DATA	FAILURE RATE IN FITS	62.89
NUMBER	0	STOR NON-OPER	NUMBER FAILED	H
STORAGE HOURS X 10	ო ო	SOURCE F TRANSISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA	STORAGE HOURS X 10	15.9
DEVICE TYPE	Transistors JANTX All Data	TABLE 3.1-6.	DEVICE TYPE	Transistors JANTX All Data

TRANSISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA - ALL SOURCES TABLE 3.1-7.

	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	COMB	INED DATA	COMBINED DATA - ALL SOURCES	ES	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
	D	AN PARTS	JAN PARTS	D	ANTK PA	JANTX PARTS
DEVICE TYPE	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURE RATE IN FITS	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Transistors All Data	2562.	18	7.02	15658.	18	1.15
Silicon PNF	51.	0	(<19.6)	2559.	ო	1.17
Silicon NPN	434.	8	4.61	6584.	ω	1.21
Germanium NFN	ı	ı	1	21.	0	(<48.0)
Germanium PNP	ı	1	•	45.	0	(<22.3)
FET	ı	1	1	1299.	H	.77
Unijunction	ı	1	1	2.	0	(<500.)
M:crowave Power	ı	i	ı	<b>.</b>	0	(<125.)

TABLE 3.1-8. SOURCE A DIODES NON-OPERATING DATA

DEVICE TYPE	number Devices	HOURS X 10	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Diodes JAN				
All Data	146832	2144.	5	2.33
Silicon	67298	982.	0	(<1.18)
Switching	24472	357.	0	(<2.80)
Signal	42826	625.	0	(<1.60)
Zener	16606	242.	S	(<4.12)
Regulator	13110	191.	0	(<5.22)
Reference	3496.	51.	0	(<19.6)

TABLE 3.1-9. SOURCE B DIODES NON-OPERATING DATA

DEVICE TYPE	NUMBER DEVICES	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Diodes JANTX				
All Data	182592	2399.567	3	1.25
Silicon	152794	2007.971	0	(<.498)
Switching	51988	683.210	o	(<1.46)
Signal	100806	1324.761	0	(<.755)
Zener .	13314	174.968	1	5.71
Microwave	7608	99.982	2	20.0
Power	8878	116.646	0	(<8.57)

TABLE 3.1-10. SOURCE C DIODES NON-OPERATING DATA

		JAN		- 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1	JANTX -	JANTX
DEVICE TYPE	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Diodes All Data	6871.	41	5,97	18761.	7	.37
Silicon	6264.	41	6.54	ı	ı	•
Switching	1	ì	1	ı	1	1
Signal	í	ı	i	1	ı	ı
Sener	. 209	0	(<1.65)	<b>.</b> 828	Н	1.11
Regulator	ı	ı	į	t	ı	
Reference		1	ı	1	i	ı
Tunnel		ı	. 1	2.	0	(<523.)
Varactor	ı	ı	ı	2.	0	(<523.)

TABLE 3.1-11. SOURCE D DIODES NON-OPERATING DATA

DEVICE TYPE	NUMBER DEVICES	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
All Data	842	25.894	H	38.6
Silicon	465	14.403	0	(<69.4)
Zener	377	11.491	н	87.0

TABLE 3.1-12. DIODES NON-OPERATING DATA - ALL SOURCES

		JAN	.!	JANTX	JANTX .	 
DEVICE TYPE	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Diodes All Data	9015.	46	5.10	21186.	11	.519
Silicon	7246.	41	5.66	2022	0	(<.494
Zener	849.	0	(<1.18)	1084.	m	2.77
Tunnel	1	1	1	2.	0	(<2005>)
Varactor	1	1	1	2.	0	(<500.)
Power	t	1	t	117.	0	(<8.55)
Microwave	ı	ı	ı	100	7	20.0

### 3.2 Discrete Semiconductor Operational Prediction Models

The MIL-HDBK-217B general failure rate model for transistors and diodes is:

$$\lambda_{p} = \lambda_{b} (\Pi_{E} \times \Pi_{A} \times \Pi_{Q} \times \Pi_{S2} \times \Pi_{C}) \times 10^{-6}$$

Where:

 $\lambda_{n}$  = device failure rate

 $\lambda_{h}$  = base failure rate

 $\Pi_{_{\mathbf{F}}} =$ Environmental Adjustment Factor

 $\Pi_{\mathbf{h}}$  = Application Adjustment Factor

 $\Pi_{O} = Quality Adjustment Factor$ 

II S2 Voltage Stress Adjustment Factor

 $II_{C} = Complexity Adjustment Factor$ 

The various types of semiconductors require different failure rate models that vary to some degree from the basic model. The specific failure rate model and the N factor values for each group are shown in figures 3.2-1 thru 3.2-15.

The base failure rate and adjustment factor values presented in the figures are based on certain assumptions. See section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for a description of these parameters.

Table 3.2-1 provides a list of the semiconductor generic groups with a cross reference to the corresponding figure number.

### 3.2.1 Base Failure Rate $(\lambda_b)$

The equation for the base failure rate,  $\lambda_b$ , is:

$$\lambda_{b} = Ae^{-(\frac{N_{T}}{273 + T + (\Delta T) S})} e^{-(\frac{273 + T + (\Delta T) S}{T_{M}})^{P}}$$

Where

A is a failure rate scaling factor.

e is the natural logarithm base, 2.718

 $N_{_{\rm T\!P}}$ ,  $T_{_{\rm M\!P}}$  and P are shaping parameters.

T is the operating temperature in degrees C, ambient or case, as applicable (see Section 3.2.3 for instructions).

AT is the difference between maximum allowable temperature with no junction current or power (total derating) and the maximum allowable temperature with full rated junction current or power.

TABLE 3.2-1 DISCRETE SEMICONDUCTOR OPERATIONAL PREDICTION MODELS CROSS REFERENCE

DISCRETE SEMICONDUCTOR TYPE	GROUP	FIGURE #
Silicon NPN Transisters	I	3.2-1
Silicon PNP Transistors	I	3.2-2
Germanium PNP Transistors	I	3.2-3
Germanium NPN Transistors	I	3.2-4
Field Effect Transistors	II	3.2-5
Unijunction Transistors	III	3.2-6
Silicon (General Purpose) Diodes	IV	3.2-7
Germanium (General Purpose) Diodes	IV	3.2-8
Voltage Regulator & Voltage Reference (Temp. Compensated) (Zener, Avalanche) Diode	s V	3.2-9
Thyristors	VI	3.2-10
Silicon Microwave Detectors	VII	3.2-11
Germanium Microwave Detectors	VII	3.2-12
Silicon Microwave Mixers	VII	3.2-14
Varactors, Step Recovery & Tunnel Diodes	VIII	3.2-15

S is the stress ratio of operating electrical stress to rated electrical stress (see Section 3.2.3 for S calculation).

The values for the constant parameters are shown in Table 3.2-2. The resulting base failure rates as functions of temperature and electrical stress are shown for each part type in Figures 3.2-1 through 3.2-15. These failure rates are based on the typical maximum junction temperatures (fully derated) of 100 degrees C for germanium (70 degrees C for microwave types) and 175 degrees C for silicon (150 degrees C for microwave types) as well as a value of 25 degrees C for the maximum temperature at which full rated operation is permitted. If device temperature ratings are different from these values, see Section 3.2.3 for S calculations to compensate for these differences.

The base failure rate tables contain failure rates up to full rated conditions. If a particular operating condition of S and T is high enough to fail into a blank portion of the table, the device is over-rated and should not be used.

### 3.2.2 I Adjustment Factors

### 3.2.2.1 Environmental Adjustment Factor, $\pi_{\rm E}$

 $II_{\rm E}$  accounts for the influence of environmental factors other than temperature. Refer to the environmental description in the Appendix.

### 3.2.2.2 Application Adjustment Factor, $\pi_{\mathbf{A}}$

IA accounts for effect of application in terms of circuit function.

## 3.2.2.3 Quality Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{Q}$

 ${
m II}_{
m Q}$  accounts for effects of different quality. The quality levels (JAN, JANTX, JANTXV) are as defined in MIL-S-19500.

TABLE 3.2-2
DISCRETE SEMICONDUCTOR BASE FAILURE RATE PARAMETERS

		•		λ <sub>b</sub> Cons	tants		
	Group	Part Type	A	NT	T <sub>M</sub>	P	ΔTT
Tra	ansistors						
		Si, NPN	0.13	-1052	448	10.5	150
	ı	Si, PNP	0.45	-1324	448	14.2	150
	-	Ge, PNP	6.5	-2142	373	20.8	75
		Ge, NPN	21.	-2221	373	19.0	75
	II	FET	0.52	1162	448	13.8	150
	III	Unijunction	3.12	-17/9	448	13.8	150
Dic	odes						
	IV.	Si, Gen. Purp.	0.9	-2138	448	17.7	150
	<b>1</b> V .	Ge, Gen. Purp.	126	-3568	373	22.5	75
	V	Zener/Avalanche	0.04	-800	448	14	150
	VI	Thyristors	0,82	-2050	448	9.6	150
		Microwave					
		Ge, Detectors	0.33	-477	343	15.6	45
	VII	Si, Detectors	0.14	~392	423	16.6	125
	A11	Ge, Mixers	0.56	-477	343	15.6	45
		Si, Mixers	0.19	-394	423	15.6	125
	AIII	Varactor, Step Recovery & Tunnel	.93	-1162	448	·13.8	150

# 3.2.2.4 Voltage Stress Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{S2}$

 $\Pi_{S2}$  adjusts the model for a second electrical stress (application voltage) in addition to wattage included in the base failure rate,  $\lambda_b$ . The voltage stress, S2, is defined as:

$$S2 = \frac{Applied (V_{CE})}{Rated (V_{CEO})} \times 100$$

### 3.2.2.5 Complexity Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{\mathbb{C}}$

 $\rm I\!I_C$  accounts for effect of multiple devices in a single package. Each transistor in a case must be treated individually for complexity factor. Its failure rate,  $\lambda_{\rm b}$ , modified by other II factors and then multiplied by this complexity factor. If only one transistor of a pair is used, treat as an independent item with II  $_{\rm C}$  = 1.0.

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR SILICON NPN TRANSISTORS FIGURE 3.2-1

 $\lambda_{\rm p}=\lambda_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm E}$   $\times$   $\pi_{\rm A}$   $\times$   $\pi_{\rm Q}$   $\times$   $\pi_{\rm S2}$   $\times$   $\pi_{\rm C}$  )  $\times$  10^-6

 $\lambda_b$  (Base Failure Rate)

		•																														
						\										5	רדעיים				7	١.	7	•	7	•	7	4	<b>ω</b>	۳.	0.30	<u>۳</u>
	-	1.018	05	2	3		1	<b>\</b>								Ú	0 t C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C			E)				<del></del>	<del></del>					-		7
•	6.		-	2	.023	2		_	\ _	_						(770) +3	C ACT CACA	5	2 2	(percent			O					40			10	0
		.011	0	d 0		디	7	2	3				7			E	S	L				Ĺ			or)							لـ
0	•	.0095	r-4	~	Н	H١		2	2		2	.033		_	\	7									Y Factor		Щ	i	.2	4.	2.0	•
s Ratio	9•	_	8		Н	김	-	0	Н	.018	7	02	~	~	ന			\	<b>\</b>						" <sub>Q</sub> (Quality		Qualicy	SVel	JANTXV	JANTX	JAN	Lower
Stres	٠5	90	07	98	0	8	T	H	01		-		Н	2	~	2		က	_	\	\			ı	) 0 #	ا ا	<u>5. i</u>	<u>ង</u>	E.	<u> </u>	<u>r</u>	ង្ឋ
	₽*	05	90	07	0	0	08	~	~	Н	0	7	~	-1	ᅥ	Н	.020	~	1	S	3		\	\	_							
	.3	04	05	90	0	90	07	08	80	60	-	-	-1	$\boldsymbol{\vdash}$	$\vdash$	H	7	Н	$\vdash$	2	2	.025	~	ന	\		\					
	.2	04	004	002	002	005	900	007	007	0	008	800	600	0	10	01	-	01	$\boldsymbol{\vdash}$	$\boldsymbol{\neg}$	-4	01	$^{\circ}$	S	2	N	$\sim$	\	\			
	.1	03	03	04	04	0.4	05	90	90	0	07	07	079	084	680	095	10	70	Н	~	-	-	Н.	↤	-	2	3	.025	~	ကျ		
E	(0)	0	10	20	25	30	40	20	55	09	65	70	75	08	85	90	6	0	C	$\vdash$		2	2	က	š	4	4	150	S	ဖ၂		

 $\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$  (7 lvironmental Factor)

Environment	H E
Ground, Benign	Н
Space Flight	-
Ground, Fixed	Ŋ
Airborne, Inhabited	25
Naval, Sheltered	25
Ground, Mobile	250
Naval, Unsheltered	25
Airborne, Uninhab.	40
Missile, Launch	40

"Complexity Factor)

Complexity	$_{\rm C}$
Single Transistor	1.0
Dual (Unmatched)	0.7
Dual (Matched)	1.2
Larlington	0.8
Dual Emitter	1.1
Multiple Emitter	1.2
Complementary Pair	0.7

MA (Application Factor)

ПA	1.5	5.0
Application	Linear Logic Switch	High Frequency (R.F. >400 MHz)

MIL-HDBX-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR SILICON PNP TRANSISTORS FIGURE 3.2-2

 $\lambda_{\rm p}=\lambda_{\rm b}$  (  $n_{\rm E}$  X  $n_{\rm A}$  X  $n_{\rm Q}$  X  $n_{\rm S2}$  X  $n_{\rm C}$  ) X  $10^{-6}$ 

r)	E E	7	p=4 L	ر د در	25.	25	25	40	40			II C	1.0		7.0			0.7								
(Environmental Factor)	Environment	Ground, Benign	$\vdash$	Ground, Fixed	(I)	•	Ŋ	o)	Missile, Launch		"C (complexicy factor)	Complexity	Single Transistor	2	Dual (Matched)	H	Dual Emitter	Multiple Emitter Complementary Pair			n (Onality Factor)	12	Level "Q	>	JANTX 2.0	er 10.
H		1.0	.030	053	063	\	\			‡	<b>=</b>			Stress			<b>=</b>	*8 <sub>2</sub>	3.0	2.25	. 65	10	•	•	• •	0.30
				034	.039	.045	1.063	\ _	_	•				Voltage	Factor)		22	(percent)	100	. 06	80	0 09	20	40	202	0 0 ri
		8.	.018	024	027	.030	$\mathbf{c}$	.053	0		\	\			ັຮຂັ	1		<u>à</u>	L		<u> </u>					
		.7	14	910	٠ ا	022	.027	.034	٠ د د د د د	.053	:063	<u> </u>	\	7							Factor	É	1.5	0.7	_	
Rate)	tio	9.	-012	0 t c	910	.018	.021	.024	770	.034	.039	.045	000	3		<u> </u>	<b>\</b>				pplication	Lion		witch	th Frequency	
lure Re	ess Rat		10 (	$\sim$	$\circ$	0	0	0	<b>&gt;</b> <	.024	(O)	$\circ$	ე ი ე ი	$\circ$	05	90	_	\	,		Appli	Application	near	1.4	High Fre	
e Fai	Str		00	2 5	선	Z		d:	75	4	2	200	2 C	3 0	3	03	04	.053 .063	1	/	\ \ '	¶ <u>₹</u>		<u>H</u>	<u> </u>	1
λ, (Bas		3	7	080	960	2	<u>-</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	15	1.6	8 6	א ני איני	22	24	27	30	.034	1	un '	യ	\	Z			
~		.2	005	000	$\sim$	800	600	10	d (	-	딩	20	<b>ゴ</b> に	70	10	02	0	.624	0	(7)	0 0	すじ)	IQ.	\	7	
		7:	004	200		207	308	600	900	-	12	d:	イ r つ c	10		0	0	.019	$\mathbf{v}$	0	<b>(7)</b> (	200	, (,,)	G 12	ושו	
	E	(0)		$\sim$	- 1C		6	0				io (	<b>.</b> .	n	مار	0	0	110	110	N	m (	1) :Q	.14.	ט נט	י שיי	

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR GERMANIUM PNP TRANSISTORS FIGURE 3.2-3

THE STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE P

 $^{\lambda}_{\rm p} = ^{\lambda}_{\rm b}$  (  $^{\Pi}_{\rm E}$   $^{\rm X}$   $^{\Pi}_{\rm A}$   $^{\rm X}$   $^{\Pi}_{\rm Q}$   $^{\rm X}$   $^{\Pi}_{\rm S2}$   $^{\rm X}$   $^{\Pi}_{\rm C}$  )  $^{\rm X}$  10-6

おんけつかり	1		4	1 -	-l u	) [	0.7	0 V	1 C	7 6	40		<del>د</del>	1		•	•	ν α	•	•	0.7									
(Environmental	i i	Environment	Greund. Benion	Ē	Ground Fixed	•	Naval Choltond	, m	٠-	C	귀		"C (Complexity Factor	Complexity		Single Transistor	Dual (Unmatched)	Darlington	Dual Emitter	٠,				II (Quality Factor)		Vuality II		۷ .	A. XTNAD	er 10
		1.0	.017	.020	.025	.031	.041	.056	<i>\</i>	7				0+1000	2012			υ U	22	3.0	2.25	•	•	0,1	. 7	4. c	• ·	300	. m	
,		6.	.013	.016	.018	.022	.027	.035	.047	_	7				_	actor /		(nercent)	;		0	0	0	0	0 (	<b>3</b> C	<b>&gt;</b>	<b>.</b>	0	
		8.	.011	.013	.015	1.017	.020	.025	031	.041	.056	7		η (Vo	182 174 LAGI	-	S.	(001	1	S		- 8	7 7	ı ق	Ω·	4.0	<u> </u>	~ · ·		
		7.	.0095	.010	.012	.013	910.	.018	.022	.027	.035	) 	7		•								Factor	П	¥,	0.0	. נ	•		
Rate)	tio	9.	0800.	0600.	.010	.011	.013	.015	.017	.020	.025	041	.056		1									uo		tch	nenga	. >400 MHz)		
lure	ss Ra	.5	2900	.0075	.0084	.0095	.010	.012	.013	.016	.018	.027	.035	.047	/	\							Application	lication	037	ic Swi	c	. G	i	
ıse Fai	Stre	4	0	9	07	080	060	10	Н	~	.015	1](\	2	3	4	S	1					1	"A (	App	1,1	Log	High	(R		
λ <sub>b</sub> (Ba		.3	004	002	005	900	007	0	000	0	012		1	02	02	03	04		\					~						
		.2	03	004	004	002	900	00	008	600	010		5	01	02	02	(M)	4	Ωľ	\										
		.1	003	003	004	004	005	005	900	000	.0084	010	01	Н	0	10	2	2	η,	ずし										
	F	ပ် (၁)	0	<u>م</u>	01	15	50	25	30	رن برد	40	20	52	09	65	70	75	80	200	90										

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR GERMANIUM NPN TRANSISTORS FIGURE 3.2-4

 $^{\lambda}_{p} = ^{\lambda}_{b} (^{\Pi}_{E} \times ^{\Pi}_{A} \times ^{\Pi}_{Q} \times ^{\Pi}_{S2} \times ^{\Pi}_{C}) \times 10^{-6}$ 

<pre>IE (Environmental Factor) Environment IE</pre>	enign ght ixed	ne, Inhabited Sheltered , Mobile	Naval, Unsheltered 25 Airborne, Uninhab. 40 Missile, Launch 40	<pre>π<sub>C</sub> (Complexity Factor)</pre>	le Transistor 1 (Unmatched) 0	Dual (Matched) 1.2 Darlington 0.8	iple Emitter 1.		No (Quality Factor)	Vuality IIQ Level IIQ	JANTXV . 2 JANTX . 4	er 10
Ab (Base Failure Rate) Stress Ratio	0 .0076 .0094 .011 .014 .016 .020 .024 .029 .035 .04 5 .0088 .010 .013 .015 .019 .023 .028 .034 .042 .05 0 .010 .012 .014 .018 .021 .026 .032 .039 .050 .05	5 .011 .014 .016 .020 .024 .029 .036 .046 .060 .0 .013 .015 .019 .023 .028 .034 .042 .055 .074 .	016 .020 .024 .029 .036 .046 .060 .083 .12 .12 .13 .12 .13 .13 .12 .13 .028 .034 .042 .055 .074 .10 .10 .024 .039 .050 .067 .095 .14	0 . C28 . 034 . 042 . 055 . 074 . 10 5 . 032 . 039 . 050 . 067 . 095 , 14	5 .042 .055 .074 .10	5 .060 .083 .12 0 .074 .10 5 .095 .14 (percent) IIS	0 .12 100 3.0	pplication Factor) 80 70	sation "A 60 1.	Switch 0.7 30 0.	>400 MHz) 10	

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILUNE RATE MODEL FOR FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTORS 3.2-5 FIGURE

=  $\lambda_b$  (  $\pi_E \times n_A \times \pi_Q \times n_C$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ ď

<pre>IE (Environmental Factor)</pre>	Environment	田	Grouna, Benign 1	Ground, Fixed 5	ne, Inhabited	Sheltered	Mobile	sheltered	ab.	Missile, Launch 40		•	$\pi_{\mathbf{C}}$ (Complexity Factor)	mplexity	Our East Succession	le Device	(Unmatched) 0	(Matched)	mplementary	Tetrode 1.1			II. (Application Factor)	3.7.	Application IIA	ת המתיד	Logic Switch 0.7	>	>400 MHz)	
		1.0	.052		001:	1	<u>\</u>	7														۲۷	្ប	ſ		צ	.2	4.	2.0	10.01
		6.	.039	350	.066	.076	10		<u> </u>	\												(Quality	Factor	-		_	\\			
		8.	.031	0.00	.047	.052	990.	.088	.10				\				٠					) (I			Vualley	ייבי אביד	JANTXV	JANTX	JAN	Lower
Rate)		4.	.026	034			ı				.088	10		\	\	,														
ilure Ra	tio	9•	.022				Г					990	920.	880.	.10			\	\											
ľ.	l W	•	.019	1 C	02	02	02	03	03	03	04	04	05	05	90	07	80	$\vdash$	_	\	\									
λ <sub>b</sub> (Base	Stre	•	.016	4 (	02	02	02	02	02	03	03	03	03	04	04	05	05	90	07	α	.10		\	\						
		ۥ	.013	1 ~	01	01	02	02	02	2	02	02	03	3	03	03	4	04	05	S	O	7	α	- 01.	\	\	N			
		•	110.	┥┌┥	Н	~		0	$\sim$	$\sim$	02	02	$\sim$	02	$\sim$	03	03	03	m	04	04	ıO	05	5	/	ന	1001.	\	\	
		. 1	.0092	1 ~	01	0	0	0	0	0	6	07	07	02	07	02	02	02	03	03	္ပါ	03	04	04	10	05	90	07	80 6	2
	EH	$\hat{\mathcal{O}}$	0 0		ις.	0	0	<u> </u>	in In		2	0	iO	<u> </u>	in	0	95	00	05	- 인건	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	20	-	<u>ه</u> ا

ţ	Factor)
compress cy	ပ္
Single Device	1.0
Dual (Unmatched)	0.7
Dual (Matched)	1.2
Dual Complementary	0.7
Tetrode	-

Factor	ПА	1.5	0.7	5.0	
ron	Application	Linear	Logic Switch	High Frequency	(R.F. >400 MHZ)

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR UNIJUNCTION TRANSISTORS FIGURE 3.2-6

=  $\lambda_b$  (  $\pi_E$  x  $\pi_Q$  ) x  $10^{-6}$ ح ط

umental Factor)

II <sub>F</sub> (Environmental Fact	Environment	1	Ground, Benign Space Flight	Ground, Fixed	H	U,		ល	ď	Missile, Launch					"Q (Yualley Factor)	ty	Level "Q	TAMPAY		NAT.	70						
		1.0	.073	133	25	\		_																			
		6.	05	.003	.095	.11	.15		\	\																	
<u> </u>		8.	.039	.058	.064	.073	.095	.13	.15		_	1	\	<b>\</b>													
e Rate		7.	150.	.043	.047	.052	.064	.083	.095	11.	.13	.15		_	\												
Failure	io	9•	.024	.033	.036	.039	.047	.058	.064	.073	.083	.095	.11	.13	.15				7								
(Base	ss Ratio	.5	.019	.026	.028	.031	.036	.043	.047	.052	.058	.064	.073	.083	.095	.11	.13	.15		\	\	<b>\</b>					
Ϋ́α	Stre	<b>7</b>	.015	22	02	0.2	02	03	03	03	04	04	05	05	90	~	90	9	.11	.13	.15		\	\			
		•	.011.	1 <b>~</b>	~		2	07	07	03	m	03	03	4	04	05	S	90	07	$\infty$	60	~	.13	Н	_		<u>\</u>
		7	0088	10	01	2	01	07	07	02	02	02	03	03	03	03	04	04	05	05	90	1	80	60	.11	리	7
		~!	.0064	000 000	0	5	0	0	5	d	02	02	02	02	02	03	03	03	03	04	04	05	05	90	07	8	90
	EH	ပ	00		ហ	0	0	0	S	<u>ာ</u>	5	0	Ŋ	0	2	0	98	00	0.5	10	15	20.	25	30	ហ	40	45

.13 .13

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR SILICON (GENERAL FURPOSE) DIODES FIGURE 3.2-7

,这种,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们也不是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm A} \times \pi_{\rm Q} \times \pi_{\rm S2} \times \pi_{\rm C}$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ 

$\pi_{\mathbf{E}}$ (Environmental Factor)	Environment N <sub>E</sub>	Bonian	얼	1, Fixed	ne, Inhabited	Sheltered	, Mobile	Naval, Unsheltered 25	Tannch		T (Application Mactor)	San T Warn	Application HA	00ma) 1.	Switch	Rectifier 1.	(>500ma)	ectifie	(H.V. Stacks) junct	, max soco		2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 477)	S2 (Voltage Stress Factor)	E S	(percent) 2	09	8.0	2 90 0.90	
			057	1.0072 1.0	6600	770	200	<u>.</u>	/ / /	_		\					"Q (Xuurru) Factor)	L	Level no	-	JANTXV .5		Lower 25.0	motion Bactori		Construction	ly Bonded	rgically Bonded	
Rate)	io	. 9.	.0033	.0039	7,0047	0000	0000	.0095	0072 .011	0082 013	200		010	020	_		*	ΙΞ	H		ים ר	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	4 4000)	וול (כמווז די	Contact Const	Metallurgical	Non-Metallurgically Bonded (Spring loaded contacts	1
Failure R	Stress Ratio		4 .00	7.000	-000	٠ ا		6 .0047	9 .0052	43 .0057	200	7	4 .00	2 .0	2 .01	5 .01	<u>.</u>	~ ;	-	\ \ !	\				,				_3
λ <sub>b</sub> (Base			010 00	013 .00	0016 600		00 8 600	027 (.00	0030  .00	0033 .00	030	0043 .00	0047  .00	0052 .00	0057 .00	054  .00	072   01	10. 280	10. 360 50. 10.	77	4 ~	2	\	\	7				
		.2	00	00	לס	לכ		02	02	.0025	3 0	003	003	03	004	04	05	ς C	رن ره د		000	H	~	<u>٦</u> (٢	V		7		
		7.	000	000	000			100	100	.0019	200	002	002	003	003	003	003	004	004		900	007	008	סור	1.0	910.	.020		
		ပ် ()	O	10	20	0 0	200	20	55	09	70	75	80	82	90	9	0 0	၁ •	-	<b>-اا</b> د	10	n	m	4,14	7 U	155	ဖ		

OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL (GENERAL PURPOSE) DIODES MIL-HDBK-217B FOR GERMANIUM FIGURE 3.2-8

( ,

 $x_{H_C}$ ) x 10<sup>-6</sup>  $\pi_Q \times \pi_{S2}$ × HA H  $^{\lambda_b}$  (  $^{\Pi_E}$  X 11 ر م

(Environmental Fac	Environment	1	a, benagn Flight		1, FIXEQ	(	Mobilo	•,	onsinercered	ne, ominian.	יבי דמחוכוו	(Appliantion Broto	ידירמרדטוו ד מכנס	ation		Signal (<500m2)	SWITCHING	(ectiler	( man oc. )	CLILLE	7. Stacks)  ju		
IIE (En	En	741.04.0	Space	ないない。	Girborno Airborno	Marral	ליומיטיים יי	Nava 1	Navar, on	Miccillo Miccillo	76677		A A KAP	Application	ł			FOWER	-	TUMO4	(H.V.	> e E	
	1.0	.0054	.0068	.0087	.011	.016	.024	/	7														
	6.	.0040	.0049	.0061	.0077	.010	.013	.019	_	7					lity	tor)	L.,	0	ľ	<u>.</u>	7.0	5.0	25.0
	8.	.0030	.0036	.0044	.0054	.0068	.0087	.011	.016	.024	/	7			<sub>n</sub> (Quality	Factor	Quality	Level	3 3,700,577	OMNTAV	JANTX	GAN	Lower
	.7	.0022	.0027	.0033	.0040	.0049	.0061	.0077	.010	.013	.019		7		Ħ	i	0	<u> </u>	1,	2	<u>ن</u>	r <sub>2</sub>	<u> </u>
) Ratio	9.	.0017	.0020	.0025	.0030	.0036	.0044	.0054	.0068	.0087	.011	910.	.024		١								
re Rate) Stress Ra	• 5	.0013	.0015	.0019	.0022	.0027	.0033	.0040	.0049	.0061	.0077	010	.013	.01.9	_								
Failure Str	. 4	0		0	0	0		0	0	0			õ	.011				7					
(Base Fa	.3	00	00	10	01	0	10	02	02	03	04	04	90	.0077	Н	Ч	100		7				
γ <sup>P</sup> (E	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Q	ت	0	.0054	C	0	-	, Si6	~	<b>\</b>	Ĺ		
	.1	00	00	00	00	00	TO	01	01	0	02	02	03	.0040	04	90	07	.010	4	_	1		
T	(၁ (၁)	0	S	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	20	55	09	65	70	75	80	85	0			

4422244 44222200000

Factor)

Factor)

					_ ~	•						
∦ A	1.0	1.5	2.5/	Junct	1	ractor) <b>J</b>		····				
	0m≥)	r 7(:0ma		U D	0 0 1 1	1	182 2	٠.	•	•	0.90	•
APPLICALION	Small Signal (<500m2) Logic Switching	Rectifie	Rectifie	(H.V. Stacks) Vmax >600	ane+[OV]	- 1	2 perc	0 to 60	1 70	80	06	100
								_			_	

ည

(Construction Factor)

H 03

Non-Metallurgically Bonded (Spring loaded contacts)

Metallurgically Bonded

Contact Construction

The state of the s

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR ZENER AND AVALANCHE DIODES FIGURE 3.2-9

THE COLUMN TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm A} \times \pi_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ 

Factor)	٦	<u>1</u>	-1 e-1	ı.					40				ੰ ਮ		 ਪ:	Ţ,	) i	C.1	7				_							
IF (Environmental Fac	Environment		Space Flight	Ground, Fixed	Ü	She	m	Naval, Unsheltered	o)	Missile, Launch			I, (Application Factor	1.02+1.02	Application	Do 2017 2 4 2 22		ש	וזביווף. בסיוולהיוזפרפתי				O (Quality Factor)	Ouality	Level	-+	CANTXV		er 2	
		1.9	;	110.	0 to 0	010:	1																							
		6.	¥600°	.0085	21.0	770.	0,10	;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;	\	\																				
		8.	.0073	.0068	200.	2000	.00%	14.0	018				`																	
		.7	.0061	8000.	4000	2000	5,000	0 0 0	0110		.015	.018		\	\	\														
Rate)	io	9	.0052	0000.		8000	TOOO	700	9800	.0094	.010	.011	.013	.015	.018			\												
ailure	ss Rat		1						000			_	_	_	_	.013	.015	.018	_	\	\									
(Base F	Stre	4	03	03	20	4 4	400	ם ט		90	900	900	007	07	008	600	01	<b>~</b> •	5	Н,	-1	`	\	\						
Ω Υ.			003	000	200	200	200	200		005	005	0.5	900	900	900	07	007	800	60	Н,	~I	Н,	07	0	\		\			
		.2	002	003	003	200	200		$\sim$	004	004	005	002	005	002	900	900	900	007	007	800	60	01	ם ֹ	0	5	~	\	\	
		-:	002	020	002	500	000	2 C	<b>&gt; C</b>	000	004	004	004	004	002	005	005	005	900	900	900	07	70c	800	00	0	<b>~</b> •	⊣ -	018	1
	Ę	(c) (c)	6	0 (	0	<u> </u>	0		ວ ທ	0	S	0	'n	0	ıΩ	0	2	00		07	15	2	2	90 90	35	40	t	S a	160	1

FIGURE 3.2-10 MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR THYRISTORS

 $\gamma_{\rm p} = \gamma_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times$  10-6

$\Pi_{ m E}$ (Environmental Factor)	Environment	ਜ਼ ਜ	Benign Light	i, Fixed	rne, Inhabited 2	Sheltered 2	, Mobile 2	nsneltered 2	rborne, Uninhab.	Missile, Launch 40					T (Chality Waston)		Quality	Level 10	+	C. L. XENAT.	-{ u		• [							
		9 1.0	-	-	•		2	7	\																					
		8.	0059 008	060	-	11	┝	-	N	_	1	<b>\</b>	\																	
Rate)		.7	40	065	072	081	.010	.012	.014	1.017	.019	.022		1	\	7														
Failure	atio	9.	.0033 .0039	00.48	.0053	.0059	.0072	0600.	.010	.011	.012	.014	1.017		N			\	7											
Base F	ress Ra		0024	.0036	1.0039	1.0044	.0053	.0065	.0072	.0081	.0090	010	.011	1.012	.014	.01,	5	$\circ$		<u> </u>	`	A								
) q <sub>Y</sub>	1	4.	.0018	002	003	003	003	004	002	002	.006	007	800	600	010	01	0	10	01		02		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<b>.</b>					
		.3	.0013	002	002	002	003	003	003	004	004	900	002	900	007	008	600	0	0	0	깅	0	07	02	_		7			
		.2	.0009	001	001	001	002	002	003	003	003	003	004	004	005	005	900	007	008	600	김	70	0	01	01	7	$\sim$	_	\	7
		.1	.0006 .0008	01	01	201	70	002	005	005	002	03	003	003	03	004	004	005	002	90	00	က က	000	~				$\boldsymbol{d}$	-10	3 H
	H	ည် )	100	20	25	30	40	20	52	09	65	70	75	80	85	90	6	0	0	Н,		~	2	m	n	4	4	S	155	) I

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR SILICON MICROWAVE DETECTORS FIGURE 3.2-11

THE STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF T

 $^{\lambda}_{\rm p}$  ~  $^{\lambda}_{\rm b}$  (  $^{\Pi}_{\rm E}$  X  $^{\Pi}_{\rm Q}$  ) X  $^{10}^{-6}$ 

$\Pi_{ m E}$ (Environmental Factor)	Futti ronmont	TOTALICAL C	Ground, Benign	light	i, Fixed	rre, Inhabited	Sheltered	, Mobile	nsheltered	rborne, Uninhab.	Missile, Launch 200							In (Quality Factor)	1 : 4 : 1	TO::01		JANTXV 1.0	JANTK 2.0	JAN 3.5	Lower 5.0					-
		1.0	.075	- 082	.092	1.10	.12	.15	\ _	<u> </u>	<b>\</b>																			
		6.	062	990	.072	.078	.087	860	- - -	.13	_	\	7																	
		8.	.055	.057	.060	.064	.069	.075	.082	.092	.10	, 12	.15	/	7															
te)		. 7	.050	.052	.054	.056	.059	.062	990.	.072	.078	.087	860.	.11	.13	\	\	X												
ure Rate)	io	9.	.047	.048	.049	.051	.053	.055	.057	090.	.064	690.	.075	.082	.092	.10	.12	.15	\	\										
e Failure	ss Ratio	•5	.044	4	4	4	4	05	S	05	S	TU)	90	90	7	07	08	6				\								
b (Base	Stre	4	.042	04	04	4	04	4	04	04	05	05	05	05	Ø	90	90	02	$\infty$	60				\	į					
~			.039	04	04	04	04	04	04	04	04	4	05	05	05	05	05	စ	90	07	0	08	60		Н	\	\			
			.037	03	03	4	04	4	04	04	04	04	04	04	04	05	05	05	05	90	90	06	07	08	σ	Н	-	7	\	
		.1		m	$(\cdot)$	ന	m	m	4	4	4	4	04	04	4	04	04	S	05	05	S	ഗ	9	9	~	7	ω	6	11.	
		(0, 0)	0										0	S	0	2	0	2	0				0	0	~	$\boldsymbol{\vdash}$	2	7	130	າ

;

i

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR GERMANIUM MICROWAVE DETECTORS 3.2-12 FIGURE

1

$$_{\lambda_{\rm p}} = _{\lambda_{\rm b}} (_{\rm n_E} \times _{\rm n_Q}) \times _{10}^{-6}$$

λ<sub>b</sub> (Base Failure Rate)

 $\Pi_{\mathrm{E}}$  (Environmental Factor)

Environment

Ground, Benign
Space Flight
Ground, Fixed
Airborne, Inhabited
Naval, Sheltered
Ground, Mobile
Naval, Unsheltered
Airborne, Uninhab.
Missile, Launch

200007777

No (Quality Factor)

Ö.					
racto	дш	1.0	2.0	•	נ
(Quality	Quality Level	JA. TXV	JANTX	JAN	Lower
O	}				

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR SILICON MICROWAVE MIXERS FIGURE 3.2-13

 $\lambda_p = \lambda_b$  (  $n_E \times n_Q$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ 

•

_	_			_						_	
Factor)			7	-	10	50	50	50	50	80	200
IE (Environmental Fac	Environment	1	T1 -		Ground, Fixed	Airborne, Inhabited	Naval, Sheltered	Ground, Mobile	Naval, Unsheltered	Airborne, Uninhab.	Minnila Tanhoh
		1.0	01.	-	10	77.	7	200		\	\
		6.	980	000	000		2	7	) L	) a	) i
		8	9	<u>σ</u>	۸ ۳	10	٠ u	Ţ			

or)				
Factor)	п	• •	3.5	•
(Quali <i>ty</i>	Quality Level	JANTXV	z	Ower
		S S	JAN	Ϊ́Ο
C H	t			

HE	L	Ŀ	as S	י ני י ני	7	4 2	2 5	2 2	d	7 7																				
			10		Н				1	\	\																			
			980	50	60	-1	~1		Н	H	_		<u>\</u>																	
re Rate)			920	07	08	œ	60	01.	Н	Н	Ч	.16	.20	<u></u>	<u> </u>	<b>\</b>														
			690	07	07	07	08	œ	60	60	Н					_		7												
	tio		.064	ဖ	90	~	07	2	07	08	ω	9	7	Ч					\ _	7										
Failure	SS Ra		090	90	90	9	90	9	07	07	07	08	08	σ	σ						<u> </u>	/								
(Base	Stre	4	()	ഗ	05	90	9	9	9	9	7	-	7	~	ထ	œ	9				.14				7					
q			0	0 5.	05	2	05	9	90	90	9	90	90	~	7	~	$\infty$	8	9	S	٠. در.					\	\			
			Ωí	S	S	S	ഗ	S	S	05	ဖ	യ	စ	Ø	9	07	~	7	7	08	.089	אוכ	) r	7:	.12	.14	.16	.20		
		٠:	4	マ	S	S	S	വ	S	05	05	05	ဖ	90	90	90	90	9	07	07	.077	olo	0 0	200	00	H	.12	.13	.15	27.
		(၁ (၁)	0																		000	νĮc	<b>&gt;</b> (	Э,	$\dashv$	Н	2	2		7

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR GERMANIUM MICROWAVE MIXERS FIGURE 3.2-14

Ĺ

$$\gamma_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b}$$
 (  $n_{\rm E} \times n_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ 

λ<sub>b</sub> (Base Failure Rate)

	0:1	.16	Н	N	.25	. 30	.37		\						
	6.	.15	.17			.25	30								
	8.	.14	Н	Н	.19	.22	.25	.31	3						
	.1	.13	Н	Н	щ	.19	2	3	.32	_	1				
0	9.	.12	13	Н	Н	.17	1	.22	.]6	.32					
s Rati	.5	.12		.13	.14	.16	.17	.20	.23	.27	.33	/	\		
Stres	• 4	H	.12	.13	.13	.15	H	Н	.20	.23	.27	.34		\	
	.3			.12					Н	.20					١
	.2	.10			.12	.13	.14	.15	• <u>16</u>	.18	.20	.24	.29		
	٠,	01.	.10	.11	.11	.12	.13	.14	.15	.16	.18	.21	.24		
E	(၁ (၂)	0	ν.	20	1.5	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	09	65

 $\pi_{\underline{\mathbf{E}}}$  (Eq. ironmental Factor)

 	=======================================
Ground, Benign	
Space Flight	-
Ground, Fixed	10
Airborne, Inhabited	50
Naval, Sheltered	50
•	50
Waval, Unsheltered	50
S	80
Missile, Launch	200

To (Quality Factor)

OH	1.0	5.0
Quality Level	JANTXV	JAN Lower
ننشنگ ا		نـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR VARACTORS, STEP RECOVERY & TUNNEL LIODES FIGURE 3.2-15

=  $^{\lambda}_{b}$  (  $^{\Pi}_{E}$  ×  $^{\Pi}_{Q}$  ) ×  $^{10}^{-6}$ 

HE (Environmental Factor)	Environment n	E .	benign light	ixed	rne, Inhabited 2	Naval, Sheltered 25	7 50%	Olisher cered 2	r ontinan.	Massare, Edulica 40							"O Mairey Factor	[Quality]	Level "Q	JANTXV		JAN 5.0	• }						
		1.	070 093	-	11 -1	.13	.18	\	<u>\</u>	7																			
Rate)		8.	.056	.077	.084	.093	.11	.15	.18	_		\	7																
		.7	047	.061	0	0	.084	.10	11.	13	1.15	.18		<u> </u>	_	<b>\</b>													
Failure R	cio	9.	.040	.050	.053	.056	• 065	.077	.084	.093	1.10	.11	.13	15	.18			7											
a	ss Rat	•	.034	.042	.044	.047	.053	.061	.065	.070	1.077	.084	.093	.10	11.	.13	.15	.18	_	/	7								
λ <sub>b</sub> (Base	Stre	4	.028	03	03	04	04	05	05	10 1	90	90	07	07	08	09	10	Н	Н	.15	. 18	\	7						
<i>*</i>			.024	03	03	03	03	04	04	04	05	05	05	90	90	07	07	08	60	-	-4	Н,	4 :-	4	\	_			
			020	02	02	02	03	03	03	04	04	04	04	05	05	05	90	90	07	07	8	90		1 -	4 ~	IJH		7	
		•	016	02	02	02	70	03	03	03	03	03	04	04	0.4	04	05	03	05	90	9	7	> α	9 0	<b>D C</b>			-4 -	
		(O)	0 0	20	25	30	40	20	52	09	65	70	75	80	82	90	SO.	0	0	н,	11	<b>~</b> c	4 L	3 (	J 44	4	S	155	໑

#### 3.2.3 Instructions for Use of Semiconductor Models

#### 3.2.3.1 Device Power Ratings

Semiconductor base failure rates,  $\lambda_b$ , are commonly related to the junction temperature. This junction temperature consists of the heat rise within the device caused by power dissipated in the junction plus the case temperature. In turn, the case temperature is related to the ambient air or to the attached heat sink temperature.

Transistors are normally rated at maximum power dissipation and diodes at maximum current permissible. Certain special-purpose devices are rated at artificial maximum ratings many times higher than normal operating conditions and at rating values which are based on burn-out of the device (e.g., Microwave Mixers).

Some maximum ratings are based on operation at a 25 degree C ambient temperature and others on a 25 degree C case temperature (the latter primarily for power devices used on heat sinks). Usually this double-type of rating is trouble-free as long as the device is used according to the type of rating.

Usually each device is given two rating points. One for maximum permissible junction temperature and the other for the maximum case or ambient temperature at which 100 percent of the rated load can be dissipated without causing the sum of ambient or case plus internal temperature rise to exceed the specified maximum junction temperature (derating point,  $T_S$ ). As the ambient or case temperature rises above  $T_S$  value, the internal temperature rise and power load must be decreased if the combined temperature is not to exceed the maximum junction temperature. See Figure 3.2-16.




FIGURE 3.2-16 CONVENTIONAL DERATING CURVE

#### where:

Ts is the temperature derating point (degrees C)

T<sub>MAX</sub> is maximum junction temperature (degrees C)

TA is ambient temperature (degrees C)

T<sub>C</sub> is case temperature (degrees C)

Maximum junction temperature  $(T_{MAX})$  is normally 175 degrees C for silicon and 100 degrees C for germanium devices. Usually 25 degrees C,  $T_{C}$  can be other values of temperature.

Some devices have a multi-point derating curve as shown by the solid line in the example of Figure 3.2-17. The failure rate of a device with multi-point derating can be estimated with the present models by assuming the device to be linearly derated from  $T_S$  to  $T_{MAX}$  as shown by the dashed line. The use of this assumption will result in a predicted failure rate higher than what the device might actually experience, with the amount of error dependent upon the difference between the two rating values where  $T_S$ , intersects the assumed and actual rating plots.

Since semiconductors may be rated based upon ambient or case temperatures, the following guidance is included:

1) When determining failure rate for a device with rating based upon ambient temperature and is used without a heat sink, calculate S per Section 3.2.3.2. Enter base failure rate table with actual operating ambient temperature or a corrected temperature if indicated in Section 3.2.3.2.




FIGURE 3.2-17 MULTIPOINT DERATING CURVE FOR 1N3263 POWER DIODE

- 2) When determining the failure rate for a device with rating based on case temperature and is used with a heat sink, calculate S per Section 3.2.3.2. Enter base failure rate table with actual operating heat sink temperature or a corrected temperature if indicated in Section 3.2.3.2.
- 3) When a device has ratings based upon ambient temperature and on case temperature, it can be used with or without a heat sink. If used with a heat sink, proceed as in (2) above. If used without a heat sink, proceed as in (1).
- 4) When a device is rated based upon ambient temperature and is used with a heat sink, no failure rate can be determined unless the device rating based upon case temperature can be found. If this cannot be determined, calculate the base failure rate as in (2) above.
- 5) When a device is rated based upon case temperature and is used without a heat sink, no failure rate can be determined unless the device rating based upon ambient temperature can be found. If this cannot be determined, calculate the base failure rate as in (1) and multiply by 10.

# 3.2.3.2 Determining Appropriate Stress Ratio & Temperature

The base failure rate tables are based upon ambient or case temperature (T degrees C) and electrical stress ratio (S). The following instructions show the methods for calculating S.

In some cases, the operating ambient or case T must be corrected before entering the failure rate tables. These corrections, where needed, are indicated in (7) below. Operating junction temperatures do not have to be calculated to use the models.

- Groups I, II & III Transistors.
  - a. Single device in case.

For Silicon, 
$$S = \frac{P_{OP}}{P_{MAX}}$$
 (C.F.) For Germanium,  $S = \frac{P_{OP}}{P_{MAX}}$ 

where:

P<sub>OP</sub> = actual power dissipated

 $P_{MAX}$  = maximum rated power at  $T_{S}$ 

C.F.= stress correction factor per (7) below

b. Dual device in single case (equally rated).

$$S = \left[\frac{P_1}{P_S} + P_2 \left(\frac{2P_S - P_T}{P_T \times P_S}\right)\right] \quad (C.F.)$$

where:

S = stress ratio of side being evaluated

P<sub>1</sub>= power dissipation in side being evaluated

P<sub>2</sub>= power dissipation in other side of device

 $P_S^-$  maximum power rating at  $T_S$  of one side of the dual device with the other side not operating (one side rating)

 $P_{T}$  = maximum rating at  $T_{S}$  with both sides operating (both side rating)

NOTE: Specifications for dual devices in one case usually give a maximum rating for each device and a total power rating which is significantly less than the sum of individual ratings.

C.F. = 1.0 for germanium

2) Groups IV & VI General Purpose Diodes & Thyristors.

For Silicon, 
$$S = \frac{I_{OP}}{I_{MAX}}$$
 (C.F.) For Germanium,  $S = \frac{I_{OP}}{I_{MAX}}$ 

where:

 $I_{OP}$  = operating average forward current  $I_{MAX}$  = maximum rated average forward current at  $T_{S}$  C.F.= stress correction factor per (7) below

3) Group V Zener Diodes Zener diodes are rated for maximum current or power or both. Either rating may be used as follows:

$$S = \frac{P_{OP}}{P_{MAX}} (C.F.) \quad or \quad S = \frac{I_{Z(OP)}}{I_{Z}(MAX)} (C.F.)$$

where .

P<sub>OP</sub> = actual power dissipated

 $P_{\text{MAX}} = \text{maximum rated power at } T_{S}$ 

I<sub>Z(OP)</sub> = actual operating zener current

 $I_{Z(MAX)}$  = maximum rated zener current at  $T_{S}$ 

C.F. = stress correction factor per (7) below

- 4) Group VII Microwave Mixer Diodes
  - S = Operating Spike Leakage (ergs)
    Rated Burno t Energy at 25 degrees C
- 5) Group VII Microwave Detector Diodes  $S = \frac{P_{OP} \text{ (Operating Power Dissipation)}}{P_{MAX} \text{ (Rated Power at 25 degrees C)}}$
- 6) Group VIII Varactor, Step Recovery, and Tunnel Diodes  $S = \frac{P_{OP}}{P_{MAX}} (C.F.)$

where:

P<sub>OP</sub> = operating power dissipated

 $P_{MAX}$  = maximum rated power at  $T_{S}$ 

C. F.= stress correction factor per (7) below

- 7) Stress Correction Factor (C.F.)
  - a. Devices with  $T_S = 25$  degrees C +  $T_{MAX} = 175$  degrees C to 200 degrees C

C.F. = 1

b. Devices with  $T_S \neq 25$  degrees C +  $T_{MAX} = 175$  degrees C to 200 degrees C

C.F. =  $\frac{175 - T_S}{150}$ 

c. Devices with  $T_S = 25$  degrees C +  $T_{MAX}$  <175 degrees C

C.F. =  $\frac{T_{MAX} - 25}{150}$ 

and enter  $\lambda_b$  table with  $T = T_A + (175 - T_{MAX})$ or  $T = T_C + (175 - T_{MAX})$ 

d. Devices with  $T_S \neq 25$  degrees C +  $T_{MAX}$  <175 degrees C

$$C.F. = \frac{T_{MAX} - T_{S}}{150}$$

and enter  $\lambda_b$  table with  $T = T_A + (175 - T_{MAX})$ or  $T = T_C + (175 - T_{MAX})$ 

### 3.3 Operational/Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparisons

# 3.3.1 Transistor Operational/Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparisons

Table 3.3-1 presents a comparison of base (ground), missile launch, and storage failure rates and their equivalent K factors for JANTX and JAN devices. The active and non-operational failure rates were calculated for a ground, fixed environment using the models in the previous section. For these calculations the following assumptions were made:

Device:

Linear, Single Transistor

Operating Temp.: 25°C

Stress Ratio:

.5

Voltage Stress:

.75 (50% applied to rated voltage)

The comparison indicates factors of 17 to 94 between operating and non-operating failure rates for JANTX transistors and factors of 24 to 92 between operating and non-operating failure rates for JAN transistors.

The Missile, Launch to Ground, Fixed Operating Ratio is "8" as given by MIL-HDBK-217B.

### 3.3.2 Diode Operational/Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparisons

A comparison of operational and storage failure rates and the modifying K factors is presented in Table 3.3-2 for JANTX and JAN devices. The ground and missile launch failure rates were calculated using the procedures of MIL-HDBK-217B. The following assumptions were made:

Device:

Metallurgically bonded, Signal

Operating Temp.: 25°C

Stress Ratio: .5

Voltage Stress: .5

The comparison indicates factors of 9 to 50 between operating and non-operating failure rates for JANTX diodes and factors of 10 to 53 between operating and non-operating failure rates for JAN diodes.

The Missi3e, Launch to Ground, Fixed Operating Ratio is "8" as given in MIL-HDBK-217B with the exception of microwave transistors which shows a factor of 20.

TABLE 3.3-1. TRANSISTOR OPERATING AND NON-OPERATING DATA

MISSILE LAUNCH TO G.FOPER- ATING RATIO		o	o o	<b>.</b> c	e o	o 0	Ď	o		<b>o</b> o	o 6	» œ
G.FOPERATING TO NON-OPERATING RATIO		17.	24.	23	. 09	76	•	2.4		33.	· .	92.
GROUND, FIXED, OPERATING FAILURE RATE x 10-9	į	20.	29.25	27.00	72.00	72.00		100.	146.	135,	375.	360.
NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATE × 10-9		1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	.77		4.1	4. L.	4.1	4.1	3.9
DEVICE CATEGORY TRANSISTORS	JANTX	Silicon PNP	Silicon NPN	Germanium NPN	Germanium PNP	Field Effect Trans.	JAN	Silicon PNP	Silicon NPN	Germanium 'iPN	Germanium PNP	Field Effect Trans.
								3.3	-3			

DEVICE CATEGORY DIODES	NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATE	GROUND, FIXED, OPERATING FAILURE RATE x 10-9	G.FOPERATING TO NON-OPERATING RATIO	MISSILE LAUNCH TO G.FOPER- ATING RATIO
JANTX				
Silicon	ស	10.5	21	ω
Germanium	ស	11.5	23	œ
Zener & Avalanche	2.8	25.0	თ	Φ
Microwave	19.8	1000.0	. 50	20
JAN		•		
Silicon	ນ.	52.5	10	ω
Germanium	5.5	57.5	10	ω
Zener & Avalanche	2.8	125.0	45	ω
Microwave	33.0	1750.0	53	20

#### 4.0 Electronic Vacuum Tubes

This section contains reliability analysis and data on electronic vacuum tubes.

### 4.1 Storage Reliability Analysis

#### 4.1.1 Failure Modes

A summary of operational failure modes affecting vacuum tubes is shown in Table 4.1-1. Operating hours are not available.

Data storage failure modes is much less extensive. A summary of the failure modes is shown in Table 4.1-2.

#### 4.1.2 Non-Operational Failure Rates

A preliminary estimate of non-operating failure rates is shown in Table 4.1-3 for various tube types. The relatively high failure rate for magnetron tubes is based on data which included some operation.

#### 4.1.3 Non-Operational Reliability Data

Non-operating data was obtained from five sources and is shown in Table 4.1-4. Note that several different environments are represented. The one source (E) which had no periodic checkout on the tubes shows the lowest non-operating failure rates.

Source D data may not be completely applicable to the missile storage environment since the tubes were conditioned after removal from storage. The conditioning included slow heater warm-up; anode, cathode, and helix conditioning by applying high voltage gradually; and RF conditioning by gradually applying RF drive and increasing it to maximum level and pulse width.

OPERATIONAL FAILURE MODES FOR DIFFERENT TUBE TYPES --- Percent of Failures Under This Mode ---TABLE 4.1-1.

		KLYSTRON	!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!			
FAILURE MODE	FINAL AMP.	MASTER OSCILLATOR	MIXER OF. DRIVER	TETRODE FINAL DRIVER	DIODE SERIES CHANGING	TR RECEIV. PROTECTION
Low Emission	27	23	•	ŧ	1	32
Incorrect Output	16	ı	71	t	21	1
Arcing	22	Ŋ	1	1	ŧ	11
Open Filament	18	Ŋ	14	12	43	32
Shorted	v	i	ı	59	15	21
Gassy	ı	ŧ	ı	29	21	1
Noisy	ı	23	ı	3	ŧ	ı
No Oscillation	ı	23	1	1	ţ	t
Unstable	ı	ı	15	•	1	ı
Misc.	11	21	1	ı	ı	4

NON-OPERATIONAL FAILURE MODES FOR DIFFERENT TUBE TYPES ---- Percent of Failures Under This Mode ---TABLE 4.1-2.

FAILURE MODE	KLYSTRON (1 failure rept.)	TWT (1 failure rept.)	MAGNETRON (4 failures rept.)	RECEIV. & TRANSM.TUBES (1.3 failures:répt.)
Open	100	1	1	15
Short	1	ı	ı	38
Open heater	ı	ŧ	ı	15
Incorrect output	1	100	75	31
Arcing	ı	1	25	Н

TABLE 4.1-3. PRELIMINARY VACUUM TUBE NON-OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATES

TUBE TYPE	λ × 10 <sup>-6</sup>
Receiver	.012
Klystron	.078
Magnetron	6.410
TWT	.826
Transmitting	.012

ON-OPERATING DATA
TUBE NON-C
VACUUM
4.1-4.
TABLE

			1				*********			H	turn		kout	1
	ENVIRONMENT	Unknown		Spacecraft orbit- Standby	Missile Storage	(1963 to 65)-   Periodic checkout	Operating time -	Storage time - 2 to 29 months	Shelf Storage (1970-72)	scorage time = 6 to 22 months (conditioned after	storage before to on.)	Missile Storage (1967-68)	No periodic checkout Storage time - 20 months	
ATA	STORAGE FAILURE RATE × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	(<2.439)	13.756	(<3.159)	6.410	1.663	<b></b>		(<3.121)			0.078	0.012	5
PERATING DA	NO. OF FAILURES	0	14	0	*•	**T			0			1***	13***	
4.1-4. VACUUM TUBE NON-OPERATING DATA	TOTAL PART STORAGE HOURS × 10 6	0.410	1.017	0.266	0.624	0.624			0.320			12.760	1059.113	
	NO. OF UNITS	1		18	124	124			25			874	72542	
TABLE 4	TUBE TYPE	Sprytron (Hi Rel.)	Tubes (MIL-STD)	TWT	Magnetron	TWT			TWT	₹		Klystron	Receiving and Transmitting Tubes	(NEW)
	SOURCE	A		Ø	υ				Ω			E		

\* Vibration after field return (12 months); Arcing (15 months); Spectrum too wide (8 months); Moding at start of oscillation ,5 months) Failure Modes:

<sup>\*\*</sup> Excessive helix current (5 months)

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Open (20 months)

<sup>\*\*\*\* (3)</sup> defective; (5) shorts; (2) opens; (1) low gain; (2) open heaters (20 months)

### 4.2 Electronic Vacuum Tubes Operational Prediction Model

The MIL-HDBK-217B failure rate . del for electronic vacuum tubes is:

$$\lambda_{\mathbf{p}} = \lambda_{\mathbf{b}} \Pi_{\mathbf{E}} \times \mathbf{e}^{-6}$$

where:  $\lambda_{p} = dev$  : failure rate

 $\lambda_{b}^{r}$  = base failure rate

 $II_E = Environmental adjustment factor$ 

The values for these parameters are presented in Figure 4.2-1. The base failure rate is valid providing tubes are replaced before wearout.

The environmental adjustment factor accounts for the influence of factors other than temperature. Refer to the environment description in the Appendix.

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR ELECTRONIC VACUUM TUBES Figure 4.2-1

 $^{\lambda}_{\rm p} = ^{\lambda}_{\rm b} \, ^{\Pi}_{\rm E} \, ^{\rm X} \, ^{10}^{-6}$ 

; (Base Failure Rate)

_
Rate
R

Tube Type	γ
RECEIVER Triode, Tetrode, Pentode Power Rectifier	10
KLYSTRON Low Power (e.g. local oscillator) High Power	30
MAGNETRON Medium Power ( < 1Mw. peak) High Power ( > 1Mw. peak)	70 150
TWT	30
TRANSMITTINC Triode Tetrode & Pentode	75
CRT	15
THYRATRON	50
λ <sub>b</sub> valid providing tubes are replaced before wearout.	pr.

_
H
Ö.
ິນ
ä
ractor
al
IJ
שַׁבַ
ΉŢ
7
ŭ
ď
2
environmental
<u>ت</u>
ر آ
≓

<b>1</b>	
Environment	ΠE
Ground, Benign	0.5
Space Flight	0.5
'n	-
Airborne, Inhabited	9
Naval, Sheltered	6.5
Ground, Mobile	10.0
Airborne, Uninhab.	10.01
Naval, Unsheltered	10.0
Missile, Launch	80.0

### 4.3 Operational/Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparison

Table 4.3-1 presents a comparison of operational and non-operational failure rates. The operational, ground fixed, failure rates were obtained from the MIL-HDBK-217B model assuming low power or medium power tubes as applicable.

The missile launch to ground, fixed operating ratio was obtained directly from MIL-HDBK-217B.

TABLE 4.3-1. VACUUM TUBE OPERATING AND NON-OPERATING FACTORS

MISSILE LAUNCH	ATING RATIO	80	80	80	80	80
G.FOPERATING TO NON~OPERATING	RATIO	420	380	11	36	62500
GROUND, FIXED, OPERATING FAILURE	RATE x 10-9	5000	30000	70000	30000	750000
NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATE	x 10-3	12	78	6410	826	12
TUBE TYPE		Receiver	Klystron	Magnetron	TWT	.Transmitting

#### 5.0 Resistors

Resistors used in electronic equipments are classified in four basic categories: Carbon Composition, Film, Wirewound types, and potentiometers (variable resistors).

The composition resistor (MTL-R-11) consists of a mixture of finely divided carbon and a binder, either in the form of a slug or a heavy coating, on a glass tube. Specially-formed wire leads are embedded in the resistance element. An insulating case, usually phenolic, is molded around the resistor forming a one-piece enclosure to support the leads and provide moisture sealing.

Fixed film resistors usually consist of resistive material, carbon or metal, deposited on the inside or outside of glass or refractory tubes and spirally-cut to achieve specific resistance. Leads in the ends of the tubes and various types of end caps provide connection to the resistance element. As with composition resistors, a molded plastic case provides physical strength and moisture protection.

The two basic types of wirewound resistors covered in this notebook are Precision styles (MIL-R-93) and Power styles (MIL-R-26).

Precision wirewound resistors are formed by winding a special alloy resistance wire on ceramic forms having expansion coefficients matched to that of the wire. By selecting and matching the resistance wire, almost any temperature coefficient of resistance can be obtained. Some types have special low-inductance and segmented windings which achieve good high-frequency response. These resistors are generally well-sealed in molded cases for use in high-humidity atmospheres.

Power wirewound resistors are similar in construction to precision wirewound types but less attention is given to close tolerances and noninductive winding. Greater attention is given to the means of mounting for the extraction of heat. Special silicone coatings are designed for maximum heat conduction and radiation.

Potentiometers used in electronic equipments are classified in five basic categories: Precision, Semi-Precision, Low Precision, Trimmers and Power types with subdivisions according to

similar reliability characteristics.

Precision potentiometers (MIL-R-11974, Style RR) are generally wirewound potentiometers on precision coil forms which can be provided in almost any linear or nonlinear resistance configuration.

Semi-Precision Potentiometers, MIL-R-19, Style RA, are also wirewound but with less emphasis on precision and conformity. The bodies and cores of RA Style power potentiometers are constructed of phenolic or other plastic.

Low-Precision Potentiometers, MIL-R-94, Style RV, are generally composition resistor types commonly used for volume or gain control.

Nonwirewound, Trimmer Potentiometers, MIL-R-22097, Style RJ, are in many styles and types of nonwirewound resistance elements.

Wirewound, Trimmer Potentiometers, MIL-R-27208, Style RT, and MIL-R-35015, Style RTR, are similar except for the greater reliability control and burn-in provided for the Established Reliability (RTR) type.

Wirewound, Power Type Potentiometers, MIL-R-22, Style RP, are vitreous and ceramic power units.

#### 5.1 Storage Reliability Analysis

#### 5.1.1 Failure Mechanisms

Most resistors are encapsulated in a molded plastic case or conformally coated to provide moisture protection. But no plastic is the equivalent of hermetic sealing so that moisture is a reliability consideration for all resistors depending on the resistor type. A carbon composition resistor will usually keep itself dry during operation because of its self-generated heat and heat from adjacent components. Long-time storage of carbon composition resistors without operation in a humid atmosphere will result in appreciable increase of resistance. Also, long-time storage in a very dry atmosphere will result in the reverse resistance change. These effects are reduced or eliminated if the composition resistors are potted or hermetically-sealed into higher-order assemblies.

The effect of moisture on film resistors varies according to type. Corrosion or electrolytic action involving impurities or surface contaminants is a major cause of open circuits in the film or between the film and end cap connections. Reduced resistance from this effect prior to final malfunction is frequently hard to detect because of the common localized nature of the effect.

Moisture absorbed during storage frequently does not cause serious trouble until after a period of operation with voltage applied to stimulate electrolysis.

Moisture in wirewound resistors is frequently a cause for leakage between turns and between layers which ultimately results in insulation breakdown and shorts. Corrosion and electrolytic action results in open wires or in openings between resistor wire and end cap connections.

Potentiometers cannot be sealed in a complete encapsulated jacket. Even where the resistor element is encased in a plastic or vitreous case there must be a portion of each turn exposed for contact with the wiper arm. This provides many possible points (which can seldom be fully sealed) for the entrance of moisture.

Operator-adjusted potentiometers must have movable shafts which protrude through the case and front panel. This opens the interior of the potentiometer to the environment exterior to protecting cases. Various types of shaft seals such as Elastomer "O" rings are at best imperfect moisture seals.

Interior-mounted trimmer potentiometers are given some shelter and moisture protection by the external case, but even these can seldom be potted or hermetically sealed inside a higher order assembly unit.

Potentiometers have additional failure modes relating to the wiper which are effected by moisture. Precision potentiometers may degrade in linearity or noise as a result of moisture absorption and corrosion.

### 5.1.2 Non-Operating Failure Rate Predictions

The non-operating failure rates in FITS (failures per billion hours) for various types of resistors are shown in Table 5.1-1.

TABLE 5.1-1. RESISTOR NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATES

Resistor Type	MIL-STD	HI-REL
Carbon Composition	0.11	0.11
Film	0.11	0.033
Wirewound	1.80	0.243
Variable	12.2	8.06
Thermistor	27.8	

#### 5.1.3 Non-Operating Pailure Rate Data

The failure rate table in section 5.1.2 is based on storage data consisting of over 61 billion part hours from several programs, with 10 failures reported. The breakdown of storage hours and number of failures for each type of resistor is shown in Table 5.1-2.

The small number of failures does not allow a detailed analysis of the data. It does indicate very little difference between MIL-STD and Hi-Rel carbon composition resistors in storage;

a factor of 3 between MIL-STD and Hi-Rel film resistors; a factor of 7 for wire wound resistors; and a factor of 1.5 for variable resistors.

Data was obtained from four sources and are listed in Tables 5.1-3 through 5.1-6.

TABLE 5.1-2. RESISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA SUMMARY

		MIL-STI	)		HI-REL .	
Device Type	Storage Hours Y 10	Number Failed	Failure Rate In FITS	Storage Hours X 10	Number Failed	Failure Rate In FITS
Composition	9169	1	.109	6897	0	(<.145)
Film	9395	0	(<.106)	30504	1	.033
Wirewound	1109	2	1.803	4116	0	(<.243)
Variable	163	2	12.195	124	1	8.06
Thermistor	108	3	27.778	22	0	(<45.5)

SOURCE A RESISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA (MIL-STD) TABLE 5.1-3.

DEVICE TYPE	NUMBER	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Composition	309396	4517	н	.221
Film	417772	6609	0	(<.164)
Wirewound	18354	268	0	(<3.731)
Variable	6118	88	H	11.236
Variable, Matched Pair	2622	38	0	(<26.316)
Fixed Variable	1748	26	0	(<38.462)
Thermal	874	13	0	(<76.923)

TABLE 5.1-4. SOURCE B RESISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA (HI-REL)

DEVICE TYPE	NUMBER	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Film	1357394	17838	0	(<.056
Wirewound	45014	592	0	(<1.689
Potentiometers	4438	22	0	(<17.241
Thermistor	1268	1.7	0	(<58.823

TABLE 5.1-5. SOURCE C RESISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA

	1 1 1 1	MIL-STD	!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!	!	HI-REL	: : : :
DEVICE TYPE	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS	STORAGE HOURS	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Carbon Composition	4652.	0	(<.215)	6897.	0	(<.145)
Carbon Film	9	0	(<166.)	108.	0	(<9.26)
Metal Film	3290.	0	(<.304)	12533.	7	.08
Thermal	1	1	ı	2.	0	(<500.)
Thermistor	95.	m	31.6	5.	0	(<200.)
Tin Oxide	1	ı	ı	4655.	0	(<.215)
Wirewound General	136.	0	(<7.35)	602.	0	(<1.66)
Power	376.	7	5.32	2109.	0	(<.474)
Precision	329.	0	3.04	788.	0	(<1.21)
Heater Element	1	ı	i	H	0	(<1000.)
Variable						
General	11.	н	6.06	37.	0	(<27.0)
Film	1	ı	1	23.	H	43.5
Plastic	ı	t	ı	<b>-</b>	_	<1000.)
Wirewound	ı	1	•	2.	<b>)</b>	(<200.)

TABLE 5.1-6. SOURCE D RESISTOR NON-OPERATING DATA (HI-REL)

DEVICE TYPE	NUMBER	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Film	797	25.012	0	(<39.98)
Wirewound	808	25.278	0	(<39.56)
Variable	111	3.488	0	(<286.7)

### 5.2 Resistor Operational Prediction Models

The MIL-HC .K-217B general failure rate model for resistors

is:

$$\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b} (\Pi_{\rm E} \times \Pi_{\rm R} \times \Pi_{\rm Q}) \times 10^{-6}$$

The general model for the variable resistors is as follows:

$$\lambda_p = \lambda_b (\Pi_{TAPS} \times \Pi_R \times \Pi_V \times \Pi_C \times \Pi_E \times \Pi_Q) \times 10^{-6}$$

where:

 $\lambda_{D}$  = device failure rate

 $\lambda_{b}^{2}$  = base failure rate

 $II_{TAPS}$  = Tap Connections Adjustment Factor

 $II_R = Resistance Adjustment Factor$ 

 $\Pi_{_{\mathbf{V}}}$  = Voltage Adjustment Factor

 $\Pi_{c}$  = Construction Class Adjustment Factor

 $\Pi_{E}$  = Environmental Adjustment Factor

 $\Pi_{O}$  = Quality Adjustment Factor

The various types of resistors require different failure rate models that vary to some degree from the basic models. The specific failure rate model and the II factor values for each type of resistor are presented in figures 5.2-1 through 5.2-14. The base failure rate and adjustment factor values in the figures are based on certain assumptions. See sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 for a description of these parameters.

Table 5.2-1 provides a list of resistor generic types with a cross reference to the corresponding figure number of the failure rate model.

## 5.2.1 Base Failure Rate $(\lambda_b)$

The equation for the base failure rate,  $\lambda_{h}$ , is:

$$\lambda_{b} = Ae^{B\left(\frac{T+273}{N_{T}}\right)^{G}} e^{\left(\frac{S}{NS}\right)\left(\frac{T+273}{273}\right)^{J}} H$$

where,

- A is an adjustment factor for each type of resistor to adjust the model to the appropriate failure rate level.
- e is the natural logarithm base, 2.718
- T is the ambient operating temperature (degrees C)
- $N_{\mathbf{m}}$  is a temperature constant
  - B is a shaping parameter
- G, H, J are acceleration constants
  - N<sub>s</sub> is a stress constant
    - S is the electrical stress and is the ratio of operating power to rated power

The quantitative values for the base failure rate model factors are given in Tables 5.2-2 and 5.2-3 for the different resistor types.


TABLE 5.2-2 FIXED RESISTOR BASE FAILURE RATE ( $\lambda_{\rm b}$ ) FACTORS

STYLE	MIL-R SPEC.	A	В	$^{ m N}_{ m T}$	G	<sup>N</sup> s	Н	J
RB	93 39005	3(10) <sup>-3</sup>	1	398	10	1	1.5	1
RBR RC	11	$4.5(10)^{-9}$	12	343	1	0.6	7	1
RCR	39008	11.3(10)	12	373	i	"."	<b>-</b> "	,
RD	11804	0.11	1	551	2.6	1.45	1.3	0.89
RE	18546	$3(10)^{-4}$	2.64	298	1	0.466	1	1
RER	39009	11	17	"	"	"	11	"
RL	22684	$6.5(10)^{-4}$	1	343	3	1	1	1
RLR	39017	11	11	n	[ "	**	11	Ħ
RN	10509	$1(10)^{-4}$	3.5	398	1	1	1	1
RNR	55182	11	11	"	"	11	11	11
RTH	No.	λ <sub>h</sub> Model.		Ì	l	See	Figur	e 6.2-8
RW	26	9.5(10)-4	1	298	2	0.5	1 ,	1
RWR	39007	11	11	"	<u> </u>	"		"

TYPE	MIL-R SPEC.	A	В	N <sub>T</sub>	G	N <sub>S</sub>	H	J
RA RK	19 39002	3.58(10) <sup>-2</sup>	1 "	355 "	5.28	1.44	1,	4.46
RJ	22097	0.423	1	400	7.3	2.69	1	2.46
RP	22	$4.81(10)^{-2}$	1	377	4.66	347	1	2.83
RR	12934	$7.35(10)^{-2}$	1	356	4.45	2.74	1	3.51
RT	27208	$6.2(10)^{-3}$	1	358	5	1	1	1
RTR	39015	#1	"	"	11	Ħ	17	и
RV	94	$6.16(10)^{-2}$	1	373	9.3	2.32	1	5.3

The ER resistor family generally has four qualification failure rate levels when tested per the requirements of the applicable ER specification. These qualification failure rate levels differ by a factor of ten. However, field data has shown that these failure rate levels differ by a factor about three, hence the  $\mathbb{I}_{\mathbb{O}}$  values have been set accordingly.

The use of the resistor models requires the calculation of the electrical power stress ratio, S = operating power/rated power, or per Section 5.2.3 for variable resistors. The models have been structured such that derating curves do not have to be used to find the base failure rate. The rated power for the S ratio is equal to the full nominal rated power of the resistor. For example, MIL-R-39008 has the following derating curve:



If a 1 watt resistor were being used in an ambient temperature of 90°C, the rated power for the S calculation would still

be 1 watt, not 60% of 1 watt. Of course, while the derating curve is not needed to determine the base failure rate, it must still be observed as the maximum operating condition. To aid in determining if a resistor is being used within rated conditions, the base failure rate tables show entries up to certain combinations of stress and temperature. If a given operating stress and temperature point falls in the blank portion of the base failure rate table, the resistor is overrated. Such misapplication would require an analysis of the circuit and operating conditions to bring the resistor within rated conditions.

### 5.2.2 I Adjustment Factors

# 5.2.2.1 Tap Connections Adjustment Factor $\Pi_{TAPS}$

 $II_{TAPS}$  accounts for the effect of multiple taps on the resistance element. It is calculated as follows:

$$\pi_{\text{TAPS}} = \frac{(N_{\text{TAPS}})}{25} + 0.792$$

where  $N_{\mbox{TAPS}}$  is the number of potentiometer taps, including the wiper and end terminations.

# 5.2.2.2 Resistance Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{R}$

 $\ensuremath{{\rm I\!I}}_R$  adjusts the model for the effect of resistor ohmic values.

# 5.2.2.3 Voltage Adjustment Factor, $\pi_{_{\hbox{\scriptsize V}}}$

IV adjusts for effect of applied voltage in variable resistors in addition to wattage included in the base failure rate.
It is based on the ratio of applied voltage to rated voltage.

The applied voltage is defined as:

where R is the total potentiometer resistance and P applied is the applied power.

# 5.2.2.4 Construction Class Adjustment Factor, $\mathbb{R}_{\mathbb{C}}$

 ${
m II}_{
m C}$  accounts for influence of construction class of variable resistors as defined in individual part specifications.

# 5.2.2.5 Environmental Factor, $II_E$

 ${\rm II}_{\rm E}$  accounts for the influence of environmental factors other than temperature. Refer to the environments description in the Appendix.

# 5.2.2.6 Quality Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{Q}$

 $\rm I\!I_Q$  accounts for effects of different quality. The established reliability resistor family generally has four qualification levels when tested per the requirements of the applicable specification.

TABLE 5.2-1
RESISTOR OPERATIONAL PREDICTION MODELS CROSS REFERENCE

Ĺ

TYPE	MIL-SPEC	STYLE	FIGURE
Fixed, Composition (Insulated)	MIL-R-39008	RCR	5.2-1
	MIL-R-11	RC	5.2-1
Fixed, Film (Insulated)	MIL-R-39017	RLR	5.2-2
	MIL-R-22684	RL	5.2-2
Fixed, Film	MIL-R-55182	RNR	5.2-3
	MIL-R-10509	RN	5.2-3
Fixed, Film (Power Type)	MIL-R-11804	RD/P	5.2-4
Fixed, Wire Wound (Accurate)	MIL-R-39005	RBR	5,2-5
	MIL-R-93	RB	5,2-5
Fixed, Wire Wound (Power Type)	MIL-R-39007	RWR	5.2-6
	MIL-R-26	RW	5.2-6
Fixed, Wire Wound (Power Type)	MIL-R-39009	rer	5.2-7
Chassis Mounted	MIL-R-18546	re	
Thermistor (Bead and Disk Type)	MIL-T-23648	RTH	5.2-8
Variable, Wire Wound (Lead Screw	MIL-R-39015	RTR	5.2-9
Actuated)	MIL-R-27208	RT	
Variable, Wire Wound, Precision	MIL-R-12934	RR	5.2-10
Variable, Wire Wound, SemiPrecision	MIL-R-19	RA	5.2-11
	MIL-R-39002	RK	5.2-11
Variable, Wire Wound, Power Type	MIL-R-22	RP	5.2-12
Variable, Non-Wire Wound (Trimmer)	MIL-R-22097	RJ	5.2-13
Variable, Composition, (Low Precision)	MIL-R-94	RV	5.2-14

(MIL-R-39008, Style RCR and MIL-R-11, Style RC) MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR INSULPTED FIXED COMPOSITION RESISTORS MIL-HDBK-217B 5.2-1 FIGURE

 $x~\pi_{\rm E}~x~\pi_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times$  10  $^{-6}$ H R م ا ď

(Base Failure Rate) 4

r)	Γ	=	ĸ	0	H	9	5				Facto	L		r-1	<del>~</del>	(4 	4	<u>ر</u>	<u>~</u>	_	ω ,	듸		_		L	上	(	٥	o c	<b>&gt;</b> (
II <sub>R</sub> (Resistance Factor	10000	(obme)	,	:0 100K	lmeg to l n	to 10 meg	>10 meg				"E (Environmental Fa	Environment			Space Flight	E E	Airborne, Inhabited	O,	•	ns	irborne,	Missile, Launch		T (Onality Factor	1	Failure Rate Level	- 1	Ξ (	<u>э</u>	4 v	1 (
		1.0	.0003	00	.0005	00	00	10	.0011	.0014	$\mathbf{H}$	.0021		က	ന	.0048	വ		\												
		6.	.0002	.0003	.0004	.0005	9000.	.0007	.0009	01	0	.0017		02	03	03	Ĺ	.0059		7											
	age	8.	.0002	.0002	.0003	.0004	.0005	9000.	.0007	.0009	.0011	.0014	[	.0021	C	.0032	.0039	0	.0058	\	7										
~	ed Volt	2.	.0002	.0002	.0003	.0003	.0004	.0005	9000.	8000.	6000.	.0011	.0014	.0017	.0021	.0026	.0031	0	04	.0057	/	\									
e Rate)	Rat	9.	1000.	.0002	.0002	.0003	.0003	.0004	.0005	9000.	8000.	.0009	.0011	.0014	.0017	.0021	.0025	03	03	04	0		\								
Failure	ating to	.5	.0001	.0001	.0002	.0002	.0003	.0003	.0004	.0005	9000.	.0008	6000.	.0011	.0014	.0017	.0020	0	03		04	.0054	.0065	\							
(Base	Opera	4	8	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	$C_{1}$	01	.0020	02	02	03	04	05	90							
γ	tio	٤٠	00	00	000	00	000	000	00	000	00	000	000	000	000	001	0	9100.	001	02	07	03	04	0.4	05	/	Δ				
	Ra		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0	.0013	01	0	02	02	03	03	04	05	\ _	7			
			00	000	000	000	000	000	00	000	000	0	00	000	000	00	00	.0010	d	10	디	02	02	03	რ 0	0.4	0.2	90			
		(S)	0		0	S	0	2	0	2		2	0	ທ	0	ທ		75					0		-	H	2	2			
											:	5.	っ-	. 7																	

ronmental Factor)

70 0.3 0.03 0.03

MIL-R-11

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MCDEL FOR FIXED FILM (Insulated) RESISTORS (MIL-R-39017, Style RLR and MIL-R-22684, Style RL) FIGURE 5.2-2

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm R} \times \pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ 

λ<sub>k</sub> (Base Failure Rate)

										<b>'</b>	1		.,,,		7	<u></u>		4		ك			1						····	الم		
		•	.0029	03.0	003	003	03	03	04	04	04	04	05	05	05	90	1															
		6.	.0026	022	003	003	03	03	03	03	04	04	04	04	05	05	05	90	/	\												
	age	•	.0023	02	02	02	02	03	03	93	03	03	04	04	04	04	05	0	05	90	\	N										
יומרכי/	d Watt	.7	0021	02	02	02	002	002	002	03	003	03	03	03	04	04	04	04	05	05	05	0	\	/								
מדדחדה	o Rate	9•	0010	022	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	03	03	03	03	03	03	04	04	04	05	S	05	90	\	/						
1 2600	ting t	.5	7100.	10	0	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	07	03	03	03	03	03	40	04	04	04	05	02	90		7				
q Q	Opera	. 4	.0016	10	001	001	01	02	02	05	02	02	02	02	02	02	03	03	03	03	03	04	04	04	04	05	S	05	/	7		
	tio of	.3	0014	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	03	03	03	03	03	03	04	04		0.5	0	02	/	7
	Ra		.0013	001	01	001	0.1	2	001	01	G	0	100	002	02	002	02	02	002	002	002	03	03	003	0.0	03	04	04	04	ທິດ	0.5	02
		.1	.0012	0	0	0	0	00	8	$\circ$	읭	00	00	00	00	읭	00	005	00	005	00	0	00	00	00	8	03	0	04	04	0	04
	٥	(၁	ပ က	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	20	55	09	65	70	75	80	82	06	Q	100	0	Н	H	N	7	m	ന	マ	4	വ
-										•	-		5	2-	. Ω																	

$\pi_{ m E}$ (Environmental Factor)	ctor)
Environment	пE
7	1.0
-1	1.0
m	5.0
Airborne, Inhabited	6.5
Naval, Sheltered	8.0
Ground, Mobile	2
Naval, Unsheltered	14.0
Airborne, Uninhab.	15.0
Missile, Launch	35.0

/ Factor)	Level RQ	1.0	0.3	0.1	0.03	- C
$\pi_{Q}$ (Quality	Failure Rate Le	×	д	rk —	ഗ	MTT. D. JOKOA

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR FIXED FILM RESISTORS (MIL-R-55182, Style RNR and MIL-R-10509, Style EA) FIGURE 5,2-3

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b} (\pi_{\rm R} \times \pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm Q}) \times 10^{-6}$ 

 $\lambda_{b}$  (Base Failure Rate)

r		· -	<u> </u>	~	<del>~</del>	~		lic.	_	~			lio.	·		~	~	}					<del></del>	`								
		1.0	0.5	03	03	004	.0049	905	000	900	90	007	007	08	08	60	09	딩	-1	01	Н			_	\	7						
		6.	0.5	03	03	03	0	04	0.5	0.5	05	90	9	07	07	38	08	60	60	Н	Н	-1	.012	Н	Н	_		7				
	ıge	8.	02	002	03	003	0	004	004	004	05	005	005	900	900	07	007	07	008	008	600	Н	.010	-	01	Н	Н		<u>\</u>	/	<b>\</b>	
	Watta	.7	02	02	02	03	03	03	04	04	04	0.4	05	05	0	90	90	90	07	07	08	08	.0091	0	-1	Н	H	1	<b>%</b> -1	Ч		\
	Rated	9•	02	02	02	02	0	03	03	03	04	04	0	04	0.5	05	05	90	90	90	07	007	0	08	08	09	09	-	Н	Н	Н	.013
	ing to		OI	02	02	02	02	03	03	03	03	03	04	04	04	04	0.4	05	05	05	90	90	0	07	07	08	0.8	08	0.0	90	H	101
	Operat		001	01	002	002	002	02	002	003	03	003	003	003	0	004	004	004	004	05	005	05	05	900	S	S	07	0.5	08	08	ဗ	.0094
	10	٤٠	0.1	0	딩	3	C)	02	02	02	02	02	03	03	03	03	03	04	ွှဲ	C 4	0.4	04	0.5	65	05	0,	90	90	90	07	07	.0080
	Rat	.2	0.1	10	0	01	01	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	03	03	03	03	03	03	04	04	04	04	04	05	05	05	05	90	90	.0068
		. 1	10	01	0	0	0	01	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	ű	02	03	03	03	03	03	03	04	04	04	04	<b>9</b> G	05	05	05	.0057
	- E1:	(၁)	9	10	20	30	40	50	ເນ	09	Ç	70	75	80	85	90	95	100	105	110	115	120	125	130	1.35	140	145	150	155	160	165	170

Range)	= K	1.0 1.1 2.5
N <sub>R</sub> (Resistance Ran	Resistance Range (ohms)	Up to 100K >.1meg to 1 meg >1 meg to 10 meg >10 meg

<pre>  E (Environmental Factor)</pre>	ctor)
Environment	IIE
Ground, Benign	1.0
귽	1.0
Ground, Fixed	•
Airhorne, Inhabited	5.0
Naval, Sheltered	7.5
Ground, Mobile	10.0
ns	11.0
Airborne, Uninhab.	12.0
Missile, Launch	18.0

$^{\rm II}_{\sf Q}$ (Quality Factor)	_
Failure Rate Level	II.O
M	1.0
Δı	0.3
rx.	0.1
တ	0.03
MIL-R-10509	1.0

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR POWER FILM RESISTORS (MIL-R-11804, Style RD/P) 5.2-4 FIGURE

$$\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b} (\pi_{\rm R} \times \pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm Q}) \times 10^{-6}$$

 $\lambda_{\mathbf{b}}$  (Base Failure Rate)

				ŀ	ł					Y
۲	Ra	Ratioo	f Ope	rating	ဌ	Rated	Watta	age		
ပ်	-	.2	.3	4.	5.	9.	.7	8 •	5.	1.0
9		4	.157	168	ω	6	Н	7	4	.273
40		.151	191.	~	$\infty$	0	1	$^{\circ}$	.260	/
į,	4	S	9	.177	9	0	2	4	Ľ	7
9	1.150	S	1.169	$\infty$	S	$\vdash$	ന	.258	<u> </u>	
70	.153	.163		.188	.204	.223	.244	9	7	
80	1.157	.167	.179	jo	Н	m	2			
90	9	7	ω	C	$\boldsymbol{\vdash}$	4	9	7		
100	165	.176	190	0	~	.243	_			
10		1.182	σ	$\vdash$	ന	ហ	/			
٥٥	.175	$\infty$	.203	.222	4	\				
30		9	<b> </b> -	[m	S	7				
140	.185	1.200	.217	က	<u> </u>					
50		0	7	4	7					
		-								

IR (Resistance Factor)

Resistance Range (ohms)	II.R
10 tc <100 100 to <100K 100K to <1 meg	1.2

 $\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$  (Environmental Factor)

Environment	n E
Ground, Benign	1.0
Space Flight	1.0
Ground, Fixed	5.0
Airborne, Inhabited	6.5
Naval, Sheltered	7.5
Ground, Mobile	12.0
Naval, Unsheltered	13.5
Arrborne, Uninhab.	15.0
Missile, Launch	35.0

Π<sub>Q</sub> (Quality Factor)

Quality Level	O <sub>II</sub>
Upper	0.4
Mil-Spec	1.0
Lower	3.0

FIGURE 5.2-5 MIL-

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR FIXED, WIPEWOUND (Accurace) RESISTORS (MIL-R-39005, Style RBR and MIL-R-93, Style RB)

A STATE OF THE STA

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm R} \times \pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ 

Ab (Base Failure Rate)

Γ	T		<u></u>									Γ.					T											`				
	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	딩	Н	01	01	0	.012	0	01	Н	01	01	Н	0	~	02	2	CI	က	က	4		/	1			
	6.	07	0	07	80	ထ	08	08	60	60	$\neg$	.010	0	0	0	М	01	0	$\vdash$	Н	-	2	N	$^{\circ}$	$\sim$	സ	נייו	A.	\ _	7		
Q E		90	90	90	07	07	07	07	07	08	80	.0088	009	003	-	Н	디	Н	01	М	0	Н	0	C1	$\sim$	2	2	സ	4	<u> </u>	7	
Wa	.7	05	05	05	90	90	90	90	90	90	07	.0074	07	08	08	08	60	9	-1	Н	ᅰ	$\vdash$	1	-1	Н	N	2	7	ന	ന	_	\
Ra+ad	9	05	005	05	005	0.5	005	005	05	900	90	00	900	900	07	007	007	800	800	009	C	Н	0	0	10	01	Н	02	C1	03	က	5
+ 50.	.5	04	04	04	04	04	04	0.5	05	005	005	0	005	05	90	90	90	007	007	07	08	60	0	01	Н	0	01	-1	02	.025	က	C
Onerat	4	0.4	04	04	04	04	04	04	04	04	04	0	04	05	0.5	005	05	900	90	90	07	07	08	0	$\boldsymbol{\dashv}$	01	.⊣	~	щ	.021	~	r
, 0	m.	03	03	03	03	03	63	04	004	04	004	00	004	004	04	004	005	005	005	005	90	90	07	08	08	0.9	-	Н	Ч	.017	3	C
7.9 +		03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	33	03	co	04	041	042	044	04	04	05	05	05	90	90	07	07	08	60	щ	01	.015	0	Ç
		03	003	003	003	03	003	003	03	003	003	0	003	003	003	004	04	004	V 0 0	004	005	0.5	05	90	07	07	80	$\dashv$	~	.013	<b>∼</b> i	C
F	(0°)	0		0	ເດ	0	r2	0	S	0	Ŋ	50	55	0	S	0	75	80		0	5	0	0	Н	<del>!</del>	2	S	സ	സ	140	4	ŧ

 $\Pi_{\mathbf{R}}$  (Resistance Factor)

se π <sub>R</sub>	1.0 1.7 3.0 5.0
Resistance Range (ohms)	up to 10K >10K to 100K >100K to 1 meg

 $\pi_{
m E}$  (Environmental Factor)

Environment	E H
Ground, Benign	1.0
Space Flight	1.0
-7	•
	٠. س
อั	18.0
Ground, Mobile	о С
S	٠ س
Airborne, Uninhab.	•
Missile, launch	70.0
The state of the s	

 $\Pi_{Q}$  (Quality Factor)

O <sub>II</sub>	1.0	0.3	0.1	0.03	5.0
Level					
Rate	X	٥.	æ	m	-63
Failure	Ū.	<b>P4</b>	<b>J-4</b>	0,	MIL-R-

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR FIXED, WIREWOUND (Power Type) RESISTORS (MIL-R-39007, Style RWR and MIL-R-26, Style RW) FIGHRE 5.2-6

ESTATION OF THE PROPERTY OF TH

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b} ( \pi_{\rm R} \times \pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm Q}) \times 10^{-6}$ 

Environmental Factor)  Environment	1, Benign 1.	•	rive Tubabited	heltered 7.	d, Mobile	Unsheltered 11.	rborne, Uninhab. 12.	Missile, Launch 30.0		n, (Quality Factor)		Fallure Rate Level No	1	•	0	0.0	-1	/ hms /		to to > 20K		1.6	NA	1.2		4 4	¥ 5	1
llure Ra.e) ing to Rated Wattago	.6 .7 .8 .9 1.	6 .0081 .0099 .	3  .0090  .011  .013  .017  .02	1 .010  .012  .015  .019  .02	0 .011  .014  .017  .02	.012 .016 .020 .0	.014 .018 .0	018 .023	.020 .0	.02	•	.03	_		A		In (Resistance Factor	Resistance Range	> 500   > 1	to to to	500   1K   5K   7.5K   10K	71 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.6	74 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.6	78 [2.0 ] 1.0 [1.0 ] 1.0 ] 1.2	0 11.0 1.2 1.6 1.6 NA	C - C	2.1 2.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 to	
λ <sub>b</sub> (Base Fe Percent of Opera	.1 .2 .3 .4 .5	0043   0053   006	0030  .0038  .0047  .0058  .007	033  .0041  .0051  .0064  .008	0036 .0045 .0056 .0071 .009	0038 .0349 .0062 .0079 .01	042 .0053 .0068 .0087 .01	0050 .0064 .0083 .010 .01	0054   0071   0093   012   01	0059 .0078 .010 .013 .01	065 .0086 .011 .015 .02	0072  .0096  .012  .017  .02	0079  .010  .014  .019  .02	0087 [.011 [.016 [.021 [.02	097 .013 .018 .024 .03	מיי מנטי שנטי יונט	200 STO - FLO	014   020   02	016 .023 .03	018 .02	021  .03	$\sim$	70	7 ]				
		) O	20	30	40	20	90	2 6	000	0	Н	2	C	4	150	ין כ	∽ α	) O	10	4	2	ო •	T U	n [				

FIGURE 5.2-7

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR FIXED, WIREWOUND (Power Type, Chassis Mounted) RESISTORS (MIL-R-39009, Style RER and MIL-R-18546, Style RE)

 $^{\lambda}_{\rm p} = ^{\lambda}_{\rm b}$  (  $^{\Pi}_{\rm R}$  ×  $^{\Pi}_{\rm E}$  ×  $^{\Pi}_{\rm Q}$  ) × 10  $^{-6}$ 

							_	}	_							7		T-	·	7						
	ſ	_C	x 0 m	<u>) പ</u>	<u>س</u> د	7	ohms/	2000	K 0 7	AN	AN A	NA A	AN L	4 -4 -					≥20K	NA	NA F	NA NA	YN S	K 2 Z	Z Z	KN KN
Factor)	- !		HC	-	0,	杍	nge	*10K	20K	NA	N N	1.6	9.7	2.7	7.5	2)	ohms)	710K	to 204	NAN	ZN Z	NA NA	NA V	1. 4 1. 4	. 4.	5 4
	- 1	Level				r-Note	ce	^ +			2 V	-	7.7	r- c	0.0	-Note	ige (	> 5K	t0 104	NA	AN A	NA.	-i -	2.5	2.5	1.2
alit		кате			8546	Factor	1 0/4	<u>۷</u> +	SK	$\frac{2}{1.2}$		-	2.7 0.1	1.0	1.0	actor		> 1 K	1 2 3 4 0 7	1.6	1.6	11.	• (		נית	1.0
In (Quality	2	rure	Σ Δ	æ	S MIL-R-18546	•	Resi	വ		<u></u>	; -i	٠,٠		-i-	-1 <sub>(-1</sub>	Īτι		) 200 4	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		1.2	1.2	) · ·		1.0	10
-	١.,	ช			M	istance		, 100 to	-	•		•	ь. о	•	1	starce	es	> 100	500	1.0		0.0	) · ·	1.0	0.0	0
			···			(Res		유원	$\circ$	•	• •	•	0.0 1.1		1	Resi			100	•		0.0				[
						<b>≃</b>		Raced	( <u>M</u>	ນ C	0 1	20	30	30 75	120	II R	6	Rated	(W)		n 0	10		0		
	ſ	,	• KV (	0340	4	1	-	a)	,	 2 29 9 0		0,70	2 ~	75			ţ	a	,	0 7	r w	5 4 5	50		25.7	
		5	32	20		4 4	. \	Styl	- 1	RE 6	24	RE 7	RE 7	RER RE 7	- 1			Stvl		RE 6	$\mathbf{\omega}$	RER RE 7	`~	1		$\infty$
		-	800	• 4 • • •	0.0		10	7	•							actor	E3	•		•		0.0		. I		
	age	,		2 t	.029	10	46	^	1	7					F	4	-		<del></del> -	ted		ъ г	<u>+ m</u>	1		
Rate)	Watt	7	015	207	000	319	035	.048	ınk		/				4	שפח וו	בזור	nrgu	xed	nhabit	ltered bile	heltered	oninnab aunch		_•	
allure Ra	Rated	l G	0122	16	0.18	24	0276	036	<*   €	* 10	10	/	<i>\</i>		(Frat: 000000000000000000000000000000000000	Freiver	5	ლ	,,,,,,	:	אַ צִּ	55	୍ୟ	1	-39009	-
F4	ing to	r.	3099	12	145	187	212	$1 \sim 1$	സിര	<b>→</b>		~ .~	. 4 ~			E E		Ground	Ground	Airbo	Ground	Naval, Ur	Aissi]		MIL-R-	
λ <sub>b</sub> (Base	rat	[ g	079	101	114	145	163	223	553	30.	34		8 -	A 1A	1	\						<del></del>			es of	
۲	44	3	64	80	000	12	9 7			•	···	<u></u> -		•••	~~~~	A	\			,	istic	sel	istic	1	cy1	
	tio		000	<u>.</u>	0 0	6	56	0			020		03			.060	_	7			aracteri 46 and	sty]	y. haracteris	and	ound	
	Ra		.0052	90	007	008	000	0		0	0.0										က္က ၁	3 (	ט כ	$\infty$	O)	
		긔	.0042	005	900	900	80	8		0	0.0		20				უ r ე C	0 3	04	2	🗀	vely	For	-R-1	nductiv	
	Ę	ပ်	10	200	2 4 0 0	0	20	0.0	00	10	202	40		200	0 0	10 -	2 0	200		7007	of I	inducti	te 1	J.	n-i	
										5.2						4		<del>- ·</del>		الله	2 0	U 4 - 근 (	₹ 5 5	2	70	

.

FIGURE 5.2-8

WIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR THERMISTORS (Bead and Disk Type) (MIL-T-23648, Style RTH)

	λ <sub>p</sub> (Predict	$\lambda_{ m p}$ (Predicted Failure Rate)
	Bead Type Style RTH 24,	Disk Type Style RTH 6, 8
Environment	34, 36, 38 to 40	and 10
Ground, Benign	0.021 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	0.065 X 10 <sup>-6</sup>
Space Flight	0.021 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	0.065 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
Ground, Fixed	0.10 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	0.31 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
Ground, Mobile	0.52 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	1.60 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
Naval, Sheltered	0.30 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	0.90 X 10 <sup>-6</sup>
Naval, Unsheltered	0.40 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	1.20 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
Airborne, Inhabited	0.25 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	0.75 X 10 <sup>-6</sup>
Airborne, Uninhab.	0.24 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	1.00 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
Missile, Launch	1.20 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	3.60 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>

FIL-HDBK-217B OFERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR VARIABLE, WIRE-WOUND, (Lead Screw Actuated) RESISTORS (MIL-R-39015, Style RTR and MIL-R-27208, Style RT) 5.2-9 FICURE

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm R} \times \pi_{\rm V} \times \pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ 

_		_						r				·								7	ָ ה ב	וא			~ (	m (	) I	<b>~</b> c			9		
Factor		# #	1.0	•	• }		or)			<b>=</b>	>	3,00	7	۳ ¢	•		1.	•	•			.				7	ว ข		۳.	، د	· :		
N <sub>R</sub> (Resistance Fa	Resistance Range	_	100	3 ;	20 00		II., (Voltage Factor		f Ap	Voltage to Rated	Voltage *	0.1	) o	000	100	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	}	· · ·			T (Enstitement	E (5110 TT OILLIGHT	Environment	Ground, Benign	ᅼ	Ground, Fixed	ا -	,,	Naval Insheltered	Ω	<b>、</b> ⊶		
																										F	Ø		ري. د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د	T:0;	5.03	3	
																									lity Factor)	Bato Tomol					27208		
		1.0			C4	.026	.027	.029	.030	.032	.034	.036	<b>(^)</b>	4	4	4	.052		9	\ _	7				$\pi_{Q}$ (Quality	11,170		Σ	ር ተ	¥ (	S MIL-R-	1	
	je	6.		2	.022	N	.024	$\sim$	.027	2	.030	.032	.034	.037	.040	.043	.046	S	.054	S		7			=	. e. c.	3 1				Σ 		
Rate)	Wattag	• 8	7	.019	$\sim$	.021	.022	.023	.024	, 025	.027	.029	m	ന	ന	.037	4	4		.052	വ	. 263	7							•	27	s 22	
re	ted W	.7		$\vdash$		.018	.019	.020	021	.023	.024	025	027	.029	.031	.033	.036	038	.042	.045	.050	.055	090.		١					1	RT26 RTR12	RT12	
Failu	to Ra	•	014	01	0	ᆔ	0	01	01	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	സ	03	က	4	41	4:	S I	<b>つ</b>							for	24;	
(Base	tin		.013	H		3	ば	0	O.	0	딩	2	02	07	02	02	2	03	സ	က	ന∣	44.	4 n	) r	9	11				•	400	22.5	
) q	Opera	4	.011 .012	$\vdash$		~1	Н,	01	0	01	딩	<u>, ب</u>	01	02	02	0.2	7	02	07	m	മി	m,	4 4	ナマ	r	9	<u>/</u>	7			Rated ==		
	t of	3	.010	-(		<b>~</b>	<b>~</b> ,	0	-	0	김	<b>~</b>	01	C C	0	02	02	2	0	2	<b>∾</b>	സ	א ני	ひね	4	S	S		\		*V Ra		
	Percen	• •	.010	0	0	ᇜ	0	0	0	0	디	<del>ا</del> ا	0	5	0	0		02	0	7	2	7	η c	ን ベ	14	4	ഹ	S	7	\			
			.0088	00	00	909	0	0	01	0	딩	С С	0	0	0	S	01	0	0	0	0	02	2 5	א ת כי	נהו	0	04	4	ഗ	္ျ			
	T	(၁၄)	0 10	10	15	20	25	30	ر بر	40	45	SÚ	ເກ	09	65	70	75	80	82	06	95	0	o r	ㅓ~	1 (1	10	ന	ന	140	2			
									•		5	. 2	- ]	15																			

Factor)

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR PRECISION WIREWOUND POTENTIOMETERS (MIL-R-12934, Style RR) 5.2-10 FIGURE

π<sub>Q</sub> ) x 10<sup>-6</sup> × X E n C х У × X II R ( Mtaps α γ = ~<sup>24</sup>

λ<sub>b</sub> (Base Failure Rate)

(C) (C) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D	-		-											
OC) .1 2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.  30 .126 .133 .140 .148 .156 .164 .173 .182 .192 .20  40 .137 .145 .154 .164 .173 .184 .195 .207 .220 .23  50 .156 .179 .192 .207 .223 .240 .258 .278 .259 .32  70 .186 .202 .219 .237 .258 .279 .303 .329 .357 .38  80 .211 .230 .252 .276 .302 .330 .361 .395 .433 .47  90 .242 .267 .295 .325 .359 .397 .428 .484 .59  10 .331 .373 .420 .474 .534 .602  20 .396 .451 .515 .587														
OC) .1 Eercent of Operating to Rated Wattage 30 .126 .133 .140 .148 .156 .164 .173 .182 .19 40 .137 .145 .154 .164 .173 .184 .195 .207 .22 50 .150 .160 .171 .183 .195 .209 .223 .238 .25 60 .166 .179 .192 .207 .223 .240 .258 .278 .25 70 .186 .202 .219 .237 .258 .279 .303 .329 .35 80 .211 .230 .252 .276 .302 .330 .361 .395 .43 90 .242 .267 .295 .325 .359 .397 .428 .484 .530 .281 .313 .349 .389 .434 .484 .540 .603 .20 .396 .451 .515 .587		0	10	. ~	10	3 6	3 6	3/2	, R	] :				
OC) .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .7 .30 .126 .133 .140 .148 .156 .164 .173 .184 .195 .50 .150 .166 .171 .183 .195 .209 .223 .60 .166 .179 .192 .207 .223 .240 .258 .200 .221 .230 .211 .230 .252 .276 .302 .330 .361 .90 .281 .313 .349 .389 .434 .484 .540 .10 .331 .373 .420 .474 .534 .602 .306 .481 .556 .641	gc	6	19	2	i くi に	0	ا لا ب	٠/١	) (	)				
OC) .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .7 .30 .126 .133 .140 .148 .156 .164 .173 .184 .195 .50 .150 .166 .171 .183 .195 .209 .223 .60 .166 .179 .192 .207 .223 .240 .258 .200 .221 .230 .211 .230 .252 .276 .302 .330 .361 .90 .281 .313 .349 .389 .434 .484 .540 .10 .331 .373 .420 .474 .534 .602 .306 .481 .556 .641	Watta	8	ļω	20	23	27	32	30	4 (	9	, 1	l		
OC) .1 Percent of Operating to CC) .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .6 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .1 .6 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .5 .6 .1 .2 .3 .4 .1 .5 .1 .1 .1 .2 .1 .2 .1 .2 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1	}	.7	H	19	22	25	30	عار	6	4	•			
OC) .1 Percent of Opera 30 .126 .133 .140 .148 .40 .137 .145 .154 .164 .50 .150 .160 .171 .183 .60 .166 .179 .192 .207 .211 .230 .252 .276 .90 .242 .267 .295 .325 .00 .281 .313 .349 .389 .10 .331 .373 .420 .474 .20 .396 .451 .556 .641	1		.164	Н	7	~	~	m	(	<b>4</b>		. 1	ı	
OC) .126 .133 .140 .30 .126 .133 .140 .30 .126 .133 .140 .30 .150 .160 .171 .60 .166 .179 .192 .30 .211 .230 .252 .90 .242 .267 .295 .00 .281 .313 .349 .10 .331 .373 .420 .20 .396 .451 .556 .641	ating	.5	15	17	6	22	2 5	30	35	43	സ	ì		
OC) .1 Percent o 30 .126 .133 .140 40 .137 .145 .154 50 .150 .160 .171 60 .166 .179 .192 70 .186 .202 .219 80 .211 .230 .252 90 .242 .267 .295 10 .331 .373 .420 20 .396 .451 .515	Oper	. 4	4	9	18	2	2	2	m	m	4	ω		į.
OC) .126	0	.3	14	15	2	19	21	5	σ	4	$\sim$	51	4	ig
CC) 30 .12 . 13 . 15 . 15 . 15 . 15 . 15 . 15 . 15	Perce	.2	3	4	9	7	20	23	ပ	31	r-	Ŋ	S	
0 m 4 5 9 7 8 8 8 9 1 7 m 4			12	m		16	3	Н	24	28	ന	$\circ$	lω	C
	To	i)	30	40	20	09	70	80	90	0	Н	120	130	140

	taps	12	4	7	0	4	7	0	7.36	9	0
	Ntaps	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
	taps	18	œ,	۲.	m.	5.	ω,	۲.	4.37	9	0
taps	Ntaps	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
П	taps	00°τ	٦.	Ċ.	m	υ.	9	ထ	•	7	4
	$^{ m N}$ taps	m ·	4.	ι C	91	7	တ	σ,	07:	T T	1.2

$\odot$		
Factor)	υ U	4240 m
uo	Construction Class	RR0900A12A7J1C3 2 3 4 5 5

Ratio of Applied Voltage to Rated

Voltage

 $II_{V}$  (Voltage)

E (Environmental Factor)

ENVIronm	Ground, Ben Space Fligh	Ground, Fix   Airborne, I	Naval, Shel   Ground, Mob	Naval, Unsh	•	rissile, La	II O (Qual	, l	Quali	Level	Upper	Mil-S	Lower	
	T			7										
ပ 	4.0	•			or)		F	: R	0.1	1.1	L.4	2.0	5.5	
Class	RR0900A12A7J1C3 $\frac{2}{2}$	<b>ω</b> 4	. N G		$\Pi_{R}$ (Resistance Factor		Kesistance Range	(2000)	100 to 10K	>10K to 20K	>20K to 50K	to 100K	to 200K	to 500K

2.00 1.22 1.10 1.00 1.05

1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 to 0.

0 0 1,0

0.0

= = =	1.0	0.0		10.0	٠. کا	120.0				
	d, Benign Flight	Fixed Thhabited	Φ.	Mobile Unsheitered	Uninhab.	Launch	M Q (Quality Factor)	Quality IIQ Level	1. pec. 2.	Lower 5.0
7 ) ) [ 7	Ground, Space Fl	Grouna, F	:	Ground,   Naval, t	Airborne,	MISSILE,	3) O II	ō <sub></sub>	P. B.	TO

FOR SEMIPRECISION WIREWOUND POTENTIOMETERS (MIL-R-19, Style RA and MIL-R-39002, Style RK) MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL 5.2-11 FIGURE

9
10,
$\times$
~
C
×
HE
×
ii V
×
II R
×
I taps
Ħ
_
γ
11
ω

	<b>,</b> .		<b></b> -	-									1									[:	= ម	• •	E/N	ا و	ഗ	) c	כ כ	N/A	N/A
	=	taps	(4	4.	.7	0	4.	6.72	0	<b>ب</b>	9	0								_	1 -	<del> </del>					ted 1	10	<u> </u>	<del></del>	-
		taps						28												(Frati ronments	Cilineii ca Factor	Factor	ກຕອກເ	Benign	ght.	xed	g	Sneltered Mobile	Mobile Unsheltered	Uninhah	Launch
	=	taps	9	$\infty$	۲.	'n	73	3.85	-!		Ġ.	9									臼		Environment	-	ਜ਼ੂਜ਼ ਜ਼ੁਜ਼	4	ĸn		<u>.</u>	ㄷ	
SC		taps						18												F	<b>=</b>   	<u>L</u>		V Gro	_	5 = 0	22 A	=	0 1	10 Air	
IItaps		taps	0	4	7	ď	ະນ	1.69	ω.	0	7	4.	1							14040	נייטד /	77			2		<u> </u>		<u>rd r</u>	<del>1 / </del>	
	2	taps	3	4	ທ	9	7	- ∞	o			12									IIVIVOILAGE FA	f Applied	to Rat	*	0.	•	φ. •	•	0	7 H	**
		1.0	9	$\infty$	Н,	4	ထ	.334	g '	9	9	ထု	0	1.043	<u>\\</u>	<b>\</b>				727	JLV V V	Ratio o	Voltage	Voltage	H	0	0		0.6 t	00	40 - 23
	ttage	6.		1.167	ထျ	-	4	.285	m ·	Q	Q	ហ	.675	82	1.02	7	\				•			Factor)			되.	١.	1.4	•	-
(e)	d Wa		.13	1.14	.16	.18	.21	.244	. 28	.32	.38	.45	.543	. 65	1.79	.98	\	\						ance Fa		Range					t (
e Rate	Rate		H	.13	.14	.16	.18	.20	.23	.27	.31	.37	.43	.51	. 62	. 75	.92	7	\					(Resistan		stance	hms)	0	o 5K		;
ailure	ng to		ŀ	1.11	1.12	.14	.15	1.17	. 20	. 22	. 26	.30	.35	.41	. 48	.58	. 70	.85	7						۲	E SO	<u>o</u>	0	>2K t	5X	
(Base Fa	rati		ŀ	1.	<u> </u>	.12	1.13	.15	-17	.19	.21	.24	.28	. 32	.38	. 44	.53	• 63	.76	7				# <b>(</b>		<u>~</u>		<u> </u>		L	
λ <sub>b</sub> (B	of Ope		H	.09	9:	.10	1.11	1.13	.14	.15	.17	. 20	.22	.25	.29	.34	.40	.47	.56	.67	7			actor		F	o	•	2.0	•	6
	cent	.3	.077	ന	$\infty$	00	0		N	3	せ	O	iα	0	$\sim$	.264	0	S	40	ထား	57	7		ity Fa	.	- ζ	***		pec.		
	Per	.2	ŀ	.07	.07	.08	.08	60.	.10	1.11	.12	.13	1.14	. i.6	.18	.20	. 22	. 26	. 29	. 34	40	4.	7	(Quality		Quality	Level	Upper	Mil-Spec	Lower	<b>1</b>
		:	lio.	S	S	~	~	ıω	$\infty$	9	10	0		$\sim$	4	ഗ	~	iO.	~	℧ ′	∞ '	.324		Ħ	OŁ			<u>.                                    </u>			£ ( ; ( ) ;
		(၁ <sub>၀)</sub>	30	35	40	45	50	55	09	65	70	75	80	82	90	S	0	0	_	Н.	$\sim$	125	ן ניי								;
												ŧ	5.	2	. ד	7												•			

for Ħ V Rated 50 for RA10 75 for RA20X-XC,F 130 for RA30X-XC,F

11 11 11

V Rated

RA20X-XA RK09 RAX-XA for 175 275 320 11 11

MIL-HUBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR POWER WIREWOUND POTENTIOMETERS (MIL-R-22, Style RP) FIGURE 5.2-12

i

 $^{\lambda}_{\rm p}$  =  $^{\lambda}_{\rm b}$  (  $^{\rm II}_{\rm taps}$  X  $^{\rm II}_{\rm R}$  X  $^{\rm II}_{\rm V}$  X  $^{\rm I}_{\rm C}$  X  $^{\rm II}_{\rm E}$  X  $^{\rm II}_{\rm Q}$  ) X 10  $^{-6}$ 

 $\lambda_{\mathbf{b}}$  (Base Failure Rate)

	1.0	.172	_	\	7							
age	6.	.157	.180		4	_		7				
Watta	8•		.163	$\infty$	$\vdash$	.259		.376	<u> </u>	\	_	
Rated	2.	.131	.148	.168	.194	.227	9	.323	9	.488	615	\
g to	9.	113	.134	.151	.172	S	23	.277	സ	.409	0	.643
Operatin	5.	109	.121	.135	.153	.175	0	.238	æ	.343	.420	.524
Ŧ	₽•		109			S	1	.205	4		.347	
rcent o	٤٠		σ				S	176	0	.240	.287	7
Perc	.2	.083		.097	101	.119	m	1.151	7	.201	$\sim$	
	.1	.076	.081	$\infty$	.095			.130	4		S	S
	(၁)	30	40	50	09	70	80	06	100	110	120	

	taps	.2	4.		6.09	4.		0	ų.	9	0
	<sup>N</sup> taps				26						
	taps	9	φ,	4	3,35	'n	ယ	٦.	'n	<u>ن</u>	ο.
מקמז	N taps				16						
	taps	1.00	7	?	1.38	5	9	ω.	0	7	4
	Ntaps	3	4	ហ	ၒ	7	œ	o	10		12

	<pre>IC (Construction Factor)</pre>
24 .643	Total Common in the
4 .348 .427 .524	, ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;

"Environmental Factor"

(L)	пν	2.00 1.40 1.10 1.00 1.00
$\Pi_{f V}$ (Voltage Factor)	Ratio of Applied Voltage to Rated Voltage *	1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 to 0.3 0.2

Environment	II E
Ground, Benign	1.0
ace Flight	N/A
	0.9
_	15.0
ð	18.0
fobile	20.0
val, Unsheltered	N/A
Airborne, Uninhab.	N/A
H	N/A

-			
S		O H	1.0
STYIC	Quality Factor)	t۲	pec.
orner	Π <sub>Q</sub> (Quality Factor)	Quality Level	Upper Mil-Spec Lower
ATT		пВ	1.0
Unenclosed All other styles	ance r)	Range	<b>~</b>
oner	esistar Factor	tance ohms)	ដ្ដ
لمہ	I <sub>R</sub> (Resistance Factor)	Resistance Range (ohms)	1 >2K >5K

1.0

2.0

RP97, RP11, RP16

Enclosed

Style

Construction

Class

υ H

10	
ø	ິດ
RP06	others
for	for
250V	500V
IJ	11
Rated	

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR VARIABLE (NON WIREWOUND TRIMMERS) RESISTORS (MIL-R-22097, Style RJ) FIGURE 5.2-13

 $\lambda_{\rm p}=\lambda_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm taps}$   $\times$   $\pi_{\rm R}$   $\times$   $\pi_{\rm V}$   $\times$   $\pi_{\rm E}$   $\times$   $\pi_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times$  10<sup>-6</sup>

			) α γ	(Base	Failure		Rate)						$^{II}$ taps			
E	_	Percent	ent o	44	ratir	4	Rated	Nattag	cage		N	+ II.	N	11 +	N	tanc
(0)		2	ות	1	7		7	8	6.	1.0	L J	L J	2422	7	د میں ا	2422
	• 10	• (					ıŀ	· [ <	-	ļα	~	00.1	13		23	6
0° -	0	~	2	. 585	.614	40	_	)	"	0	) ·	•	7 .	•	3 0	1 1
40	0	ľ	α	615	648	89	Н	വ	σ	4	4.	11.1	14	$\infty$	24	3.
) C	ıu	0	V		109	7	-	_	86	916	10	7	72		25	
000	)	0	1	0 0		- 1	• •	1 (	۲ (	i (	·	C	7 (	r	90	C
<u> </u>	$\infty$	2	9	1.701	.744	79	4	Ŋ	4	•	o 	•	07	?	0 7	•
7 (2	2	V	7	760	760 811	86	.924	.987	1.05	1.12	_	•	1.7	٠.	27	4.
	250	) [C	100	026	100	962		1	-	2	ω	1.60	18	3.85	28	6.72
200	•	171.	0	7	•	,	1 1	•			٥	0	٥١	_	20	C
000	.746	. 804	.867	.934	10.1	20.1		7	17.30		n (	•	7 6	• (	7 0	
טטר	•	.905	.981	1.06	1.15	11.25	1.35	1.46	7		07	•	2 C	•	ر م	• •
0 -	ווייי		_	1 23	1 34	7					11	7	21	4.64	31	9
7 7	ر د	•	7 + + +		7	1					د ر	~	٠,	7 0.7	22	7.00
120	11.12	1.22	1.34	1.47	-						77	٦,	77		32	?
130	<b> </b>	1.48	1.53		Å											
	1,66			i												
	?															

II <sub>R</sub> (Resist	Resistanc	Sillio)	10 to	>50K to	>100K to	>200K to	>500K to			*V Rated = 2	ן יי
ctor)	II E	1.0	N/A	3.0	6.0	8.0	10.01	12.5	15.0	80.0	
${ m II}_{ m E}$ (Environmental Factor)	Environment	Ground, Benign	닯	רסי	Airborne, Inhabited	Naval, sheitered	Ground, Mobile	Uns	Airborne, Uninhab.	Missile, Launch	

stance Factor	tor)	$\pi_{\mathbf{V}}$ (Voltage Factor		IQ (Quality
ice Range		Ratio of Applied		1 40.00
(51	ਜ਼ ਲ	ltag		Level
50K	1.0	Voltage *	<b>\</b>	
100K	1.1	1.0	20	Upper William
200K	1.2	0.0	0.5	Jade-TTW
500K	1.4	0.8 to 0.1	00	LOWer
1 meg	1.8	harman de la company de la com		

t Out

4 2 1. 0 0 0

V Rated = 200V for RJ26 & 50 = 300V for RJ12,22,& 24

FOR COMPOSITION (LOW PRECISION) POTENTIOMETERS (MIL-R-94, Style RV) MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FIGURE 5.2.14

 $n_Q$ ) x 10<sup>-6</sup> × E E и<sub>V</sub> х × II R × ( ntaps γ ll ۲<sup>۵</sup>

	aps	,	0 4	7	60.	.40	.72	.04	.36	0.0		actor		1	N N	707	50.	50.	200	ດິດ		?		н )				
	taps	+	0 4		9	7	8	<u></u>	0 -	32 8		ntal F	t.		:		Inhabited	red	υ.	tered	Uninhab.			y Factor		o ≓	<u>-i (</u>	5.0
	taps			, rd	ω.	ı.	œ	4	•	4.92		(Environmental	Environment	Renia	Flight		_	$\mathbf{Y}$	l, Mobil	S	_ +	<u>ט</u>		To (Quality	Quality	Level	1)pper	M11-Spe Lower
sdı	Ntaps	<b>.</b>	14	15	16	17	18	51	20	22		П Е	Env	Ground	Space	Ground	Airborne	Naval,	Ground, N	Naval,	Alrbox	MISSIN	1	<u>ح</u>				
Ataps	tabs	1	) r	7	<u>ښ</u>	3	9.	œ		2.45						•	tor)		[-	"R	1.	1.1	•	•	•			
	Ntaps	. 1	. 4		9	7	တ	σ		12							nce Factor		e Range	_	10	100K	0	00	T meg			
	-	1	1.1	.16	.18	. 20	.22	. 26	<u>.</u> د	. 41	1						In (Resistance	N.	Resistance	smdo)	6	>50K to	100K	<b>S</b> 5	200	Ľι		
451-	tage	151	30 .14	140 1.15	53 .16	68 .18	86 .20	08   23	234   26	.310 .358	63 .42	ო /	\				Factor)				Δ	1.20	0	입		xA;RV4xC &		
ire Rate	Ra	ם ער	2 .120	9 1.129	8 .140	8	0 .167	5 85	3 .207	32 . 268	5 .3	8 c	<u>: ~</u>	\			Ø		Applied	ຕ				0.1		i	0	ry pes
se Failure	rating	280	04 .1	10 11	17  .1	25 .1	35 .1	47   1.1	162   1	201 .2.	27 .2	60 .3	55	N			II, (Voltag	i	tio of	ltage t	Lta	1.0	0	0.8 to	BV444	RV2, RV5, RV6x	XXA	Telle T
λ <sub>b</sub> (Base	Of O	00	90.09	3 .10	8 -10	3 .11	0   12	7  -13	6 - 14 7	0 1.17	61.9	6 . 22	· ·	9 .34	9 .41	<u>,</u>		Į	Ra	<u>&gt;</u> :	× J			لـــ	Ļ	for RV	or	or ar
		80	83 .0	86 <u> </u> .0	0.060	94 .1	1. 660	105  -1	112  -1	130 .15	142   1	57   L	98	26 .2	63 63	10 T	- 1	\							1		S	7
		• ļr		07	08	ထြ	ထ	9	ט כ ט ת	.113	2	J 4	1.6	∞∣	-1 <	40	Ø <	<b>₽</b>							17 Dated 17			
	H <sub>C</sub>									70						) r	٦,	4					•		*	1		
								•	5.	. 2-	20																	

1.0 N/A 10.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 60.0

<u>.</u>ப

Factor)

# 5.2.3 Calculation of Stress Ratio for Potentiometers The stress ratio (S) is defined by the equations

The stress ratio (S) is defined by the equation:

where:

P applied

is the equivalent power input to the potentiometer when it is not loaded (i.e., wiper lead disconnected). Its value is computed as the square of the input voltage, divided by the potentiometer total resistance.

$$W_{\text{operate}} = (V_{\text{in}}^2/R_{\text{P}}).$$

P rated

is the power rating of the potentiometer.

II ganged

is a correction factor to correct for the reduction in effective rating of the potentiometer due to the close proximity of two or more potentiometers when they are ganged together on a common shaft. the values of Il ganged are obtained from Table 5.2-6.

 $^{\rm II}$ eff

is a correction factor for the electrical loading effect on the wiper contact of the potentiometer. Its value is a function of the type of potentiometer, its resistance, and the load resistance.

The value of  $I_{eff}$  may be computed as follows:

$$II_{eff} = \frac{R_L^2}{R_L^2 + K_H (R_P^2 + 2R_P^2 R_L)}$$

### where:

 ${\rm K_{H}}$  is a constant dependent upon the style shown in Table 5.2-4.

 $R_{L}$  = load resistance (If  $R_{L}$  is variable, use lowest value).

 $R_{p}$  = potentiometer resistance

The value of  $I_{eff}$  can be obtained directly from Table 5.2-5.

TABLE 5.2-4

Potentiometer Type (Mil Spec)	Style	К <sub>Н</sub>
MTL-R-19	RA	0.5
MIL-R-22	RP	7.0
MIL-R-94	RV	0.5
MIL-R-12934	RR1000,2100, 1001, 2101,	
	2102, 2103, 1400, 1003	0.3
MIL-R-12934	All other types	0.2
MIL-R-22097	RJ11, RJ12	0.3
MIL-R-22097	All other types	0.2
MIL-R-27208	RT22, 24, 26, 27	0.2
MIL-R-27208	All other types	0.3
MIL-R-39002	RK	0.5
MIL-R-39015	RTR22, 24	0.17
MIL-R-39015	RTR12	0.3

TABLE 5.2-5. LOADED POTENTIOMETER DERATING FACTOR,  $II_{eff.}$ 

R <sub>T.</sub> /		К <sub>Н</sub>			
R <sub>L</sub> / <sub>R<sub>p</sub></sub>	0.5	01.0	0.167	0.2	0.3
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.5 2.0	.02 .05 .10 .15 .20 .25 .29 .33 .37 .40 .53	.008 .03 .05 .08 .11 .14 .17 .20 .22 .25 .36	.05 .15 .25 .35 .43 .49 .55 .60 .67 .77	.04 .13 .22 .31 .38 .45 .51 .55 .59 .63 .74	.03 .07 .16 .23 .29 .35 .40 .45 .49
3.0 4.0 5.0 10.0	.72 .78 .82 .90	.56 .64 .69 .83	.89 .91 .93 .96	.87 .90 .92 .96	.81 .86 .88
100.0	.99	.98	1.00	1.00	.99

TABLE 5.2-6. GANGED-POTENTIOMETER FACTOR, I ganged

Number of Sections	First Potentiometer Next to Mount	Second in Gang	Third in Gang	Fourth in Gang	Fifth in Gang	Sixth in Gang	
Single	1.0	No	t Applica	able			
Two	0.75	0.60	Not A	oplicable	9		
Three	0.75	0.50	0.60	Not Applicable			
Four	0.75	0.50	0.50	0.60	Not App	licable	
Five	0.75	0.50	0.40	0.50	0.60	Not Appli- cable	
Six	0.75	0.50	0.40	0.40	0.50	0.60	

### 5.3 Operational/Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparison

Table 5.3-1 presents the operational failure rates with the operation to non-operation failure rate ratio. The operational failure rates were calculated using the MIL-HDBK-217B prediction models and the following assumptions:

For carbon composition, film and wirewound resistors, a quality level 'M' with less than 100K resistance at 25°C was assumed with a 50 percent ratio of operating to rated wattage.

For variable resistors, a precision wirewound potentiometer with 3 taps, upper quality, less than 10K resistance and 50 percent derating was assumed.

The launch operation factors were extracted directly from MIL-HDBK-217B.

LESISTOR OPERATING AND NON-OPERATING FACTORS 5.3-1. TABLE

DEVICE CATEGORY RESISTORS	NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATE x 10-9	GROUND, FIXED, OPERATING FAILURE RATE x 10-9	G.FOPERATING TO NON-OPERATING RATIO	MISSILE LAUNCH TO G.F. OPER- ATING RATIO
Composition	0.11	9.0	5.	7.5
· Film	.033	10.5	318.	7.
Wirewound	.243	29.4	121.	11.7
Variable	90.8	780.0	97.	20.
Thermistor	27.80	310.0	. 11.	12.

### 6.0 Capacitors

Capacitors used in electronic equipment are usually categorized into types based on the dielectric material used and their physical construction.

The following summarizes some characteristics of specific capacitor types.

Film dielectric capacitors with paper, paper/plastic, or plastic dielectrics are commonly made by interleaving thin films of dielectric material with metallic foils which serve as electrodes. The resulting four-layer wedge is spiral-wound into a tight cylindrical roll. Leads are attached to this capacitor section by soldering or welding. There are two basic internal constructions. The inserted tab construction utilizes flat metal tabs which are laid against the electrode during winding. These tabs are brought out within one turn of each other and are connected to external leads. The tabs are usually connected to the electrodes without solder. In the extended foil type of construction, the electrode foils are offset from each other such that the end of each electrode turn is exposed only at one end of the roll assembly. The leads are attached at opposite ends and connect all turns of each electrode in parallel.

Paper dielectric capacitors have several constructions: metallic cases with leads existing through glass-to-metal hermetic seal.; mylar wrap encasement, and polystyrene.

Electrolytic capacitors include aluminum, non-solid tantalum and solid tantalum.

Glass and mica dielectric capacitors have non-flexible dielectric materials. To obtain the higher capacitance units, thin layers of the dielectric are stacked between multiple electrodes. Alternate electrodes are connected in parallel. The electrodes can be either metallic foil or a metallic film painted directly on the dielectric. The assembled stack of electrodes and dielectrics is held in close contact by clamps or by the capacitor encasement.

Mica dielectric capacitors are available either with a molded

encasement or with a conformal dipped encasement.

Glass and procelain dielectric capacitors are encased in glass and the leads are pretreated to give a good glass-to-metal seal. This provides high resistance to humidity. Flexible or semi-rigid conformal coating is recommended for these capacitors.

Ceramic dielectric capacitors are generally available either as tubular designs, as flat disc designs, or as flat plate designs. Mechanically the tubular designs consist of a ceramic tube with silver bands (electrodes) fired on the inside and outside surfaces. Capacitance is formed between the silver bands with the ceramic as the dielectric. Leads are wrapped around each end and soldered to the bands. Leads exit radically from the tube and are parallel. The assembly is encapsulated in Durez resin which is subsequently vacuum-impregnated with a high melting point wax. The disc capacitors consist of a disc with a thin coating of metallic paint fired on each face. Parallel leads are soldered to the metallic electrodes. The assembly is encapsulated in Durez and impregnated with a high melting point wax. Flat plate capacitors consist of a monolithic stack in a molded case. The internal stack consists of multiple films of a noble metal spaced with thin films of ceramic. This assembly is fired to give a monolithic construction. Feedthrough or standoff capacitor designs are essentially a modification of one of the above three capacitor types in which one plate of the capacitor becomes an integral part of the chassis.

Variable ceramic dielectric capacitors consist of a thin ceramic disc mounted in contact with a ceramic frame so that it can be rotated about its center. The electrodes consist of semi-circular silver patterns. Capacity is changed by varying the overlap of the electrodes. Contact to the rotatable electrode is made by a spring-loaded spider washer which holds disc in contact with adjacent electrode.

Air dielectric variable capacitors consist of a fixed stator with parallel metal plates and a rotor with similar parallel plates located so that these plates are spaced between the stator plates. Glass piston trimmers consist of a metal piston which moves axially within a glass sleeve. One electrode consists of a metal band either outside or embedded within the glass sleeve. The close fitting piston forms the adjustable electrode of the capacitor.

### 6.1 Storage Reliability Analysis

### 6.1.1 Failure Mechanisms

Capacitors are susceptible to water vapor. Even in hermetically-sealed units, moisture present during manufacture can lead to deterioration of insulation or dielectric materials. This can be a more serious consideration in certain poorer grade capacitors.

The entrance of moisture through cracks in the seals can be minimized in several ways. Capacitors with seal cracks prior to installation in equipment should be screened out and removed from manufacturing stock. Cracks developed during assembly into equipment can be prevented by careful process control and sometimes can be screened out by final assembly inspection. Cracks which develop during use in later life of the equipment can sometimes be traced to low-quality seals or stresses placed on the leads during equipment manufacture. Certain seal cracks are traceable to a combination of these causes plus stress resulting from use environment.

Electrolytic capacitors have experienced problems in storage. Table 6.1-1 summarizes the predominant failure mechanism associated with the solid tantalum capacitors. Table 6.1-2 summarizes those for wet tantalum capacitors. Electrolyte leakage in the wet tantalum capacitor has been the major source of problems while impurities in the solid tantalum capacitor has caused problems. Most of the failure mechanisms associated with these capacitors are accelerated to failure by a temperature cycling environment.

### 6.1.2 Non-Operating Failure Rate Predictions

The non-operating failure rate table for various types of capacitors is shown in Table 6.1-3.

TABLE 6.1-1.

# FAILURE MECHANISM ANALYSIS, SOLID TANTALUM CAPACITORS

DETECTION METHOD	High leakage currents, or outliers	Short circuits High leakage currents, or outliers. High	factor. Dissipating, capacitance, radiographic inspection	Radiographic inspection
FAILURE MODE	Out-of- tolerance	Short Cut-of- tolerance	Out-of- tolerance	
ACCELERATING . ENVIRONMENT	Temperature cycling, burn in, surge test	Surge test Temperature cycling, burn in, surge test	Temperature cycling, burn in	Temperature cycling, burn in
CAUSE	Impurities in starting tantalum impede cxide growth at sites during anodization.  Abrasions of sintered pellets expose impurities prior to anodization.  Binder or die impurities on sintered pellet.  Handling damage during anodization processes and ascembly.  Crystalline tantalum pentoxide.	Oxide shorts due to excessive power surges under flicker or schillation conditions.  Thin MnO <sub>2</sub> or silver paint penetrating MnO <sub>2</sub> and preventing healing of defect sites.	Inadequate wetting of solder to silver paint. Silver paint dissolving into the solder.	Low solder level, pocr anchorage of slug to case, flux between solder and paint
FAILURE MECHANISM	Oxide Defects	•	Poor Slug Adhesion	

TABLE 6.1-1.

FAILURE MECHANISM ANALYSIS, SOLID TANTALUM CAPACITORS (cont'a.)

		T	
	DETECTION METHOD	Radiographic inspection	Radiographic inspection
	FAILURE MODE		
	ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT		·
	CAUSE	Excessive heat applied during assembly of capacitor into circuit.	Solder distributions, voids, slugs canted in case, bent risers, etc.
	FAILURE MECHANISM	Solder Reflow	Mechanical Defects
ı	~~~~	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~	

TABLE 6.1-2.

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

FAILURE MECHANISM ANALYSIS, TANTALUM FOIL CAPACITORS

1	*·····································		·	
DETECTION METHOD	Visual in- spection, electrical test	Electrical test	Electrical test	Visual, electrical test
FAILURE MODE	Shorts, open, ca- pacitance, leakcy3	Short, dissipa- tion fac- tor	Capaci- tance, dis- sipation factor	Open
ACCELERATING ENVIRONMENT	Temperature cycling, burn in	Temperature cycling, burn in	Temperature cycling, burn in	Temperature cycling, burn in
CAUSE	Leakage past center of seal causing electro-lyte to bridge between internal nickel wire and case.	Metallic contamina- tion in mylar sleev- ing, improperly cured cured epoxy compound	Reactive impurities in electrolyte or in paper spacer	Machine and operator errors cause inade- quate welds
FAILURE MECHANISM	Electrolyte Leakage	Insulation Defects	Foil Separation	Faulty Lead to Fcil Welds

TABLE 6.1-3. CAPACITOR NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATE

	Failure Rate	in Fics
	MIL-STD	Hi Rel
Paper & Plastic	3.8	3.8
MICA	1.2	.97
Glass	.84	.84
Ceramic	.35	.35
Tantalum		
Solid	-	.25
Non-Solid	2500.	9.3
Aluminum Oxide		7.0
Variable	11.	11.

### 6.1.3 Non-Operating Failure Rate Data

The failure rate table in Section 6.1.2 is based on storage data consisting of over 23 billion part hours with 24 failures reported. Storage hours and failure data for each type of capacitor is shown in Table 6.1-4. No significant differences can be seen in this data between MIL-STD and Hi-Rel parts with one exception. The MIL-STD wet tantalum capacitors show a significantly higher failure rate than the Hi-Rel parts.

Data was obtained from four sources and are listed in Tables 6.1-5 through 6.1-8.

TABLE 6.1-4. CAPACITOR NON-OPERATING DATA SUMMARY

的是是我们的时候,我们是这个时候,我们是这个是一个,我们是不是一个,我们是不是一个,我们是不是一个,我们也是一个,我们的是一个,我们的是一个,我们也是一个,我们

•	\$ 5 6 1	MIL-STD	; ; ;	1	HI-REL	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
02 1	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN TITS	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE PATE IN FITS
Paper and Plastic	2103.	ω	3.8	336.	8	5.95
MICA	858	0	(<1.16)	1033.	႕	.968
Glass	1192.	0	(<.84)	.396.	0	(<3.38)
Ceramic	2916.	0	(<,34)	6557.	ო	.458
Electrolytic						
All	800.	7	2.5	7124.	7	.983
General Class	ı	ı	ı	2612	8	.766
Solid Tantulum	1	ı	1	3935.	н	.254
Non-Solid Tantalum	8. m	2	2500.	430.	4	6.3
Aluminum Oxide	ı	ı	ı	147.	0	(<6.80)
Variable						
All	84.	0	(<11.9)	91.	н	11.0
Glass	84.	0	(<11.9)	50.	0	(<20.0)
Ceramic	ľ	ı	ţ	e	0	(<3330.)
Air	ı	í	ŧ	41.	Н	24.4

TABLE 5.1-5. SOURCE A CALACITOR NON-OPERATING DATA (MIL-STD)

SOURCE B CAPACITOR NON-OPERATING DATA (HI-REL) TABLE 6,1-6.

TYPE	STORAGE FAILURE NUMBER RATE DEVICES X 10 FAILED IN FITS	19020 249.955 0 (<4.00)	50720 666.546 0 (<1.50)	261842 3441.046 1 .291	143918 1891.325 0 (<.529)	
TXE H	គ្នា					
DEVICE Paper MICA Ceramic	DEVICE TYPE	Paper	MICA	Ceramic	Tantulum,	

TABLE 6.1-7. SOURCE C CAPACITOR NON-OPERATING DATA

STATES TO STATES AND SECURITY OF SECURITY OF STATES AND SECURITY OF SECURITY OF

		MIL-STD	# # # 9	1 1 1 2 2	HI-REL	;
	STORAGE HOURS	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE	STORAGE HOURS	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE
DEVICE TYPE	x 106	FAILED	IN FITS	x 10 <sup>6</sup>	FAILED	IN FITS
Paper	329.	7	80.9	19.	0	(<52.6)
Plastic	1	1	1	30.	H	33.3
Polycarbon Film	ı	1	1	24.	Н	41.7
Mylar	۲,	0	(<100.)	ı	t	ı
Polystyrene	1	i	ı	10.	0	(<100.)
Metallic Film	1	ŧ	ı	2.	0	(<200:)
MICA	297.	0	(<3.37)	354.	H	2.82
MICA, Dipped	1	1	ı	<b>o</b>	0	(<111.)
MICA, Reconstituted	1	ı	i	4.	0	(<2.5)
Glass		0	(<200.)	295.	0	(<3.39)
Ceramic	729.	က	4.12	3103.	7	.64
Feedthrough	ı	ı	ŧ	12.	0	(<83.3)
Chip	18.	0	(<55.5)	ı	1	i
Electrolytic General Class	i	1		2612.	74	.76
Foil	<b>в</b>	0	(<125.)	145.	0	(69.>)
Solid Tantalum Non-Solid Tantalum	, ∞.	1 7	2500.	2030. 430.	<b>-1 4</b> *	9.3
Variable Piston Trimmer		0	(<11.9)	í	ı	t
Air			•	41.	<b>~</b> 1 (	24.4
Ceramic Glass	1 1	1 1	ı l	ო . დ	00	(<33333.) (<125.)

TO THE STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE STATE OF THE STATE

SOURCE D CAPACITOR NON-OPERATING DATA (HI-REL) TABLE 6.1-8.

 $\bigcup j$ 

DEVICE TYPE	NUMBER	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Paper	35	1.220	0	(<819.)
MICA	96	2.877	0	(<348.)
Glass	20	. 605	0	(<1650.)
Ceramic	20	.626	0	(<1600.)
Tantulum, Solid	400	13.599	0	(<73.5)
Aluminum Oxide	63	1.771	0	(<565.)
Wariable, Air	ហ	.133	0	(<7,520.)

The about the contract of the

### 6.2 Capacitor Operational Prediction Models

The MIL-HDBK-217B general failure rate model for capacitors is:

$$\lambda_{p} = \lambda_{b} (\Pi_{E} \times \Pi_{CV} \times \Pi_{SR} \times \Pi_{Q}) \times 10^{-6}$$

where:

 $\lambda_{n}$  = device failure rate

 $\lambda_{h}$  = base failure rate

II = Environmental Adjustment Factor

II<sub>CV</sub> = Capacitance Value Adjustment Factor

 $II_{SR}$  = Series Resistance Adjustment Factor

II<sub>O</sub> = Quality Adjustment Factor

The various types of capacitors require different failure rate models that vary to some degree from the basic models. The specific failure rate model and the II factor values for each type of capacitor are presented in Figures 6.2-1 through 6.2-16. The base failure rate and adjustment factor values in the figures are based on certain assumptions. See sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 for a description of these parameters.

Table 6.2-1 provides a list of capacitor generic types with a cross reference to the corresponding figure number of the failure rate model. As indicated in the table, the models are broken out by capacitor style, characteristic and temperature rating. These can be identified from the capacitor type designation. For example, CQR09 A 1 M C152KlM indicated style CQR09, "A" rated temperature, and characteristic "M."

### 6.2.1 Base Failure Rate $(\lambda_b)$

The equation for the base failure rate,  $\lambda_b$ , is:  $\lambda_b = A \left[ \left( \frac{S}{N_S} \right)^H + 1 \right] e^{\frac{T}{N_T}} e^{\frac{T}{N_T}}$ 

where:

- A is an adjustment factor for each different type of capacitor, to adjust the model to the proper failure rate.
- S represents the ratio of operating to rated voltage.

N<sub>c</sub> is a stress constant

- e is the natural logarithm base, 2.718
- T is the operating ambient temperature in degrees Centigrade
- $N_m$  is a temperature constant.
- B is a shaping parameter
- G and H are acceleration constants.

The quantitative values for the base failure rate model factors are given in Table 6.2-2 for the different capacitor types. The last column of this table lists the figure number that presents the resulting base failure rate values.

### 6.2.2 Adjustment Factors

# 6.2.2.1 Environmental Factor $\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$

 $\mathbb{R}_{2}$  accounts for the influence of environmental factors other than temperature. Refer to the environment description in the Appendix.

# 6.2.2.2 Capacitance Value Adjustment Factor, $\pi_{CV}$

 $\Pi_{\mbox{CV}}$  adjusts the model for effect of capacitance related to case size.

# 6.2.2.3 Series Resistance Adjustment Factor, $\mathbb{F}_{SR}$

 $\pi_{SR}$  adjusts the model for the effect of series resistance in circuit application of some electrolytic capacitors.

## 6.2.2.4 Quality Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{O}$

 $\Pi_{O}$  accounts for effects of different quality levels.

The Established Reliability (ER) capacitor family generally has four qualification failure rate levels when tested per the requirements of the applicable ER specification. These qualification failure rate levels differ by a factor of ten. However, field data indicates that these failure rate levels differ by a factor about three, hence the  $\mathbb{F}_0$  values have been set accordingly.

TABLE 6.2-1
CAPACITORS OPER.JIONAL PREDICTION MODEL CROSS REFERENCE

,我们是一个人,我们

FIGURE	6.2-1	6.2-2	6.2-3	6.2-4		6.2-5	6.2-6	6.2-7	6.2-3	6-2-9
STYLE	CPV07 CQ08,09,R,3,-Characteristic P	CPV17 CHR09 (50 Volt Rated) CHR39 & 49 CQ08,09,12,13-Characteristic M CQ72,-Characteristic E CDR32 & 33	CHR09 (above 50 Volt Rated) CHR01, 12,19,29 & 59 CQ08, 09,12,13,20,72, Charac- teristic K CQ06 & 07-Characteristic Q CQR01,07,09,12,13,39,42	CM (Molded)	CMR (Dipped)	CB	CYR	Designated'A' rated temperature CKR13,48,64,72	Designated 'B' rated temperature CKR05-12,14-16,17-19,73,74	Designated 'C' rated temperature
MIL-SPEC	MIL-C-14157 MIL-C-19978	MIL-C-14157 MIL-C-39022 MIL-C-19978	MIL-C-39022 MIL-C-19978	MIL-C-5	MIL-C-39001	MIL-C-10950	MIL-C-23269	MIL-C-11015 MIL-C-39014	MIL-C-11015 MIL-C-39014	MIL-C-11015
TYPE	Paper and Plastic Film 65° Max Rated	Paper and Plastic Film 85°C Max Rated	Paper and Plastic Film 125°C Max Rated	MICA	•	Button MICA	Glass	Ccramic (General Purpose) 85°C Max Rated	Ceramic (General Purpose) 125°C Max Rated	Ceramic (General Purpose) 150°C Max Rated

TABLE 6.2-1 CAPACITORS OPERATIONAL PREDICTION MODEL CROSS REFERENCE (CON'T)

(

TYPE	MIL-SPEC	STYLE	FIGURE
Ceramic, Temperature Compensating	MIL-C-20	သ	6.2-10
Tantalum Electrolytic (Solid)	MIL-C-39003	CSR	6.2-11
Tantalum Electrolytic (Non-Solid)	MIL-C-39006 MIL-C-3965	CLR CL	6.2-12
Aluminum Electrolytic (Aluminum Oxide)	M1L-C-39018	cu	6.2-13
Aluminum Dry Electrolytic	MIL-C-62	CE	6.2-14
Variable Ceramic	MIL-C-81	CV	6.2-15
Variable, Piston Type (Tubular Trimmer)	MIL-C-14409	PC	6.2-16

one is a real section is a section of the section of the section of the section of a section of a section of the section of th

(MIL-C-14157, Style CPV07 and MIL-C-19978, Style CQ08,09 RATED FOR PAPER & PLASTIC FILM CAPACITORS -65°C MAX. MIL-HDE. -217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL 12, 13 - Characteristic P) 2-1 ဖ FIGURE

de la companya de la

x 10\_6 Ŏ ( n<sub>E</sub> x , O 11

Rate)\* Failure (Base

.0060 .0062 .0065 .0076 ,0058 010 023 036 990 .0035 .0045 .0060 0074 0039 .0041 .0051 7600. .013 .021 039 Voltage .0077 0021 .0023 .0025 .0019 .0020 .0020 .0029 .0033 0041 .0054 .012 Rated .0015 .0011 .0017 .0010 .0013 .c041 .0011 .0064 0022 011 ဌ .0005 0002 0010 0057 .0005 .0005 9000. 9000 0020 .0007 .0003 .0014 0031 Operating .0003 .0005 .0015 .0002 .0003 .0027 .0002 .0002 .0002 .0009 0002 .0004 0000 of 0002 0003 0000 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0002 0004 0001 .0001 .0001 0013 .0001 Ratio 80000 80000 00008 60000. 00000 0000 0002 .0002 .0004 8000 .0001 .0001 .0001 1000 ທີ 00000 90000 80000 60000 90000 90000 00000 .00007 0001 0002 0003 1000 0001 9000 ž 90000 90000 .00008 .0000 90000 00000 .0000 0003 0001 0002 0000 1000 9000 30 35 35 40

 $\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$  (Environmental Factor)

7.0 0.3 0 Level Failure Rate MIL-C-19978 Non-ER いばずまら O

0

 $\pi_{\mathbf{O}}$ 

Factor)

(Quality

ហ

404440NO Airborne, Inhabited Naval, Unsheltered Airborne, Uninhab Naval, Sheltered Launch Grouna, Mobile Environment Benign Ground, Fixed Space Flight Missile, Ground,

Figure 6.2-1-a and corresponding 6.2-1-b in determining stresses Observe ac voltage limits of temperature rise from Figure table look-up for

Maria atom




FIGURE 6.2-la. EQUIVALENT TEMPERATURE INCREASE FOR EFFECTS OF AC OR PULSES FOR PAPER & PLASTIC FILM CAPACITORS (Applicable to MIL-C-14157 & MIL-C-19978, Chars. E, K, M & Q; MIL-C-39022 all styles).




FIGURE 6.2-1b. BASIC RESTRICTION ON USE OF PAPER & PLASTIC FILM CAPACITORS IN AC APPLICATIONS (Applicable only to MIL-C-14157 & MIL-C-19978, Chars. E, K, M & Q; MIL-C-39022 all styles).

FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR PAPER MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL 6.2-2 FIGURE

W

SELECTION OF THE PROPERTY OF T

rated), (MIL-C-14157,Style CPV17; MIL-C-39022,Style CHR09(50 volt r CHR39 & 49; MIL-C-19978,Style CQ08,09,12,13-characteristic CQ72-characteristic E, CDR32 & 33) 85°C MAX RATED PLASTIC FILM CAPACITORS -

9\_01 × ( ue م =. , a

Rate)\* (Base Failure γ

Factor)

(Environmental

Environment.

Benign

回

44405

Mobile

Airborne, Inhabited Naval, Unsheltered Airborne, Uninhab. Naval, Sheltered Ground, Fixed Space Flight Missile, Ground, Ground, o<sub>H</sub>O .0055 0058 .0067 0057 0072 0800 055 S 6500. .0064 1600 .0013 .0061 0017 .010 0033 .0033 0032 .0036 0043 .0054 .0063 0010 .0040 0078 .0035 .0038 .0047 022 Voltage .0019 .0026 .0030 .0018 .0022 0024 .0018 0019 .0019 .0020 .0044 .0021 .0010 .0010 .0011 .0011 9900 .0014 .0016 .0023 .0042 6000. 6000. 00100 0010 ,0012 .0018 0030 Rated .0005 .0005 .0004 .0011 0000 .0005 .0005 9000 9000 .0007 .0009 0015 0032 0057 .0004 .0004 .0004 ဌ Operating 0002 .0002 .0002 .0002 ,0002 .0005 .0002 .0003 .0002 .0003 .0004 .0002 .0002 0007 .0015 0027 1000 0003 .0001 .0001 .0002 0013 .0001 .0001 .0001 0007 .0001 1000 1000 .0002 1000 .0001 of o Ratio .00009 .00008 00000 80000 00007 00000 00000 0000. 0000 0002 0003 0001 .0001 1000 0004 0008 .0001 90000 90000. S .00006 .00006 80000 90000 90000 90000 .00007 00008 .0000 0003 .0001 .0002 .0001 .0001 1000 90000 90000 90000 90000 90000 0000 00000 80000 60000 90000 90000 00007 0002 .0001 .0001 9000 0001 15 55 35 40 45 50 09 65 30 70

(Quality Factor)

Launch

400 0.03 0.0 Level Failure Rate MIL-C-19978 Non-ER MP

> corresponding temperature rise from Figure 6.2-1-b \*Observe ac voltage limits of Figure 6.2-1-a and in determining stresses for table look-up

Charles agreed the angeles and the contraction of t

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR PAPER & PLASTIC FILM CAPACITORS -125°C MAX RATED (MIL-C-39022, Style CHR09 (above 50 volt rated), CHR01, 12, 19, 29 & 59; MIL-C-19978, Style CQ08, 09, 12, 13, 20, 72-characteristic K, CQ06 & 07-characteristic Q, CQR01, 07, 09, 12, 13, 19, 39 & 42) 6.2 - 3FIGURE

 $^{\prime}_{p}=^{\cdot}^{\prime}_{\lambda}$  (  $^{\prime\prime}_{E}$   $\times$   $^{\prime\prime}_{Q}$  )  $\times$  10 $^{-6}$ 

λ<sub>b</sub> (Base Failure Rate)\*

																	L	4								L		
-		1.0	0	05		.0054	.0054	.0055	05	0.5	S	05	.0057	05	90	90	90	0	07	07	30	60	H	,	~	3	.039	ဖ
1 1	4	6.	03	03	.0032	0		.0032		03	3	.0033	203	03	.0035	03	03	0		04	03	05	07	0	H	.015		.039
	Voltage	8.	0	C	Ч	O	01	.0018	10	01	10	10	10	10	02	02	02	7	02	02	02	,0033	03	O	90	80	.013	2
of Operating to Rated	Rated	7.	00	00	.0009	00	00	5000	00	9	00	0	01	.0010	10	01	01	0	01	CJ	10	01	02	02	03	0	~	.011
	ng to	9•	00	00	.0004	0	C	00	8	00	0	.0004	00	.0005	00	0	00	.0005	00	00	00	00	10	0	70		03	
	Operati		$\sim$	00	C	00	0	.0002	00	00	00	.0002	00	00	.0002	.0002	.0002	.0002	.0002	0.	00	.0004	00	00	00	-	0	2
	o of	٠4	00	00	.0001	00	.0001	1000.	00	00	00	.0001	000	0	00	0	00	.0001	00	00	00	.0002	00	00	0	.0005	00	.0013
- 1	, Rati	.3	000	000	.00000	000	.00007	00	000	000	00	C	000	000	000	00	000	60000	000	00	00	00	1000	00	0		.0004	8000.
	S	.2	000	000	00	00	00	90000	000	000	000	00	0	90000	0	90000.	000	.00007	000	000	000	.0001	00	0	00	00	.0004	.0006
		.1	000	000		9000	.00006	000	000	000	0	90000	000	000	0	00	0	00	$\circ$	00	000	.0001	00	0	00	.0002	0	.0006
	E	(၁)	0	ທ	10	15	20	25	30	10	_	45	50	10	0	65	70	75	0	85	06	95	0	105	10	Н	120	125

(Environment Factor)

Ground, Benign Space Flight Ground, Fixed Airborne, Inhabited Naval, Sheltered Ground, Mobile Naval, Unsheltered Airborne, Uninhab. 15 Missile, Launch	Environment	3 11
ace Flight  Jund, Fixed  rborne, Inhabited  val, Sheltered  Jund, Mobile  val, Unsheltered  rborne, Uninhab. 1  ssile, Launch		~
ound, Fixed rborne, Inhabited val, Sheltered ound, Mobile val, Unsheltered rborne, Uninhab. 1	pace Flig	;- <del>1</del>
rborne, Inhabited val, Sheitered ound, Mobile val, Unsheltered rborne, Uninhab. 1	Fixe	~
val, Sheitered Jund, Mobile val, Unsheltered rborne, Uninhab. 1		ব্য
ound, Mobile val, Unsheltered rborne, Uninhab. 1 ssile, Launch	Naval, Sheitered	4
ral, Unsheltered irborne, Uninhab. 1. ssile, Launch 2	, Mobj.l	97
rborne, Uninhab. 1.	Unshel	0)
ssile, Launch 2	rborne,	
	ssile, L	

(Quality Factor)

		-
Failure Rate L	Level	OII
L		1.5
Σ		1.0
Д		0.3
ĸ		1.0
ഗ		0.03
MIL-C-19978		
Non-ER		10.0

\*Observe ac voltage limits of Figure 6.2-1-a and corresponding temperature rise from Figure 6.2-1-b in determining stresses for table look-up. A STANDARD S

MIJ.-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR MICA CAPACITORS (MIL-C-5, Style CM(Molded) and Mil-C-39001, Style CMR(Dipped) FIGURE 6.2-4

aladidikansa tahinga dala, pina antukana appentua dalah salah salah nigalikan dalah dalam pentukan dalah katan

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b} (n_{\rm E} \times n_{\rm Q}) \times 10^{-6}$ 

λ<sub>b</sub> (Base Failure Rate)

(°C;) .1 .2 .3 10 .00004 .00005 .00006 10 .00005 .00007 .00009 15 .00007 .00008 .0001 26 .00002 .0001 .0001 30 .0001 .0001 .0001 30 .0002 .0002 .0002 45 .0003 .0003 .0004 55 .0008 .0005 .0006 65 .0006 .0006 .0007 75 .0008 .0006 .0014 80 .0012 .0018 .0017 90 .0012 .0018 .0020 .0011 100 .0022 .0025 .0031 110 .0034 .0030 .0014	atio of	Operati	ing to	Rated	Vol+20V	ď		
000004 .00005 .00006 5 .00005 .00006 .00007 10 .00005 .00007 .00009 15 .00007 .00008 .0001 25 .0001 .0001 .0001 30 .0001 .0001 .0001 35 .0002 .0002 .0002 45 .0002 .0002 .0004 65 .0006 .0004 .0005 60 .0006 .0007 .0006 65 .0006 .0007 .0006 80 .0010 .0011 .0014 85 .0012 .0013 .0014 85 .0015 .0016 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0031 00 .0022 .0039 .0031	4.	ı	1	ı	1	,		Env
0.00004.00005.00006 10.00006.00007.00009 15.00007.00009 20.00009.00001.0001 30.0001.0001.0001 30.0001.0001.0001 45.0002.0002.0002 46.0002.0002.0003 50.0003.0004.0005 60.0004.0005.0006 60.0006.0007.0006 60.0006.0007.0006 60.0006.0007.0006 60.0006.0007.0006 60.0006.0007.0006 60.0006.0007.0006 60.0006.0007.0006 60.0006.0007.0006 60.0006.0007.0006		.5	9•	7. 1	8.	6.	1.0	ļ
5 .00005 .00006 .00001 10 .00006 .00007 .00001 25 .00002 .0001 .0001 30 .0001 .0001 .0001 40 .0002 .0002 .0002 45 .0003 .0003 .0004 55 .0003 .0004 .0005 60 .0006 .0006 .0007 75 .0008 .0006 .0014 80 .0010 .0011 .0014 85 .0018 .0020 .0031 90 .0022 .0030 .0031 90 .0022 .0030 .0031	000 1 90	00	00	00	00	00	00	Scounce
10 .00006 .00007 .00009 25 .00007 .00008 .0001 25 .0001 .0001 .0001 30 .0001 .0001 .0001 40 .0002 .0002 .0002 45 .0003 .0003 .0004 55 .0003 .0004 .0005 65 .0006 .0006 .0006 65 .0006 .0007 .0009 80 .0010 .0011 .0014 80 .0012 .0018 .0017 80 .0012 .0018 .0017 80 .0012 .0018 .0018 80 .0012 .0018 .0017 80 .0012 .0018 .0017 80 .0018 .0020 .0031 80 .0022 .0030 .0031	0000 1 20	00	00	00	၁	00	00	Space
15.00007.00008.0001 25.00001.0001.0001 30.0001.0001.0001 35.0001.0001.0002 40.0002.0002.0002 50.0003.0004.0005 60.0004.0005.0006 65.0008.0006.0006 65.0008.0006.0007 75.0008.0006.0007 80.0010.0011.0014 85.0012.0013.0017 90.0015.0016.0011	000 60	8	00	00	8	00	01	Ground
25 .00059 .0001 .0001 35 .0001 .0001 .0001 35 .0001 .0001 .0001 40 .0002 .0002 .0002 50 .0003 .0003 .0004 55 .0003 .0004 .0005 60 .0005 .0005 .0006 65 .0006 .0007 .0006 70 .0006 .0007 .0011 80 .0012 .0011 .0014 85 .0012 .0016 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0031 00 .0022 .0035 .0031	1 .000	00	8	000	95	00	10	Alrbor
25 .0001 .0001 .0001 30 .0001 35 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0002 45 .0002 .0002 .0003 .0004 .0003 .0004 .0005 .0006 .0007 .0006 .0007 .0006 .0007 .0006 .0007 .0006 .0007 .0008 .0011 .0014 85 .0012 .0013 .0017 .0018 .0020 .0021 .0033	1 .000	O	0	0	0	0	.0014	Naval
30 .0001 .0001 .0001 35 .0001 .0001 .0002 45 .0002 .0002 .0002 50 .0003 .0003 .0004 65 .0003 .0004 .0005 60 .0004 .0005 .0006 65 .0005 .0006 .0007 75 .0008 .0007 .0009 75 .0018 .0011 .0014 85 .0012 .0013 .0017 95 .0018 .0020 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0031 96 .0027 .0030 .0031	1 1.000	00	00	00	000	5	0	Ground
35 .0001 .0001 .0002 45 .0002 .0002 .0002 50 .0003 .0003 .0004 55 .0003 .0004 .0005 60 .0004 .0005 .0006 65 .0005 .0006 .0007 75 .0008 .0007 .0014 80 .0012 .0013 .0014 85 .0015 .0018 .0020 95 .0018 .0020 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0031 96 .0027 .0030 .0031	1 .000	8	8	00	10	d	02	Naval
40 .0002 .0002 .0002 50 .0003 .0003 .0004 55 .0003 .0004 .0005 60 .0004 .0005 .0006 65 .0005 .0006 .0007 75 .0008 .0009 .0011 80 .0012 .0013 .0017 50 .0015 .0016 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0031 96 .0027 .0030 .0031	2 .000	00	00	01	0	02	002	Alrbor
45.0002.0003 50.0003.0003.0004 60.0004.0005.0006 65.0005.0006.0007 70.0006.0007.0006 75.0008.0009.0011 80.0010.0011.0014 85.0012.0013.0017 95.0018.0020.0021 95.0018.0020.0021 95.0018.0020.0021	2 .000	00	00	10	01	02	03	Missi
50 .0003 .0004 .0004 .0006 .0004 .0005 .0006 .0006 .0006 .0007 .0006 .0007 .0009 .0011 .0014 85 .0012 .0013 .0017 .0018 .0020 .0026 .0022 .0031 .0034	3 .000	00	01	0	02	03	04	
55 .0003 .0004 .0005 60 .0004 .0005 .0006 70 .0006 .0007 .0009 75 .0008 .0007 .0011 80 .0010 .0011 .0014 85 .0012 .0013 .0017 50 .0015 .0016 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0026 00 .0022 .0025 .0031 00 .0027 .0037 .0039	4 .000	00	01	01	02	03	04	
60 .0004 .0005 .0006 65 .0005 .0006 .0007 75 .0008 .0009 .0011 80 .0012 .0011 .0014 85 .0012 .0013 .0017 90 .0015 .0016 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0026 95 .0018 .0020 .0031 96 .0027 .0037 .0031	5 .000	0	01	02	03	04	90	
65.0005.0006.0007 75.0006.0007.0009 80.0016.0011.0014 85.0012.0013.0017 50.0015.0016.0021 95.0018.0020.0026 00.0022.0025.0031 05.0027.0030.0039	000. 9	0	10	02	04	05	007	×, ~
70 .0006 .0007 .0009 80 .0018 .0011 .0011 85 .0012 .0013 .0017 50 .0015 .0016 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0026 00 .0022 .0025 .0031 05 .0027 .0030 .0039	7 [.001	CI	02	03	34	90	60	Failur
75 .0008 .0009 .0011 80 .0015 .0011 .0014 85 .0012 .0013 .0017 50 .0015 .0016 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0026 00 .0022 .0025 .0031 05 .0027 .0030 .0039	9 (.001	0	02	04	90	08	H	
80 .0016 .0011 .0014 85 .0012 .0013 .0017 50 .0015 .0016 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0026 00 .0022 .0025 .0031 05 .0027 .0030 .0039	1001	02	03	0.5	07	Н	Н	
85 .0012 .0013 .0017 \$0 .0015 .0016 .0021 95 .0018 .0020 .0026 00 .0022 .0025 .0031 05 .0027 .0030 .0039 10 .0034 .0037 .0047	4 (.002	07	40	90	60	Н	ri.	
\$0.0015.0016.0021 95.0018.0020.0026 00.0022.0025.0031 05.0027.0030.0039 10.0034.0037.0047	7  .002	03	05	0,7	~	Н	2	
95.0018.0020.0026 00.0022.0025.0031 05.0027.0030.0039 10.0034.0037.0047	1 6003	04	90	9	-	М	N	
00 .0022 .0025 .0031 05 .0027 .0030 .0039 10 .0034 .0037 .6047	6 .003	05	08	7	-4	S	3	MILL MILL MILL MILL MILL MILL MILL MILL
05 .0027 .0030 .003 10 .0034 .0037 .504	1 .00	9900.	8600	.014	.020	.027	.037	
10 .0034 .0037 .504	9 (.005	08	Н	-	~	ന	.045	
	7  .006	60	7	2	ന	4	S	
15 .0041 .0046 .005	8 .008	H	Н	2	ന	S	ø	
20 .0050 .0056 .007	1 .01	Н	2	m	4	9	8	
25 1.0062 1.0068 1.008	7 1.0	-	2	.038	S		.10	

Factor)	HE		-	4	-	9	9	14	24	20
	nt	ub	,	ന	Inhabited	ered	Je	ltered	inhab.	400
(Environmental	Environment	, Benign	Flight	14	_	Sheltere	Mobi	Unshel	ie, Uni	Cutte.T.
П <sub>Е</sub> (Envi	Envi	Ground	Space I	$\boldsymbol{\sigma}$	Airborne	Naval,	Ground,	Naval,	Airborne,	Micail

r)	O <sub>II</sub>	1.0	0.3	0.1	0.03	0
II (Juality Factor	Failure Rate Level	M	ρι	æ	ശ	MTTC-5 (molded)

FIGURE 6.2-5

MIL-HDBK-217E OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR BUTTON MICA CAPACITORS (MIL-C-10950, Style CB)

 $^{\lambda}_{\rm p}$  =  $^{\lambda}_{\rm b}$  (  $^{\Pi}_{\rm E}$  X  $^{\Pi}_{\rm Q}$  ) X  $^{10}^{-6}$ 

 $\lambda_{\rm b}$  (Base Failure Rate)

	r	-	-	7-	_	<u>.</u>	_	_	_		<b>,</b>	-
			0	1220	ì	7/57			α	.2195	1590	1000
			ο.	2060	100	2	1227	-	֓֞֞֜֜֝֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֡֓֓֓֡֓֡֓֓֓֓֡֓֡֓֡֓֡	.1636	1361	, (
	+200	25.22	8	0724	070	h .	.0891			mi	.1424	7.
	ed Volta		•	.0512	0563	, ,	.0630	0719	1 0	0500	1001	1242
	to Rate	١	?	.0352	0.387	,	4.	.0495	u	0/50	Š	.0855
	ating	,	1	7	1.0261	C	ני ו	.0334	C	) I<	7040.	.0577
14	or Operat	7		TOTO	[. 0.177	0.0	١ (	1.0226	.0264	C	/ TCO:	39
1	Nacio o	۳. -	7,70	4 (	9776	.0141	, ,	Ω	<u>~</u> !	0225	1 (	17
U	1	.2	1000	1000	2	1.0111	5		14	1	0 0 0 0	7777
		7.	.0082	0000	7	10101	נכ	74.0	. U. 34	1910.	O	
£	0	3	30	40	) (	20	90	7 (	?	80	0	

 $\Pi_{Q}$  (Quality Factor)

O <sub>H</sub>	1.0 5.0
Quality Level	Upper Mil-Spec Lower

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

_			
Factor)	E E	14 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	30
IE (Environmental Fa	Environment	Ground, Benign Space Flight Ground, Fixed Airborne, Inhabited Naval, Sheltered Ground, Mobile Naval, Unsheltered	14

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR GLASS CAPACITORS (MIL-C-23269, Style CYR) FIGURE 6.2-6

والمنافقة المنافقة والمنافئة والمنافئة والمنافئة والمنافئة والمنافئة والمنافئة والمنافئة والمنافئة والمنافظة والمنافظة والمنافئة والمنافظة والمناف

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm CV} \times \pi_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ 

(Base Failure Rate)

1 ncv i

 $\pi_{ extsf{CV}}$  (Capacitance Factor)

92100 00086

240 360 470 560 880 820

L			,							[د	3	
	S	Ratio	OI OD	era	g to K	area v	70			.다 ()	tance	Value in
•		۳.	7.	S.	%	۲.	•	<u>ئ</u>	1	CY1	0	CY15
00	000.	00	00	00	00	00	7	02	03	5 to	H	1
00	000	00	000	00	00	C	0	0	04	12	~	20 to
00	000	00	00	00	00	01	2	03	04	2		70 to
00	000.	00	00	000	01	0	02	0	0	33 to	m	390 to 4
00	.000	00	00	000	0	02	03	04	6	(1)	4	10 to
00	000	00	00	100	TO	02	03	90	08	-	10	20 to
00	.000	00	00	01	01	03	10	07	Н	) C		50 to
00	.000	00	덩	001	02	03	05	99	Н	9	200	910
00	0	0	0	00	0	0	0		910.	) C	300	
0	001	01	5	002	03	0.5	80	႕	러	ł		CY30
に	.001	5	02	02	04	90			7	+ 09	68	
001	00.	01	02	003	05	08	$\mathbf{H}$	2	2	5 5 5 7 7	000	
02	.002	02	003	004	90	,- <del>-</del>	$\boldsymbol{\vdash}$	$\sim$	က	) =	300	600 to
02	.002	02	03	002	08	Н	႕	က	4	500 0	180	4700 to 5
03	.003	003	04	900	60	01	02	3	വ	000	360	200
03	.004	004	05	07		01	2	4	9	3900 ±0	5100	) ) )
04	.004	05	90	0	1	05	3	S	ထ			
05	.006	90	08	H	Н	2	Ś	9	Œ.	II	_	<b>Environmental</b>
07	,007	08	$\vdash$	Н	$^{\circ}$	03	S	œ	1.12	4 <u>L</u>		
.008	.009	009	.012	.017	.026	.042	.066	.10	.14	-	Env	Environment
7	-	-		?	3	2	α		.18	15	und	, Ben
Н	~	Н	H	~	4	9	g		.22	0,	Space	Fligh
Ч	Н	Н	3	က	4	1	.12		.27	<u>~</u>	Ground	Fiy
Н	3	2	2	C	S	σ	.14		.33		8	. e
€.	2	~	3	4	~		.18		1.40		Navai,	She
2	ന	ന	ヸ	S	σ		. 22		.49		Ground	MOY.

0001 4080

1000 to 1200 CY30

2.0

10000

4300 5600

E (Environmental Fac	ractor)
Environment	티
Ground, Benign	7
Space Flight	7
Ground, Fixed	4
Airborne, Inhabited	9
Navai, Sheltered	9
Ground, Mobile	9
S	14
rborn	24
Missile, Launch	30

0.00 0.3 0.03 MQ (Quality Factor) Level Failure Rate 上MPRS THE SECTIONS OF THE PROPERTY O

FIGURE 6.2-7

( )

MIL-HDRK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR CERAMIC (General Purpose) CAPACITORS - 85°C MAX RATED (MIL-C-11015, 'A' rated temperature; MIL-C-39014, Style CKR13, 48, 64, 72)

 $^{\lambda}_{\rm p}=^{\lambda}_{\rm b}$  (  $^{\rm n_E}_{\rm E}$  x  $^{\rm n_Q}_{\rm Q}$  ) x  $^{\rm 10}^{-6}$ 

 $\lambda_b$  (Base Failure Rate)

	1.0	1	1	0.7	. ~	0.7		07	80	$\alpha$	80	ılα	80	80	08	8	Įα		.092
1+age	9	ln )	ហ	0.5	0.5	0.5	.057	05	.058	0.5	90	) VO	90	90	90	9	Ю		.067
ed Vo			3	03	03	04		04		04	04	040	04	04	045	4		4	048
o Rat	.7	N	N	02	02	N	.028	N	~	C	02	03	03	3	.031	m	im	m	m
ing t	9	.017	П	~	М	Н	0	м	$\vdash$	~	$\vdash$	Н	N	~	N	2	1	.021	.021
Operat	•	7	Н	М	Н	.011		H	. :	$\overline{}$		-	-	rd	.012	-4	7		.013
o jo o	1	90	90	9900.	90	.0068	0	9	07	7	1.	07	07	07	.0077	07	07	0800.	0081
Rati	.3	03	S	03	0	.0040	4	04	.0042	4	43	043	44	45	.0045		47	47	
S,	.2		07	2	.0025	.0026		2	~		2	0	7	02	.0029	.0030	03	.0030	
	.1		07		02		0	02	02	022	22	022	2	0.2	07	.0024		24	
Ţ	(၁၇)	0	2	10	15	20	25	30	32	40	45	50	2	09	65	2	75		85

 $\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$  (Environmental Factor)

	E ≡
ש	-1
Space Flight	7
Ground, Fixed	7
Airborne, Inhabited	4
Naval, Sheltered	4
Ground, Mobile	4
Naval, Unsheltered	8
Airborne, Uninhab.	10
Missile, Launch	15

Ilog (Quality Factor)

Failure Rate Level	II.
1	1.5
×	1.0
Ą	0.3
ĸ	•
ี่	0.03
MIL-C-11015	10.01

FOR CERAMIC (General Purpose) - 125°C MAX RATED (MIL-C-11015, 'B' Rated Temperature and MIL-C-39014, Styles CKR05-12, 14-16, 17-19, 73 & 74) MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FIGURE 6.2-8

The state of the contraction of the state of

THE PARTY OF THE P

 $^{\lambda}_{\rm p} = ^{\lambda}_{\rm b}$  (  $^{\Pi_{\rm E}}$  X  $^{\Pi}_{\rm Q}$  ) X 10 $^{-6}$ 

(Base Failure Rate)

	TUATEOUMENT	Ground, Benign	ht	Ground, Fixed	Airborne, Inhabited	Naval, Sheltered .	Ground, Mobile	Naval, Unsheltered	
	1.0	190	.068	890.	690.	.070	.071		•
מלכ	6.	.049	.050	.050	.051	.052	.052	.053	•
AOT TOA	8.	.035	.035	.035	.036	.037	.037	.038	
משכוש	.7	.024	.024	.024	.025	.025	.025	.026	•
5	9	510.	.016	910.	,016	.016	910.	.017	•
-						_			

ł			
ı			
L			
ı			
ı			
ı			
l			
ľ			
l			
ı			
ı			
l			
ļ			
ľ			
l			
l			
ŀ			
١			
ı			
1			

or)	ПО	1.5	1.0	0.3	0.1	0.03	10.0
<pre>IQ (Quality Factor)</pre>	Failure Rate Level	Ţ	. Σ	Д	<b>K</b>	ഗ	MIL-C-1.1015

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

tor)		三 三	-	7	2	VI.	4	4	ထ		15	1			_	:	"O	٠	1.0	•	•	0.03	10.0					
$^{ m II}_{ m E}$ (Environmental Factor		Environment	177	light	_	Airborne, Inhabited	Naval, Sheltered .	Ground, Mobile	Naval, Unsheltered	Airborne, Uninhab.	Missile, Launch				$\mathbb{I}_{O}$ (Quality Factor)		railure kate revei	Г	. Σ	Д	e e		MIL-C-11015					
		1.0	9	9	S	S	.070	.071	~	~	~	.075	7	~	.078	~	.080	œ	.082	$\infty$		8	980	သ	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$	.089	Ō	.092
	age	6.	4		S	S	.052		Ľ,	S		.055	950	S	.057	S	ın		Q	ø	Ø	9		9	9	9	990.	
	Volt	ω.		.035	ന	.036	.037	.037	m	ന	.039	.039	.040	4	.041	4	.042	Ť	.043	4		.044	.045	4	4		4	.048
Kate	Rated	.7	2		~		.025	7	2	2	2	.027	.027	.027	.028		.023	7	.029	.029	.030	.030		.031			.032	.033
Fallure	ng to		7		Н	,016	.016		Н	H	Н	.017	.018	Н	.018		.018	7	Н		.019	.020	7	.020	S	.021		.021
(Base Fa	ati	5	0		.010		.010		Н	Н		.011	.011	Н	.011	.011	.011		H	М		.012		.012	.013	.013	Н	.013
1	of Oper	. 4	900	900	900	900	.0062	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	8	007	07	007	007	0	07	07	07	07	0	0	0
	Ratio	.3	03	003	003	003	.0037	003	003	003	003	003	004	004	04	004	004	04	04	004	04	004	004	04	04	004	04	904
	S,	.2	02	007	02	002	00	02	002	02	002	002	02	902	02	002	002	002	002	002	002	002	002	02	03	03	03	
		1'	01	01	10	01	.0019	01	0019	020	0020	00200	0020	0021	0021	0021	0021	022	0022	0022	0022	023	623	02	02	02	02	8
		(၁၇)	0	ις.			20																0	0	H	H		~

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR CERAMIC (General Purpose) - 150°C MAX RATED (MIL-C-11015, 'C' RATED TEMPERATURE) FIGURE 6.2-9

是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人,我们是一个人

 $\gamma_{\rm p} = \gamma_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ 

, (Base Failure Rate)

	•	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	~	-	~	1	7	5-	~	7	1	~	~	~	8	1801	$\infty$	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$	8	8	œ	œ	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$	σ	9
qe	6.	4	4	4	4	4	2	S	5	S	05	05	S	05	S	05	05	S	05	05	05	090	ဖ	ဖ	9	9	9	9	ဖ	9	9	9
Volta	.8	S.	n	ന	ന	3	3	ຠ	က	n	ന	3	ന	03	03	03	04	04	4	4	04	.042	04	4	4	04	4	4.	4	4	4	4
ted		7	2	CI	N	(1)	2	2	2	~	2	7	2	~	~	~	2	~	2	2	2	.029	3	m	m	3	3	m	3	က	က	က
to Ra		H	~	H	М		7	М	Н		-	-	Ч	-	Н	0	2	-	Н	10	10	.019	Н	0	2	2	7	2	~	2	2	
rating		0	60	9	60	$\boldsymbol{\vdash}$	-	Н	$\boldsymbol{\vdash}$	$\vdash$	<b>FH</b>		Н	Н	щ	-		Н	H	11	11	.012	H	Н	Н		7		Ч	Н	H	-1
of Ope		05	05	0.5	05	05	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	90	900	90	90	007	07	.0072	07	0,	07	07	07	07	07	07	80	80
Ratio		03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	S	03	04	04	04	04	004	004	.0042	04	04	04	04	04	04	04	04	04	04
S,	•	02	05	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	0	02	20	02	002	002	02	002	02	.0027	07	02	02	02	02	07	03	03	03	03
	Ţ	10	01	0	10	0	01	001	100	01	10	100	002	02	002	002	02	002	02	002	002	.0022	02	002	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	02
	(၁၇)	0	ഗ																			100	0	Н	Н	2		m	က	4	4	S

WIND ROUR LEAGURAL STORM AND COLORS OF STREET AND STORM AND STORM

<pre>  Environmental Factor)</pre>	cor)
Environment	IIE
_	Н
ı	<b>н</b>
Ground, Fixed	7
Airborne, Inhabited	4
Naval, Sheltered	4
Ground, Mobile	4
Naval, Unsheltered	8
Airborne, Uninhab.	10
Missile, Launch	15

r)	OH	1.5	7.0	0.3	0.1	0.03	0.01
$^{ m II}_{ m Q}$ (Quality Factor)	Failure Rate Level	1	×	ρ,	<b>~</b>	ഗ	MIT LOUIS

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR CERAMIC, TEMPERATURE COMPENSATING CAPACITORS (MIL-C-20, Style CC) FIGURE 6.2-10

$$\gamma_{\rm p}=\gamma_{\rm b}$$
 (  $\pi_{\rm E} \propto \pi_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ 

λ<sub>b</sub> (Base Failure Rate)

T.			S	Ratio o	f Opera	ting to	Rated	Voltage		
(၁၅)	.1	•	.3	. 4	5.	9•	.7	•	6	•
0		007	010	018	30	048	14	0	151	<u> 208</u>
ນ		008	013	22	37	059	90	13	185	252
35		010	910	27	45	0072	110	9	226	307
40		012	019	33	55	088	135	13	76	375
45	.00125	.00156	.00241	.00407	.03680	.01086	.01654	.02410	.03380	.04591
20		019	029	049	83	132	202	29	412	260
55		023	036	9	10	162	246	35	504	684
09		0028	044	074	23	197	301	43	615	836
65		0034	053	060	51	241	368	53	752	021
70		042	065	110	84	295	449	65	H	248
75		052	080	135	25	360	549	80	1122	1524
80		063	097	65	75	440	670	97	370	861
85		0077	119	201	36	538	819	19	674	274
90		0094	146	246	H	657	000	45	044	777
95		0115	178	300	02	802	222	78	497	392
100		141	217	367	13	80	492	17	050	143

 $\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$  (Environmental Factor)

Environment	田田田
<b>.</b>	Ľ
딢	~
Ground, Fixed	4
Airborne, Inhabited	9
Naval, Sheltered	9
Ground, Mobile	9
Naval, Unsheltered	18
Airborne, Uninhab.	24
Missile, Launch	30

$\widehat{\mathbf{G}}$		
Factor	ο <sub>II</sub>	1.0 5.0 15.0
Quality	Quality Level	Upper . il-Spec Lower
=		

RATE MODEL CAPACITORS FAILURE (Solid) MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FOR TANTALUM ELECTROLYTIC (MIL-C-39003, Style CSR) FIGURE 6.2-11

i

$$\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b} ( \pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm SR} \times \pi_{\rm Q}) \times 10^{-6}$$

t			
•			

I. (Environmental Factor)	Prist's common t		'( )	Tight.	red	rne, Inhabited	Sheltered	d, Mobile	nsheltered	rborne, Uninhab. 1				"SR (series Resistance Factor)	ircuit Resistance	ع		0.0	7.0	2.0	8.0	0.6	2.0	2. 2.	·			Factor)	Level II <sub>O</sub>
	ſ	1.0		S	.056		0	090	.062	90	.067	07	-	.078	œ	S	9	10	12	.13	1	\						(Quality Factor	Rate
	ge	6.		4	.041	.042	.043		4	04	.050	05	05	.058	9	9	0		.089	01.	.12	.13	.16	\	<b>\</b>			ت ا0	Failure
	Voltage	8.			. v 30	.031	.031	.032			3	03		4	4	4	05			.073	.084		.12	.14	71.				Fa
(e)	Rated	.7	.020		.021	.021	.022	.023		.024	N	02	2		m	.034	m	.041	.046	.051	.059	690.	180	.097	.12	.15	.19		
ure Rate	ş	9	-014	014	.014	.015	.015	.015	.016	.016	.017	.018	1—	.020	$\sim$	.023	2	.028	.031	.035	.041	.047		.067	.082	.10		.18	
Failur	rat	.5	9600	8	0	0	-	10	М	10	0	$\boldsymbol{\vdash}$	0	$\vdash$	2	10	10	10	~	07	~	3	3	4	S	~	σ	.12	
(Base	of Ope	4.	.0065	90	90	90	007	07	07	007	008	008	80	60	Н	0	01	Н	Н	Н	4	2	7	S	C	4	90	$\infty$	
qγ	Ratic	.3	.0046	9.	04	04	05	005	05	05	005	90	900	90	07	07	08	600	Н	Н	Н	0	-1	~	N	m	4	9	
	S,	.2	.0036	003	003	003	003	004	004	004	004	004	05	305	005	900	900	07	008	600	덩	0	7	5	2	02	03	8	
		.1	.0033	5500	0034	035	0035	980	038	0039	041	042	045	0048	0051	055	060	990	073	0082	095	11	13	16	19	24	31	41	
		(3)	Oi	n (	01 -	15	20	25	30	32	40	45	20	55	09	65	70	7.5	80	82	06	9	0	0	110	ᅥ	2	2	

مهما والمعاول المعاول وكالمارة والمارة والمارة والمارة والمارة والمارة والمارة والمارة والمارة والمارة والمارة

1.0 0.3 0.1 0.0

これなれる

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR TANTALUM ELECTROLYTIC (Non-Solid) CAPACITORS (MIL-C-39006, Style CLR and MIL-C-3965, Style 'L) FIGURE 6.2-12

$$\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b} (n_{\rm E} \times n_{\rm Q}) \times 16^{-6}$$

λ<sub>h</sub> (Base Failure Rate)

		• [	9	1	~	7	~	6	07	08	œ	ω	S	0	0	.115	2	m		~		\	V					
020		٠Į٤	Ç	05	S	05	05	S	05	90	9	90	<b> </b>	7	07	.085	9	0	$\vdash$	(1		7	0	\	\			
+107	4 .	-10	~	m	3	m	4	4	4	4	4	4	S	ហ	S	9	Q	1	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$	Q	0	N	.145	~	$\vdash$	\	\	
Da+od	1	-[4	7	2	2	~	2	~	က	3	n	m	m	$^{\circ}$	4		4	S	ເດ	9	~	œ	103	2		g	4	
4	ľ	٠ŀ	-	Н	Н	H	7	(2)	2	3	2	7	2	2	~	n	ന	m	4	4	S	9	.071	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$	0	B	9	2
ratin	1	٠ŀ	-	Н	Н	Н			Н	Н	Ч	$\dashv$	-	Н	Н	~	2	2	~	m	က	4	.048	S	~	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$	Н	2
) L	1	٠k	$\mathbf{\mathcal{I}}$	0	0	0	0	00	00	М	-1	-	<b>-</b> :	Н	Н	$\boldsymbol{\vdash}$	Н	-	Н	N	~	~	032	m	4	9	7	0
4.10		:k	S S	90	90	90	90	90	90	007	07	07	08	08	9	9	10	11	13	14	16	9	.0230	27	33	42	54	72
S		: ;	7 50	047	048	049	020	052	053	055	058	090	064	1900	072	078	084	660	10	116	133	15	0182	27	56	33	43	57
	-	!}	750	043	044	044	04	047	048	020	052	05	057	061	065	020	07	084	093	10	120	13	0164	19	24	30	33	51
E	(0)		> ·															5					100	0		H	N	2

The state of the second of the

IE (Environmental Factor)

Environment	I E
Ground, Benign	T
Space Flight	٦
Ground, Fixed	7
Airborne, Inhabited	9
Naval, Sheltered	9
Ground, Mobile	છ
Naval, Unsheltered	14
Airborne, Uninhab.	20
Missile, Launch	30

 $\pi_{Q}$  (Quality Factor)

Failure Rate Level	O <sub>II</sub>
J	1.5
E	1.0
Α,	0.3
ĸ	0.1
ຜ	0.03
MTT,-C-3965	10.0

6.2-13 MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL (MIL-C-39018, Style CU (Aluminum Oxide)) FOR ALUMINUM ELECTROLYTIC CAPACITORS FIGURE

$$^{\lambda}_{p} = ^{\lambda}_{b} (^{\Pi}_{E} \times ^{\Pi}_{Q}) \times ^{10}^{-6}$$

λ<sub>h</sub> (Base Failure Rate)

		1.0	9	Ō	1	$\infty$		S										.40			1	\						
	tage.	6.		S	Ŋ	Ģ	9	r-	œ	9								.30						\				
	ed Vo]	8.		က	4	4	K!	S	9	9	7	œ						.22								\		
	o Rat	.7	7	2	ന	3		4	4	S	S	9	-	8	σ			.16								1.0	\	\
	ating t	9.		(1	~	2	2	3	3	S	4	4	വ	9	~	$\infty$		.12									7.0	1.4
	Opera	5.		Н	H	H	-	7	2	2	S	സ	m	4	S	9	~	680.										0"
Q	io of	<b>p</b> •		H	Н	$\boldsymbol{\vdash}$	$\boldsymbol{H}$	-	$\vdash$	2	2	2	N	$\omega$	4	4	S	290.	œ									
	, Rat	.3	9800	60	7	Н	Н	H	Н	$\vdash$	Н	N	2	2	E	3	4	.054	9	$\infty$	9	.12	.15	.20	.26	.35	.47	29
	S	. 2	007	08	0	60	01	01	5	Н	Н	Н	2	02	2	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$	m	04	05	7	08	.10	.13	Н	.23	.31	.41	.57
		.1	10	07	0	60	H		$\vdash$	щ	$\vdash$	$\vdash$		2	2	$\omega$	3	.044	S	9	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$							
		(၁)	0	'n	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	09	65	70	7.5	80	85	90	95	0	0	Н	115	3	0

Ground, Fixed Airborne, Inhabited Naval, Sheltered Environment Ground, Benign Space Flight

Naval, Unsheltered Airborne, Uninhab

Ground, Mobile

Missile, Launch

(Environmental Factor)

Factor	O H	1.0 3.0 10.0
No Quality P	Quality Level	Upper Mil-Spec Lower

THE METERS AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF

6.2-14 MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR ALUMINUM DRY ELECTROLYTIC CAPACITORS (MIL-C-62) FIGURE

THE PARTY OF THE P

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm Q}$  )  $\times 10^{-6}$ 

 $\lambda_{\mathbf{b}}$  (Base Failure Rate)

·					2						
	E-1			S	Ratio	of Ope	f Operating	to	Rated Vo	Voltage	
	(c)	.1	.2	.3	₹.	.5	9•	.7	8•	6.	1.0
	0	~	10	11	.0133	യ	22	62	39	<u>21</u>	<u>6</u> 3
	ស		11	12	.0146	മ	4	.0322	2	56	73
	10	-1	12	13	.0161	$\mathbf{c}$	26	35	47	62	81
	15	$\sim$	13	ın	.0180	$\sim$	29	33	.0531	0	$\mathbf{H}$
	20	₹#	10	17	.0204	ഥ	ന	5	09	79	03
	25	i:o	17	19	.0232	iO.	38	27	89	90	17
	30	$\boldsymbol{\sigma}$	20	22	.0268	ന	44	59	78	04	35
	35	N	23	26	.0313	O	51	59	92	21	58
	40	S	28	31	.0370	w	61	8	80	43	37
	45	.0322	.0336	.0372	.0444	.0561	.0736	.0981	.1306	.1724	.2246
	50	ion	5	45	.0540	i co	8	67	58	60	73
	55	$\alpha$	50	55	9990	4	0	47	96	59	37
	09	0	m	70	837	n	38	85	46	25	23
	65	~	80	89	.1069	ഥ	77	36	14	15	41
	70	-	05	16	.1392	യ	31	07	9	40	04
	75	S.	39	55	.1847	m	90	80	43	17	35
	80	پے	89	10	.2505	യ	15	S)	.736	72	.266
	85	_	62	90	34	Œ	575	99	020	46	54

II. (Environmental Factor)

	Ŀ
PII/TI Olimelle	Ξ
Ground, Benign	7
pace Flight	H
ixed	~
Inhabited	12
eltered	12
Tobile	12
sheltered	20
Uninhab.	30
Launch	40

**这种,我们是我们是我们的,我们是不是一个,我们是一个,** 

Factor)	O <sub>II</sub>	1.0 3.0 10.0
<pre>IQ (Quality</pre>	Quality Lével	Upper Mil-Spec Lower

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR VARIABLE CERAMIC CAPACITOR (MIL-C-81) FIGURE 6.2-15

 $^{\lambda}_{\rm p} = ^{\lambda}_{\rm b} (^{\Pi_{\rm E}}_{\rm x} \times ^{\Pi_{\rm Q}}_{\rm o}) \times 10^{-6}$ 

 $\lambda_{b}$  (Base Failure Rate)

E+ (				S, Ra	atio of	Oper	ating to	Rated	Voltage	0.
(၁၅)	.1	.2	• 3	. 4	• 5	9•	.7	8.	6.	1.0
25	.0023	9	3	27	20	98	36	2	87	93
30	02	05	3	28	53	90	42	М	8	디
35			.0138	g	56	ഗ	50	3	17	34
40	.0027	05	4	31	60	0	59	~	37	61
45	.0029	.0064	.0157	34	54	09	71	4	62	95
20	03	90	_ `	36	59	18	98	o	92	37
52	.0035	9200.	.0188	40	9/	σ	04	₹.	31	91
09	03	$\infty$	_	S	35	44	28	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$	81	58
65	.0044	9600.	$\omega$	51	96	(1)	58	3	44	45
70	.0051	.0110	.0273	.0589	.1111	.1889	.2975	.4420	.6276	.8593
75	05	C	2	6	30	22	49	S)	38	.010
80	.0072	15	8		57	67	20	25	87	15
.85	0	.0193	.0476	.1029	93	ΟJ	13		1.0954	.499
90	$\vdash$	24	0	0	9	18	59	79	9	.904
95	.0147	2	9		22	48	64	83	.822	95
100	9		-	~	œ	45	1.1734	4	5	.389

Factor)	田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田田	7
Environmental	Environment	Benign
(Envi	Envir	Ground,
$\pi_{\overline{\mathbf{E}}}$		Gr

or)	α	000
Factor	ш	1.20.
(Quality	.ty	Spec Spec
(Qua	Qual i Leve]	Upper Mil-S Lower
OH		

are the control of th

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR VARIABLE, PISTON TYPE (Tubular Trimmer) CAPACITOR (MIL-C-14409) FIGURE 6.2-16

 $^{\lambda}_{\rm p}=^{\lambda}_{\rm b}$  (  $^{\Pi}_{\rm E}$  X  $^{\Pi}_{\rm Q}$  ) X  $^{10}^{-6}$ 

 $\lambda_{b}$  (Base Failure Rate)

,	<b>-</b> ,	~		-	-				_		_	_	_		<b>.</b>		_	-
	•	000	) t	T) O	49	0.15		-10	700.	519	) r	77	• 6I9	254	0 4 7		.465	R ROA
+300	270	:10	4 C	$\Sigma$	5	0	אורט מורט	10770-1	*/0.	.860	7 L	7	.41I	618	253	3 1	.466	1 462
-	α	"	7 C	י ע	9	37	0 .	V V 8 0	r 0	332	ROA	* *	. 443	.308	100	•	.064	, 21
d to Ra	-	6 V I	100	. 404	.274	.371	502	8089	•	.921	1.248		T.08%	2.287	3.097	70 5	4 • T 7 4	5.678
peratin	9	6	, ~	ר כ כ	χ α	46	34	4526	) (	7	29		777	.521	59	100	00/	.775
o of o	5	6	υ α	) ( ) r	9	57	13	. 2891	) (	5	30	י ר	<b>.</b>	Z	15	701	10/	411
S, Rati	4	39	T.	1 (	7	97	32	1795		4.	53	7	֓֞֜֝֜֜֜֝֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֓֡֓֓֓֡֓֓֓֓֓֡֓֓֡֓֡֓֡֓֡֓	03	S	שטנ		763.
	.3	24	5	שו דו	יי מי	5	83	.1131	L	n n	07	2	) (	သူ	14	9	) (	43
	.2	6	23	5	٦ ;	43	58	~		9	44	76	' L	ဂ္ဂ	50	36	) (	α
	.1	7	Н	20	יי פיי	Ø	49	.0664	0	ָ ס	$\mathbf{H}$	64	٠,	2	.3019	$\infty$		. 2235
H	(၁)	30	40	r C	2	0 0	70	80	3	9 6	007	110	000	750	130	140	0	0077

 $\pi_{\mathbf{E}}$  (Environmental Factor)

Environment Ground, Benign	E
Space Flight Ground, Fixed	ч.
Airborne, Inhabited Naval. Sheltered	о с П г
Ground, Mobile	• •
Naval, Unsheltered	•
cborne, Uninhab.	•
issile, Launch	12.0

This with the state of the second of the transfer of the transfer of the transfer of the transfer of the second of

 $\Pi_{\mathbb{Q}}$  (Quality Factor)

O <sub>H</sub>	3.0	10.01
Quality Level	Upper Mil-Spec	Lower

TABLE 6.2-2 CAPACITOR BASE FAILURE RATE  $(\lambda_b)$  FACTORS

Style	MIL-C- SPEC	A .	В	т	G	N <sub>S</sub>	Н	FIGURE NOS.
СВ	10950	8.9(10)-4	1	358	1	.3	3	6.2-5
сс	20	3.6(10) <sup>-9</sup>	1	25	1	.3	3	6.2-10
CE	62	$4.2(10)^{-3}$	1	282	5.9	.55	3	6.2-14
CHR	39022	5.5(10) <sup>-5</sup>	2.5	358	1.8	. 4	5	6.2-2
CHR	39022	5.5(10) <sup>-5</sup>	2.5	398	18	.4	5	6.2-3
CK	11015 Max Rated T=85°C	8.9(10)-4	1	358	1	• 3	3	6.2-7
	Max Rated T=125°C	8.9(10)-4		398	1	.3	3	6.2-8
	Max Rated T=150°C	8.9(10)-4	1	423	1	.3	3	6.2-9
CKR	39014	See Styl	e CK.					
CL	3965	$3.8(10)^{-3}$	1	358	9	.4	3	5.2-12
CLR	39006	See Styl	e CL.					
СМ	5	$6.9(10)^{-10}$	16	398	1	.4	3	6.2-4
CMR	39001	6.9(10)-10	16	398	1	.4	3	6.2-4
CPV	14157	5.5(10)-5	2.5	338	18	. 4	5	6.2-1
CPV	14157	5.5(10) <sup>-5</sup>	2.5	358	18	.4	5	6.2-2
CPV	14157	5.5(10) <sup>-5</sup>	2.5	398	18	.4	5	6.2-3
CQ & CQR	19978	See Styl	e CPV.					
CSR	39003	3(10)-3	1	358	9	,4	3	6.2-11
CU	39018	3.3(10) <sup>-3</sup>	3	358	5	.5	3	6.2-13
cv	81	1.5(10)-3	1	342	10.1	.17	3	6.2-15
CYR	23269	·3.3(10) <sup>-9</sup>	16	398	1	.5	4	6.2-6
PC	14409	1.46(10)-6	1	33	1	.33	3	6.2-16

# 6.3 Operational/Non-Cperational Failure Rate Comparison

Table 6.3-1 presents the operational failure rates and the operating to non-operating failure rate ratio. The operating failure rates were calculated using the MIL-HDBK-217B prediction models assuming the following factors:

For paper, mica, glass and ceramic capacitors, a voltage derating of 50 percent was assumed for a quality level 'M' part at 25°C.

For tantalum capacitors, a 50 percent voltage derating was assumed for a quality level 'M' part with ^.1 ohms per volt circuit resistance.

For aluminum electrolytic capacitors, a voltage derating of 50 percent for an upper quality level part was assumed.

For variable piston type capacitors, a 50 percent voltage derating was assumed for an upper quality level part at 25°C.

The comparison between operational and non-operational shows a higher failure rate in storage for paper and plastic capacitors.

Missile launch ratios were obtained directly from MIL-HDBK-217B.

CAPACITOR OPERATING AND NON-OPERATING FACTORS TABLE 6.3-1.

	DEVICE CATEGORY CAPACITORS	NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATE × 10-9	GROUND, FIXED, OPERATING FAILURE RATE x 10-9	G.FOPERATING TO NON-OPERATING RATIO	MISSILE LAUNCH TO G.FOPER- ATING RATIO
	Paper & Plastic	3.0	4.	r.	10
	Mica	.97	1.2	1.2	7.5
	Glass	0.8	4.0	S	7.5
	Ceramic	0.3	20.0	67	7.5
	Electrolytic				•
	Tantalum Solid	.25	20.0	080	10
6.	Tantalum Non-Solid	9.3	28.0	, m	15
3-	Aluminum Oxide	7.0	42.0	9	20
2	Variable .	11.9	63.5	9	40

#### 7.0 Inductive Devices

This section contains reliability analyses on inductive devices. Information has been collected and analyzed for the following types of devices: coils, filters and transformers.

#### 7.1 Storage Reliability Analysis

#### 7.1.1 Non-Operational Failure Rate Predictions

The non-operational failure rates for the three types of components analyzed are shown in Table 7.1-1. The available storage data on filters did not report a single failure. The failure rate shown assumes one failure and therefore it is a worst case failure rate. No difference was apparent in the data between MIL-STD and Hi-Rel coils.

TABLE 7.1-1. INDUCTIVE DEVICES NON-OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATES

Device	$\frac{\texttt{MIL-STD}}{\lambda \text{ in FITS}}$	HI-REL $\lambda$ in FITS
Filters & Chokes	9.6	.99
Coils & Inductors	1.3	.94
Transformers	13.9	.99

#### 7.1.2 Non-Operational Failure Rate Data

Information on inductive devices represents data from three sources with a total of over seven billion hours of storage for inductive devices. The breakdown of storage hours and failures for each device is shown in Table 7.1-2. Information as to the specific type of each device and quality levels is broken out by source in Tables 7.1-3, 7.1-4, and 7.1-5.

TABLE 7.1-2. SUMMARY OF INDUCTOR NON-OPERATING DATA

	: ! !	MIL-STD	!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!	!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!	HI-REL	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DEVICE TYPE	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER FAILED	FAILURE RATE IN FITS	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Filters & Chokes	104.	Н	9.62	2016.	7	.992
Coils & Inductors	744.	0	(<1.34)	1060.	н	.943
Transformers	649.	O	13.9	3037.	ო	988.
Reactors	13.	0	(<76.9)	27.	0	(<37.0)

SOURCE A NON-OPERATING DATA FOR INDUCTIVE DEVICES (MIL-STD) TABLE 7.1-3.

(<78.4)	0	12.760	874	Reactors
(<7.1) (<39.2)	00	140.364	9614 1748	Inductors General Class Toroidal
(<78.4) (<39.2)	00	12.760 25.521	874 1748	Power Signal
(<39.2) (<78.4)	00	25.521	1748	Audio
(<13.1)	0	76.562	5244	Transformers Reference
(<2.0) (<78.4) (<9.8)	000	497.656 12.760 102.083	34086 874 6992	Coils RF Toroidal IF
(<13.1)	0	76.562	5244	Filters General Class
FAILURE RATE IN FITS	NUMBER	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	DEVICE TYPE

SOURCE B NON-OPERATING DATA FOR INDUCTIVE DEVICES (HI-REL) TABLE 7.1-4.

		はつくなりませ		37 T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T
DEVICE TYPE	NUMBER DEVICES	HOURS X 10	NUMBER	RATE IN FITS
Filters General Class	145186	1907.989	7	1.05
Coils General Class	32968	433.255	H	2.31
Transformers General Class	8242	108.314	0	(<9.23
Reactors	634	8.332	0	(<120.)

SOURCE C NON-OPERATING DATA FOR INDUCTIVE DEVICES TABLE 7.1-5.

		MIL-STD	1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	HI-REL	HI-REL
DEVICE TYPE	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS	STORAGE HOURS X 10	NUMBER	FAILURE RATE IN FITS
Filters General Class Ceramic Bandpass	, ,	10	- (-3662>)	88.488	0 !	(<11.3)
Ceramic Feedthrough Transmittal	1gh .378	H 0	2645.	1 1	1 1	1 1
RC, Low Pass EMI			(<38.9)	10.044	10	-(98-6)
Chokes	.756	0	(<1323.)	9.437	0	(<106.)
Coils General Class RF	5.418	10	_ (<185.)	79.181 285.800	00	(<12.6) (<3.5)
Transformers	509.000	O	17.7	2928.309	က	(<1.0)
Inductors	i	ı	•	261.557	0	(<3.8)
Reactors	ı	ı	ę	18.8	0	(<53.2)

#### 7.2 Inductive Devices Operational Prediction Models

The MIL-HDBK-217B general failure rate model for inductive devices is:

$$\lambda_{p} = \lambda_{b} (\Pi_{E} \times \Pi_{f}) \times 10^{-6}$$

where:  $\lambda_p = device$  failure rate

 $\lambda_{h}$  = base failure rate

 $\Pi_{E} = \text{Environmental factor}$ 

 $\Pi_{f} = family type factor$ 

Specific model parameter values are given in Figure 7.2-1 for MIL-T-27 Transformers and Inductors (Audio, Power and HiPower Pulse) and MIL-C-15305 Radio Frequency Coils; and in Figure 7.2-2 for MIL-T-21038 Low Power Pulse Transformers.

The base failure rate and adjustment factor values presented in the figures are based on certain assumptions. See sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 for a description of these parameters.

# 7.2.1 Base Failure Rate $(\lambda_b)$

The equation for the base failure rate,  $\lambda_h$ , is:

$$\lambda_{b} = Ae^{x} \text{ where } x = \left(\frac{T_{HS} + 273}{N_{T}}\right)^{G}$$


T<sub>HS</sub> = Hot stop temperature in degrees C, e is natural logarithm base, 2718,

A,  $N_{\rm T}$ , and G are model equation constants The determination of hot spot temperature is described in Section 7.2.3.

The model equation constants are given in Tables 7.2-1 and 7.2-3. The models are valid only if  $T_{\rm HS}$  is not above the temperature rating for a given insultation class.

Devices in accordance with the three specifications included in this section are identified by the classification scheme used in each specification. The following information will help in determining the Insultation Class, the Family Type and the Construction Grade if only the specification and type designation are known:

a. MIL-T-27. An example type designation per this specification is




The Grade and Insulation Class symbols are the same as used in Figures 7.2-1 and 7.2-2. The codes used for Family Type are

Power transformer + filter: 01 thru 09, 37, thru 41

Audio transformer: 10 thru 21, 50 thru 53

Pulse transformer: 22 thru 36, 54

b. MIL-C-15305. All parts in this specification are r.f.
 coils. An example type designation is




The codes used for the Insulation Class are

Class B: 4, 5, 6

Class 0: 7, 8, 9

Class A: 10, 11, 12

c. MIL-T-21038. All parts in this specification are pulse transformers. An example type designation is



The Insulation Class symbols are the same as used in Figures 7.2-1 and 7.2-2.

# 7.2.2 I Adjustment Factor

# 7.2.2.1 Environmental Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{\rm E}$

 ${\rm I\!I}_{\rm E}$  accounts for the influence of environmental factors other than temperature. Refer to the environment description in the Appendix.

Grade 6 transformers require adequate environmental protection through encapsulation, or sealing; otherwise, application in any of these environments is unacceptable, and values not valid.

#### TABLE 7.2-1.

# MODEL EQUATION CONSTANTS, MIL-T-27 INSULATION CLASS & MAX OPERATING TEMP. (MIL-C-15305 Class in Parenthesis)

#### Insulation Class

Constants	Q (O) 85°C	R (A) 105°C	S (B) 130°C	V* 155°C	T* 170°C	U* >170°C
A	6.37x10 <sup>-4</sup>	7.20x10 <sup>-4</sup>	6.06x10 <sup>-4</sup>	1.83x10 <sup>-3</sup>	2.03x10 <sup>-3</sup>	2.6x10 <sup>-3</sup>
N <sub>T</sub>	329	352	364	409	398	477
G	15.6	14.0	8.7	10.0	3.8	8.4

<sup>\*</sup> Temperature ratings for these "letters" are different from Table 7.2-2.

#### TABLE 7.2-2.

# MODEL EQUATION CONSTANTS, MIL-T-21038 INSULATION CLASS & MAX OPERATION TEMPERATURE

#### Insulation Class

Constants	Q 85°C	R 105°C	s 130°C	T* 155°C	U* 170°C	V* >170°C
A	6.37x10 <sup>-4</sup>	$7.20 \times 10^{-4}$	6.06x10 <sup>-4</sup>	$1.83 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.03 \times 10^{-3}$	2.6x10 <sup>-3</sup>
N <sub>T</sub>	329	352	364	409	398	477
G	15.6	14.0	8.7	10.0	3.8	8.4

<sup>\*</sup> Temperature ratings for these "letters" are different from Table 7.2-1.

FOR MIL-T-27, TRANSFORMERS AND INDUCTORS (AUDIO, POWER & HI POWER PULSE) AND MIL-C-15305, COILS, RADIO"FREQUENCY

( \_

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b}$  (  $\pi_{\rm E} \times \pi_{\rm f}$  ) x 10<sup>-6</sup>

Base	Rate	4	** (MII	(MIL-C-15305		ass	in Pare	arenthese	
(B)		k.	* D	_	<b>E</b>	2	*	*Œ	*n
30°C  155	°C 17	၂၁ ့၀	>170°C	THS	105°C	130°C	155°C	170°C	>170°C
0007 1.00	0.	026	.0026		4	.0018	.0026	.0042	.0029
0001 2000	0	026	.0026		.0068	.0021	.0027	.0044	.0030
0	19 .00	027	.0026	0	10	.0024	.0025	.0046	.0030
00.	0	027				.0029	.0031	.0043	.0031
00.	<u>•</u>	028		H			.0033	.0050	.0031
7 .00	0.	028		0		4	.0036	.0053	.0032
0	<u>.</u>	029	N	2			.0040	9500.	.0032
08   001	<u></u>	030	2	n		.0068	.0043	.0058	.0033
	<u>.</u>	030	~	135			.0049		.0034
0. 80	<u>·</u>	031	0	4				90	
09   002	<u>·</u>	032		4			.0063	9	.0036
09 .002	•	033	05	S			.0074		
.002	?	034	.0027	S			.0088	.0076	.0039
.002	•	035	.0028	9				æ	.0041
.002	•	980	.0028						.0042
0012  .0022	0	037	.0028	170				.0091	.0045
.002	0	038	.0028	1					.0047
0014  .002	4 1.00	040	.0028	180					.0050
0016 .002	5 .0	041	.0029						.0053
fo	r the	ese	"letter	3 = 0	re dif	lifferent	from	Figure	7.
o Ab for	a gir	ven	Tue and	Cla	ss, de	evice i	s over	H	•

Hr (Family Type Factor)

Family Type	Upper	Mil-Spec	Lower
Pulse Transformers	1.0	1.5	5.0
Audio Transformers	1.5	3.0	7.5
Power Transformers and Filters	4.0	8.0	20.0
RF Transformers and Coils	6.0	12.0	30.0

IE (Environment Factor)

nd, B nd, Flii nd, F nd, M orne, orne,	Environment	$\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$
Flight, Fixed, Mobile ne, Inhab.	, Beni	τ
Fixed Mobile ne, Inhab. ne, Uninhab.	light	7
orne, Mobile brne, Inhab. l brne, Uninhab. ile, Launch		~
orne, Inhab.  orne, Uninhab. ile. Launch	, Mobi	ო
L brne, Uninhab, ile, Launch	Η,	2
orne, Uninhab.	Naval	Ŋ
ile.	rne,	7
	Missile, Launch	10

STREET CONTROL OF THE STREET O

7.2-2 MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE TATE MODEL FOR MIL-T-21038, TRANSFORMERS, PULSE, LOW POWER FIGURE 7.2-2

 $^{\lambda}_{\rm p} = ^{\lambda}_{\rm b}$  (  $^{\rm II}_{\rm E}$  X  $^{\rm II}_{\rm f}$  ) X  $^{\rm 10}^{-6}$ 

λ<sub>h</sub> (Base Failure Rate for MIL-T-21038) \*\*

ŗ		7																			T-	
	×1 70°		03	033	03	.0031	003	003	003	003	003	003	003	003	004	004	04	004	005	005	17	י מיו
	170°C		004	004	004	005	005	05	05	900	900	900	007	007	08	œ	60				gure 7	er-
(0COT)	155°C	002	02	02	03	.0033	03	03	04	04	05	90	~	800							rom Fi	iso
7 7	130°C	8	02	02	02	.0035	04	05	90												fent f	devic
101	105°C	00	.0068	10											•				***************************************		diffe	lass
	TES	95	C	0	Н	115	3	2	က	S.	4	4	S	Ŋ	9	9	7	7	$\infty$	œ	ಗ ≖-	3
*/\	>170°C	026	N	02	02	. 1026	02	02	02	02	02	07	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	2	4	
*11	170°C	02	2	02	02	.0028	02	02	03	03	00	03	03	3	03	03	03	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$	04	0	these "	for a g
٩ *	155°C	01	0	01	0	.0019	0	0	0	Ü5	02	02	02	02	2	02	02	02	02	02	for	hown
S.	130°C	10	00	0	00	.0007	00	0	00	00	00	00	00	.0010	07	0	Н	0	.0014	01	atin	ر م
ď	105°C	00	0	00	00	.0008	00	00	00	00	00	01	0	Н	01	0	01	02	02	003	tur	ø
0	85°C	0	00	00	00	8000	00	00	00	01	0	0	0	07	02	04	07	2	26		zədwə,	f ther
	$^{\mathrm{T}}_{\mathrm{HS}}$	0	വ	20	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	20	55.	09	65	70	75	80	82	0	<u>.</u> -*	H-**

IIF (Family Type Factor)

Family Type	$x$ edd $\Omega$	Mil-Spec	Lower
Pulse Transformers	1.0	1.5	5.0
Audio Transformers	1.5	•	
Power Transformers and Filters	4.0	•	
RF Transformers and Coils	0.9	12.0	

 $\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$  (Environment Factor)

A. Company of the Com		
Ell V & Colline III C	E,	
round, Benign		
ght	П	
Ground, Fixed	2	
£ .	က	
Airborne, Inhab.	2	
Val	2	
Airborne, Uninhab.	7	
Missile, Launch	10	

#### 7.2.3 Hot Spot Temperature

The failure rate,  $\lambda_{\rm p}$ , of the inductive device is a function of the hot spot temperature of the inductive device. This hot spot temperature can be obtained by direct measurement or by approximation. Although the latter method is normally used, there may be times when the direct measurement technique would be advisable.

# 7.2.3.1 Determination of Hot Spot Temperature - Direct Measurement

a) Average Temperature Rise, Change in Resistance Method as described in MIL-T-27 (4.8.14) or MIL-T-21038 (4.7.14)

$$\Delta T = \frac{R-r}{r} \quad (t + 234.5) - (T-t)$$

where

AT = Temperature rise in degrees Centigrade above specified maximum ambient temperature

R = resistance of winding in ohms at temperature  $(T + \Delta T)$ 

r = resistance of winding in ohms at temperature
 (t)

t = specified initial ambient temperature in degrees Centigrade

T = maximum ambient temperature in degrees Centigrade (at time of power shutof;); T shall not differ from t by more than 5°C.

For transformers, rated voltage shall be applied to the primary with the specified loads across the secondaries. For inductors, rated d-c and a-c, current shall be applied to the windings.

# b) Hot Spot Temperature Rise

Approximate value by assuming temperature-rise of hot spot is 10 percent greater than highest average temperature-rise as measured or as estimated by approximate methods. See para. 7.2.3.2.

Actual measurement requires burying of thermocouples or thermistors in coils; hence is not feasible to measure on complete part. However, for developmental devices, this step should be seriously considered where temperature is significant.

# 7.2.3.2 Determination of Hot Spot Temperature - Approximation


Approximation of the hot spot temperature can be determined by referring to Figures 7.2-3 through 7.2-6. which gives the average temperature rise. Use the figure which best correlates to the known input data. If Figure 7.2-4 is used to determine the temperature, use of a MIL-T-20138 transformer, case AF will give the most practical result. The hot spot temperature is then calculated as follows:

 $T_{HS} = T_A + 1.1$  ( T)  $T_{HS} = \text{Hot spot temperature (C°)}$   $T_A = \text{ambient temperature (C°)}$   $\Delta T = \text{temperature rise (C°)}$ 

When using Figures 7.2-3 through 7.2-6, it is advisable to follow the order of precedence established via Table 7.2-3.


TABLE 7.2-3 ESTIMATE OF AVERAGE TEMPERATURE-RISE\*

Reference	Input Data	To Calculate Approximate Average Temperature-Rise**	Comment
Figure 7.2-3 (Step 1A)	Power loss (watts) Radiating surface area of case (sq in.)	Enter graph with radiating area on ordinate, locate intersection with appropriate line for power loss and read temperature-rise on abscissa;	Radiating area readings include heat losses due to both radiation and convection. This method preferred for MIL-T-21038.&
Figure 7.2-4 (Step 1B)	Power loss (watts) Case symbol per MIL-T-27	Enter graph with case symbol on ordinate; locate intersection with appropriate line for power loss and read temperature-rise on abscissa.	Cise symbols represent standard case sizes.
Figure 7.2-5 (Step 1C)	Power loss (watts) Transformer weight (lb)	Enter graph with weight on abscissa; locate intersections with appropriate line for power and loss and read temperature-rise on ordinate.	This calculation is possible because of actual relationship between size and weight of conventional transformers.
Figure 7.2-6 (Step 1D)	Power input (watts) Transformer weight (1b) Assumed 80 percent efficiency	Enter graph with weight on abscissa; locate inter-section with appropriate line for power input and read probable temperature-rise on ordinate.	Note error possibility in efficiency assumption; use Figure 7.2-3, and 7.2-6 preferably.
**Graphs gradiation it is pro	Température = Ambie measured coil tempe ive predicted temper n from other compone eferable to measure power loss or input	r Temperature plus 1,1 e). rise in still air and if forced air cooling o former temperature undermal use frequency.	times average temperature in absence of nearby heat or heat radiction is used, or operating conditions,



AVERAGE TEMPERATURE-RISE (°C) AT

FIGURE 7.2-3. POWER LOSS AND RADIATING AREA KNOWN: ESTIMATE AVERAGE TEMPERATURE-RISE (Step 1A)



AVERAGE TEMPERATURE-RISE (°C), AT

FIGURE 7.2-4. POWER LOSS AND CASE SYMBOL KNOWN: ESTIMATE AVERAGE TEMPERATURE-RISE (Step 1B)




FIGURE 7.2-5. POWER LOSS AND WEIGHT KNOWN: ESTIMATE AVERAGE TEMPERATURE-RISE (Step 1C)




FIGURE 7.2-6. POWER INPUT AND WEIGHT KNOWN: ESTIMATE AVERAGE TEMPERATURE-RISE (Based on 80 PERCENT EFFICIENCY) (Step 1D)

### 7.3 Operational/Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparisons

Table 7.3-1 summarizes the operational to non-operational failure rate ratios. Operational failure rates were computed using the models in Section 7.2 with the following assumptions.

- a) For coils a hot spot temperature of 20°C was assumed.
- b) For transformers insulation class "Q" and a temperature rise of 20°C were assumed.

The missile launch to ground, fixed operating ratio was obtained directly from MIL-HDBK-217B

TABLE 7.3-1. INDUCTIVE DEVICES OPERATING AND NON-OPERATING FACTORS

MISSILE LAUNCH TO G.FOPER- ATING RATIO	ນ ທ ທ	ស	ហេដ	n
G.EOPERATING TO NON-OPERATING RATIO	10 7 10	1.3	1.5	* • T
GROUND, FIXED, OPERATING FAILURE RATE x 10-9	0.0 4.0	12.8	19.2	7.2.
NON-OPERATING FAILURE RATE X 10-9	o. e. e. o. 4. e	9.6	٠. ١	13.9
DEVICE CATEGORY DIODES	Hi-Rel Filters Coils Transformers	Filters	Coils	17 and 10 the 10

nato una escontistica instituta propinsionale presentativa del

### 8.0 Crystals

This section contains reliability information and analysis on crystals. Available information did not specify crystal material, therefore the failure rate must be considered only under the general classification of crystals.

#### 8.1 Storage Reliability Analysis

# 8.1.1 Non-Operational Failure Rate

The non-operational failure rate for crystals was estimated at 44 failures per billion hours.

#### 8.1.2 Non-Operational Failure Data

Forty five million storage hours of crystals with two failures were reported.

# 8.2 Operational Failure Rate Information

The operational failure rate for quartz crystals is listed in MIL-HDBK-217B as 0.2 failures per million hours.

# 8.3 Operational/Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparison

Operational to non-operational failure rate ratio for crystals is 5 based on the above failure rates.

### 9.0 Batteries

This section contains reliability information on batteries. Missile batteries are usually one shot devices. However, being chemically activated devices, batteries are susceptible to degradation after lon priods of storage. The available information did not permit evaluation of aging characteristics.

## 9.1 Storage Reliability Analysis

### 9.1.1 Failure Modes and Mechanisms

The principal failure modes and mechanisms and corrective measures for nickel-cadmium batteries are summarized in Table 9.1-1.

### 9.1.2 Guidelines for Long Life Assurance

### 9.1.2.1 Design Guidelines

- a) Design excess capacity into the battery to reduce the percent depth of discharge and compensate for capacity decrease with usage. The penalty is cost and watt-hours/pound;
- b) The negative to positive plate area should be at least 1.5:1 so that the negative plate area can absorb the oxygen generated during recharging, preventing battery overpressure;
- c) Use non-woven polyproplene separators since they degrade slower than nylon at higher temperatures. The non-woven configuration wets more readily;
- d) Hermetically seal the battery to avoid degradation of other parts by the electrolyte;
- e) Either plate the terminal seal braze with nickel or consider using a nickel-titanium braze material to reduce the probability of electrolyte attacking materials containing copper;
- f) Use 304 or 304L stainless steel for case and cover material. These materials have proven satisfactory;
- g) Use ceramic to metal terminal seals that are more KOH resistant than glass.

## 9.1.2.2 Process Control Guidelines

a) Employ clean areas during processing and manufacturing to reduce the amount of harmful contaminants. Also, use clean

lintfree cotton gloves when handling components. Store components in clean plastic bags when not being processed;

- b) Employ clean processes, remove the carbonates and keep the nitrates content down to prevent gas pockets that pop off active material;
- c) Flush plates after KOH is used in the process to form active hydroxides to remove carbonates;
- d) Flush and brush plates prior to installation to remove contaminants;
- e) Coin plates flat. Flex and clean plates prior to assembly. Have resident inspector examine plates for conformity just prior to cell assembly. These actions will reduce the probability of short by either projection of jagged wire filament through the separator or loose particles of plate material or sometimes tab failures:
- f) Weigh each plate to be certain weights are within ±3 1/2% of mean. Also, perform actual capacitance measurements to check plate matching. Mismatched cells can prevent full battery charge.
- g) Control the brazing temperature-time relationship to prevent excess dwell during brazing operations that can cause active material penetration of ceramic seals;
- h) Avoid rapid cocling after brazing to prevent cracked ceramics and brazing voids.
- i) Purge cells of air prior to injecting electrolyte to prevent KOH reacting with CO<sub>2</sub> to form carbonates;
- j) Place plates under serialized control and provide traceability for separators and electrolyte material to improve the quality of individual cells which has varied more than desired;
- k) Require process and test controls for each active element -plates, separators and electrolyte to reduce end product variability.

### 9.1.2.3 Test Guidelines

a) Helium leak check the assembled cells. Option-chemical leak check with phenolphthalein;

- b) Subject battery during acceptance test to a minimum of three charge/discharge cycles, high impedance short test, and leakage tests. These tests should provide assurance that the basic operating characteristics and construction are satisfactory;
  - c) X-ray along three axes to find gross battery defects;
- d) Conduct a minimum of 30 charge/discharge cycles on assembled cells to eliminate infant mortality and to confirm these tests.

# 9.1.2.4 Application Guidelines

- a) Maintain battery within a -20°C to +22°C temperature range to retard separator deterioration;
- b) Store Ni-Cd batteries discharged, shorted and about 0°C to obtain a storage life of about five years.

# 9.1.3 Non-Operational Failure Rate Data

A total of .2 million storage hours without a single failure were reported. Since no failures occurred and the specifics of the stored batteries were not available it was impossible to assess the aging characteristics.

Based on this information, the failure rate of batteries is less than 5000 failures per billion hours.

TABLE 9.1-1. FAILURE MECHANISM ANALYSIS - NICKEL CADMIUM BATTERIES

Part and Function	Tailure Mode	Effect on Battery Output	Rel. Rank	Failure Mechanisms	How to Eliminate/Minimize Failure Mode
A. Plates (Contain charge)	Loss of active material	Lessens capa- city available	2	1. Permanent passivation 2. Shedding 3. Redistribution or migra- zion of Cd	1. Operate within 0 to 22°C range. 2. Use proper plate geometry for greater heat dissipation. 3. Don't overcharge excessively. 4. Employ clean processes, remove nitrates and keep carbonate content down to prevent gas pockets from forming underneath that pops off material. 5. Provide excess of cadmium oxide. 6. Start with battery with ercess capacity, penalties permitting.
	Short	Lower capacity Lowers voltage High tempera- tures		1. Plate tabs broken, burned or shortened against cace or other plate 2. Plate buckling 3. Projections of jagged wire filaments penetrates separators. 4. Loose particles of plate material or metallic particales introduced during processing. 5. Machanical environments.	1. Don't weld tabs on - make part of substrate. Use wider tabs. Option: coin plates -> receive welded tab. 2. Coin plates including all four edges, smooth. 3. X-ray for misalignment determination. 4. Employ clean processes and materials. Flex and brush off plates just prior to assembly.
	Plate mis- matches	Capacity decreased		<ol> <li>Active material applied uneven or wt. out of tolerance.</li> </ol>	1. Require wt. of plates to be within ±3½ of that required.
	Невогу	Capacity avail- able limited.		Temporary passivation.     Depressed operating voltage	1. Completely discharge, short, and recharge to wipe out most of memory.
	Contam- inates	Lower Voltage & current		Carbonate contaminates in plates.	1. Brush and flush plates prior to sealing cells.
B. Separators (separate, insulate, absorb, and con- ducts)		Capacity decrease	1	Separator deterioration including dissolved, burned, pinpoint penetration, and impregnated with negative plate material.	<ol> <li>Limit operating temp. range of battery to 0 to 22°C; 0°C pranferred.</li> <li>Use alkali resistant material such as polyproplene or nylon.</li> <li>Strict material and process controls.</li> <li>Perform insulation resistance tests on material.</li> </ol>
	Concam- inates	Lower voltage & current		Material deteriorates, carbonater formed.	Use polyproplene for long-life applications.     Low battery temps (0°C) retards deterioration.

<sup>\*</sup> Extracted directly from Reference 1.

TABLE 9.1-1. FAILURE MECHANISM ANALYSIS-NICKEL CADMIUM BATTERIES (cont'd)

	t and ution	Failure Mode	Effect on Battery Output	Rel.	1	How to Eliminate/Minimize Failure Hode
		Poor KOR absorp- tion and distri- bution	Higher temper- atures. Lower capacity over charging. High voltage on charge and low voltage on dis- charge	1.	Improper material and reave configuration.	1. Don't use woven nylon.  2. No non-woven configurations except for nylon naterial.  (Polyproplems more difficult to wet them nylon.)
Commissions and it may be experienced and the second of th	Case (Contain and sup- port)	Leak/ burst	Lower capacity, eventually be- coming am open circuit.	3	1. Oxygen overpressure due to overcharging. 2. Seal or weld leakage or failure. 3. KOH-case material not compatible. 4. Under designed structure	1. Employ high pressure relief valve/ burst disc for manned mission.  2. Limit overcharge, especially above 80% full charge (third electrode, cooloneter, voltage limit, thermistor, stabistor or 2-step regulator).  3. Proper ratio of negative to positive plate capacity.  4. Proper quantity of electrolyte- just enough to wet plates and separator.  5. Leak test assembled cell.  6. Proper process control. Weld per HIL-W-8611A. Passivate per HIL-F-14072, finish 300.  7. Use 304L, cond. A per QQS - 766 or equiv.  8. Ceramic-to-matal seal preformed. Suggest stress relieving design such as a "floating" seal. Con- sider redundant sealing surfaces.
		Post to cell cover short	loss of capa- city, heating		Ceramic failure     Electro-metallic bridging     across ceramic	l. Hinimize quantity of braze used with attention given to its elimination on interior side.
Э.	Electro-	Freeze	No output.	5	1. Low temperatures.	1. Keep storage temp. abovo - 48°C.
	2,00	Contami- nate			2. Carbonate's nitrate contrminates	<ol> <li>Light carbonate and nitrate concentrations to 0.01 gm/liter and 1 mg/liter or less respectively.</li> <li>Don't expose to air as KOH has infinity for CO<sub>2</sub>.</li> </ol>
Ξ.	Internal Electri- cal con- nections (Conduct current)	Open	Partial or com- plate loss of capacity, vol- tage.	4	<ol> <li>dechanical breakage of cell terminals, plate lugs or welded joints.</li> </ol>	Strict QG.     Avoid overly severe dynamic stresses during usage.

## 9.2 Operational Failure Rate Data

Operational data collected consisted of three different battery types as shown in Table 9.2-1.

TABLE 9.2-1. BATTERY OPERATIONAL FAILURE DATA

BATTERY	NO. OF FAIL.	OPERATING HRS.	$\lambda \times 10^{-6}$
A	2	60	33333
В	6	1580	5084
C	9	29750	302

The wide discrepancies in failure rates suggest different battery types and applications. Unfortunately the detailed information to verify this is not available. By pooling all the information in Table 9.2-1, the average failure rate is 542 failures per million hours.

#### Reference:

MCR-72-169, Volume 3, Long Life Assurance Study for Manned Spacecraft Long Life Hardware, K. W. Burrows, Martin Marietta Corp., dated September 1972.

# 10.0 Connections and Connectors

## 10.1 Storage Reliability Analysis

The available data on storage failure rate of electrical connections and connectors is shown in Table 10.1-1.

The average failure rate for the data in Table 10.1-1 is 0.13 fit, but all of the failures occur in one classification. Statistical analysis shows that the classification containing the failures is wildly discordant: the expected number of failures for 11603 hours is 1.486 and the probability of seeing even as many as 10 failures in this number of hours is less than 0.00001. Unfortunately, this classification is not further identified, and except for the submarine data, it is not clear to what it could be compared.

The line of data containing the 17 failures gives a worst case failure rate of 1.46 fit. Pooling the remaining data gives a gest case failure rate of .0080 (one failure assumed).

Combining the three sets of data referring to pins gives a total of 80,071.4 million hours with no failures, which gives 90% confidence that the true failure rate lies below 0.028 fit.

Combining the three sets of data referring to soldered connections gives a total of 35,385 million hours with no failures, which gives 90% confidence that the true failure rate lies below 0.065 fit.

STORAGE FAILURE DATA FOR ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS TABLE 10.1-1.

Comment	Soldered	Stud and nut	20 pin, gold plated	Soldered	Welded	Pins	General	Submarine, general	Pins	Soldered	
Hours (million)	169.	24.5	163.	316.	5580.	47.4	11603.	6.3	79861.	34900.	136.115
Failures	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	17
Source	A	Ą	R	Ø	Ø	щ	ပ	ပ	ပ	Ų	
Failure rate (fit	1	į	i	ı	į	i	1.5	1	•	i	

# 10.2 Connector and Connection Operational Prediction Models

### 10.2.1 Connectors

The MIL-HDBK-217B general failure rate model for a mating pair of connectors is:

$$\lambda_p = [\lambda_b (\Pi_E \times \Pi_p) + N\lambda_{cyc}] \times 10^{-6}$$

where:  $\lambda_{p} = device failure rate$ 

 $\lambda_{h}$  = base failure rate

 $II_E = Environmental Adjustment Factor$ 

 $\Pi_{D}$  = Pin Quantity Adjustment Factor

N = Number of active pins

 $\lambda_{\text{cyc}} = \text{Cycling Rate Factor}$ 

The base failure rate and adjustment factor values presented in Figure 10.2-1 are based on certain assumptions. See Sections 10.2.1 and 10.2.2 for a description of these parameters.

# 10.2.1.1 Base Failure Rate $(\lambda_b)$

The equation for the base failure rate  $\lambda_h$  is:

$$\lambda_b = A e^{x}$$
where  $x = \left(\frac{T + 273}{N_T}\right)^G + \left(\frac{T + 273}{T_G}\right)^P$ 

e = 2.718, natural logarithm base

T = cperating temperature (°C).

= ambient + temp. rise (See Table 10.2-4).

A,  $T_{O}$ ,  $N_{T}$ , G and P are model constants (See Table 10.2-3).

MIL-HDBK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR CONNECTORS FIGURE 10.2-1

1 x 10-6 + Ny cycl (di x Eu) ا ن Ħ ζ۵

Material

Insert

(၁)

Rate)

Failure

(Base

Factor)

Rate

λ<sub>cyc</sub> (Cycling

γαχι

41

SYC

\*4

15 (24) 12 (36) 16 (16) 19 (19) Quality 10(10) 16 (16) 30 (30) 20 (20) 0 Factor) \* Lower for -SPEC aH 10 (10) 46688  $\Pi_{\overline{E}}$  (Environmental in Parenthesis ന ത 4 connectors Airborne, Inhabited Naval, Unsheltered Airborne, Uninhab. Naval, Sheltered Missile, Launch Ground, Mobile Environment Ground, Benign Ground, Fixed Space Flight coaxial -Values

.060 .038 .1258 .158 .200 .324 .323

.007 .009 .012

0012

005

.065 .0095 .116 .139 .170

.019

0032

0027

10 20 20 40 40 40 40 90

ALL THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPER

0182

260 280 280 280 390 320

.0222 .0222 .0271 .0331

.00013 .00015 .00016 .00020 .00027 .00030

Contacts) Active 410 number for (Factor .0603

.0045

.0737 .0815

430 440 450

.0360

.6067

.0546

.0447 .0494

.0404

.0900.

.0074

.1215

.0100

460 470 480

.0090

.1343

484

221000 221000 221000 221000 78.47 83.47 88.72 94.23 53.12 56.83 60.74 64.85 73.70 43.08 .47 A ≓ 185 170 180 155 160 165 19 23.10 27.13 27.28 29.56 31.98 34.53 cont 14.60 16.10 17.69 10.39 21.19 α ≓ tive 65 70 75 80 80 80 90 90 100 110 125 ac 6.46 7.42 8.42 9.50 3.572 9 4 118 120 130 130 130 130 \* Z 00. H 2645978904764

es/1000hrs

cycl

Ste

types of insert material, the two insert types rates for two two base failure nses connectors the of the average of if a mating pair \*For Ab,

100 110

.046

.058

.030

0044 0900 072

089 111

.0070 .0082 .0095

120

139 175 221

0130

130 140 150 160 170

281

.0180

.0254

.0394

.0549 .0682

.0447

.0367

TABLE 10.2-1. CONFIGURATION, APPLICABLE SPECIFICATION, AND INSERT MATERIAL FOR CONNECTORS

Configuration	Specification	In	sert Ma Table		-
		Ā	В	С	D
Rack and Panel	MIL-C-28748 MIL-C-83733 MIL-C-24308	Х	X X X		
Printed Wiring Board	MIL-C-21097 MIL-C-55302		X X		
Cable, Circular	MIL-C-5015 MIL-C-26482 MIL-C-38999 MIL-C-81511 MIL-C-83723	x x	х х х х		X X
Power Coaxial, RF	MIL-C-3767 MIL-C-3607 MIL-C-3643 MIL-C-3650 MIL-C-3655 MIL-C-25516 MIL-C-39012			X X X X X	х

TABLE 10.2-2. TEMPERATURE RANGES OF INSERT MATERIALS

Туре	Common Insert Materials	Temperature Range, °C *
A	Vitreous Glass, Alumina Ceramic, Polyimide	-55 to 250
В	Diallyl Phthalate, Melamine, Fluorosilicone, Silicone Rubber, Polysulfone, Epoxy Resin	-55 to 200
С	Polytetrafluoroethylene (Teflon) Chlorotrifluoroethylene (Kel-F)	-55 to 125
D	Polyamide (Nylon), Polychloroprene (Neoprene), Polyethylene	-55 to 125

<sup>\*</sup> These temperature ranges indicate maximum capability of the insert material alone. Connectors using these materials generally have a reduced temperature range caused by other considerations of connector design. See applicable connector specification for connector operating temperature range.

TABLE 10.2-3. MODEL CONSTANTS

Constants	Insert Material (see tables 10.2-1 and 10.2-2)					
	A	В	С	D		
A	0.324	6.9	3.06	12.3		
T <sub>O</sub>	473	423	373	358		
$ exttt{N}_{ exttt{T}}$	-1592	-2073.6	-1298	-1528.8		
G	-1	-1	-1	-1		
P	5.36	4.66	4.25	4.72		

TABLE 10.2-4. INSERT TEMPERATURE RISE (°C) vs. CONTACT CURRENT & CONTACT SIZE

CONTACT SIZE

AMPERES PER CONTACT	22 Ga.	20 Ga.	16 Ga.	12 Ga.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 25 30 35 40	3.7 7.7 13. 20. 27. 36. 46. 58. 70.	2.4 5.0 8.5 13. 18. 24. 30. 37. 45. 95.	1.0 2.2 3.7 5.5 7.7 10. 13. 16. 20. 41. 70.	0.4 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.8 3.7 4.8 5.9 7.2 15. 25. 38. 53. 71. 91.

NOTE: 1:  $\Delta T = .989(i)^{1.85}$  for 22 gauge.

 $\Delta T = .64(i)^{1.85}$  for 20 gauge.  $\Delta T = .274(i)^{1.85}$  for 16 gauge.

 $\Delta T = 0.1(i)$  1.85 for 12 gauge.

Δ T = °C insert temperature rise.

i = amperes per contact

NOTE 2: The operating temperature of the connector is usually assumed to be the sum of the ambient temperature surrounding the connector plus the temperature rise generated in the contact. If the connector is mounted on a suitable heat sink (not or cold plate), the temperature of this sink is usually taken as the ambient. For those circuit design conditions which generate a contact hot spot, this hot-spot temperature rise is added to the ambient to obtain the operating temperature.)

## 10.2.1.2 Adjustment Factors

# 10.2.1.2.1 Environmental Adjustment Factor, $\Pi_{E}$

 $II_E$  accounts for the influence of environmental factors other than temperature. Refer to the environment description in the Appendix.

# 10.2.1.2.2 Pin Quantity Adjustment Factor, $I_p$

 $\pi_{p}$  accounts for the quantity of contacts. For coaxial and triaxial connectors, etc., the shield contact is counted as an active pin.

$$\pi_{p} = e \quad \left(\frac{N-1}{N_{O}}\right)^{q}$$
where
$$N_{O} = 10$$

$$q = 0.51064$$

$$N = Number of active pins$$

# 10.2.1.2.3 Cycling Rate Factor, $\lambda_{\text{cyc}}$

 $\lambda_{\text{cyc}}$  adjusts the model for cycling rates. The term is ignored for connectors experiencing cycling rates < 40 cycles/1000 hr.

The values for  $\lambda_{\rm cyc}$  are derived from the following equation:  $\lambda_{\rm cyc} = .001 \, {\rm e}^{\, (f/100)}$ 

where f is the cycling rate in cycles/1000 hrs.

## 10.2.2 Connections

The MIL-HDRK-217B failure rate predictions for solder, crimp, weld and wire wrap connections are presented in Figure 10.2-2. Comparable rates from LC-76-EM5 are shown in Figure 10.2-3, The rates shown are the best statistically significant.

FIGURE 10.2-2. CONNECTIONS OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE PREDICTIONS

Connections	<sup>l</sup> p (10 <sup>-6</sup> /hr.)
Solder, reflow lap to P.C. boards	0.00012
Solder, wave to P.C. boards	0.00044
Other hand solder connections (e.g., wire to terminal board)	J.0044
Crimp	0.0073
Weld	0.002
Wirewrap	0.0000037

FIGURE 10.2-3. BEST CONNECTIONS FAILURE RATES FROM LC-76-EM5

Connections	λ <sub>p</sub> -6/hr.)
Solder	0.00134
Weld	0.00171
Wrap	0.0000103
Crimp	0.0162

10.3 Operational/Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparisons

Using the model in Section 10.2, the operational failure rate is estimated at .09 failures per million hours under the following assumptions.

- a) Configuration and insert material-printed wiring board
- b) Operating temperature 30°C
- c) Number of pins 20
- d) Operating environment ground fixed
- e) Cycles less than 40 cycles per 1000 hours.

The 90% confirence level for pin connectors in Section 10.1 was .028 fit. The operational to non-operational failure rate ratio is 3.2.

### 11.0 Printed Wiring Boards

### 11.1 Storage Reliability Analysis

### 11.1.1 Failure Mechanisms

Printed circuits have a dominant failure mechanism which imposes a definite limitation on life. It is caused by the difference in the thermal coefficient of expansion of the substrate and the plated copper. The copper yields to accommodate temperature changes, but eventually a fatigue failure causes an open circuit, usually in one of the plated thru holes. Use of very pure copper and control of the cross section help to extend the life.

Research results show that over 200 cycles from -65° to 110°C are obtainable, 50 cycles on a test coupon of 80 or more holes is recommended as a screening test.

### 11.1.2 Non-Operational Failure Rate

Non-operational failure rate of printed wiring boards is estimated at .83 failures per billion hours.

### 11.1.3 Non-operational Data

Non-operational data collected consisted of 1210 million hours with one failure reported. Storage conditions are unknown.

# 11.2 Printed Wiring Boards Operational Prediction Model

The MIL-HDBK-217B failure rate model for MIL-P-55110 Printed Wiring Boards and MIL-P-55640 Multilayer (Plated-Through-Hole) Printed Wiring Boards is

$$\lambda_p = \lambda_b N \pi_E \times 10^{-6}$$

where:  $\lambda_p$  = board failure rate

 $\lambda_{b}^{-}$  = base failure rate

N = number of plated-through holes

 $\Pi_{E}$  = Environmental Adjustment Factor

The above model is applicable only to high quality boards that have received screening and burn-in and that use G-10 or equivalent epoxy materials.

Figure 11.2-1 gives the specific values for the model. See the Appendix for a description of the environments.

MIL-HDEK-217B OPERATIONAL FAILURE RATE MODEL FOR PRINTED WIRING BOARDS FIGURE 11.2-1

1 ,

 $\lambda_{\rm p} = \lambda_{\rm b} \text{NII}_{\rm E} \times 10^{-6}$ 

λ<sub>b</sub> (Base Failure Rate)

Туре		~	
Two-Sided Boards	9	×	10_0
Multi-layer Boards	ស	×	10-4

 $\Pi_{\mathbf{E}}$ (Environmental Factor)

Environment
Benign
Flight
Fixed
Sheltered
Mobile
, Inhabited
Unsheltered
, Uninhab.
Launch

A CARLO CONTRACTOR OF THE CONT

N = Number of Plated Through Holes.

# 11.3 Operational/Non-Operational Failure Rate Comparison

Using the model in Section 11.2, the operational failure rate of a multilayer board with 100 holes in a ground environment is 100 failures per billion hours. The operational to non-operational failure rate ratio is 120.

# 11.4 Conclusions and Recommendations

Fatigue failure due to thermal cycling is the dominant failure mechanism. A coupon is taken from the printed circuit board to use in verifying the quality of the plated thru holes.

Constant temperature storage would be ideal. Lacking that, it is desirable to limit both the frequency and amplitude of the temperature excursions.

Some studies on matching the expansion coefficients have been made.

In application of printed circuit boards, cracking of solder joints is also a problem. The problem is more severe if encapsulating or potting are used. The principle design process for alleviating this problem is stress relief.

### APPENDIX

### ENVIRONMENTAL DESCRIPTION

ENVIRONMENTAL DESCRIPTION		
Nominal Environmental Conditions		
Nearly zero environmental stress with optimum engineering operation and maintenance.		
Earth orbital. Approaches Ground, Benign conditions without access for maintenance. Vehicle neither under powered flight nor in atmospheric reentry.		
Conditions less than ideal to include installation in permanent racks with adequate cooling air, maintenance by military personnel and possible installation in unheated buildings.		
Conditions more severe than those for Ground, Fixed, mostly for vibration and shock. Cooling air supply may also be more limited, and maintenance less uniform.		
Surface ship conditions similar to Ground, Fixed, subject to occasional high shock and vibration.		
Nominal surf ce shipborne conditions but with repetitive high levels of shock and vibration.		
Typical cockpit conditions without en- vironmental extremes of pressure, tem- perature, shock and vibration.		
Bomb-bay, tail, or wing installations where extreme pressure, temperature, and vibration cycling may be aggravated by contamination from oil, hydraulic fluid, and engine exhaust. Classes I and Ia equipment of MIL-E-5400 should not be used in this environment.		

Missile, Launch Severe conditions of noise, vibration, and other environments related to missile launch, and space vehicle boost into orbit, vehicle re-entry and landing by parachute. Conditions may also apply to installation near main rocket engines during launch operations.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF TH'S PAGE (Minn Data Entered)

A

	- 1 O'	READ INSTRUCTIONS
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Substile)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
STORAGE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS SUMMARY		FINAL, June 1974 to
REPORT		June 1976
VOLUME I ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES		6. PERFORMING ORG, REPORT HUMBER
		LC-76-2 Volume I
7. AUTHOR(a)		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
DENNIS F. MALIK		
·	•	DAAH01-74-C-0853
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		
		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT HUMBERS
RAYTHEON COMPANY, EQUIPMENT D 3322 S. MEMORIAL PARKWAY		
HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA 35801		
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE
HEADQUARIERS, U. S. ARMY MISSILE COMMAND		May 1976
Attention: DRSMI-QSD		13. NUMBER OF PAGES
REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA 358	09	279
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(II different		15. SECURITY CLASS. (al IMS report)
		Unclassified
		15= DECLASSIFICATION/OOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
15. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (If this Report)		

Unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the sectors entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

1% SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identity by block much v)

RELIABILITY, STORAGE, MISSILE MATER'EL, FAILURE RATES, FAILURE MUCHANISMS, OPERATION, FLECTRICAL DEVICES, ELECTRONIC DEVICES, INTEGRATED CIRCUITS, MICROELECTRONICS, SEMICONDUCTORS, TRANSISTORS, DIODES, RESISTORS, CAPACITORS, INDUCTIVE DEVICES, TRANSFORMERS,

20. ABSTRACT (Cuntinue on severae side il necessary and identify by Llock number)

This report summarizes analyses on the non-operating reliability of missile electrica! and electronic devices. The analyses are part of a research program being conducted by the U.S. Army Missile Command, Redstene Arsenal, Alabama. The objective of the program is the development of non-operating (storage) reliability prediction and assurance techniques for missile material. Included are analyses of Integrated Circuits, Semiconductors, Vacuum Tubes, Resistors, Capacitors, Inductive Devices, Crystals, Batteries,

19. Key Words (continued)

COILS, FILTERS, CHOKES, INDUCTORS, VACUUM TUBES, PRINTED WIRING BOARDS, CONNECTORS, CONNECTIONS, CRYSTALS.

20. ABSTRACT (continued)

connections, Connectors and Printed Wiring Boards.